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ABSTRACT—There is wide agreement among conservation activists and scientists alike 
that loss and alteration of habitat are the leading threats to biodiversity in America. 
Suburbs and exurbs, though, are only beginning to acknowledge that they are the 
problem in the struggle to stem the tide of “sprawl” and other economic processes 
producing ecosystem-wide habitat degradation today.  A recent resurgence in academic 
and activist attention to local governments in America is reconsidering them as viable 
solutions to this problem. But most of this dialogue is being based upon a mistaken 
conception of local governance.  Much of the legal scholarship on local 
environmentalism has ignored the reality of our localism and its role in the creation of 
the ever-expanding built landscape in America. This paper argues that this lack of 
realism in the current debate about local environmental law renders it blind to the 
vices of local governments and some of their sham conservation measures, but also to 
their counterintuitive virtues and possibilities for real conservation progress.  Local 
government’s deep connection to private property entrepreneurialism is what has 
made it so practically powerful in resisting so many state and federal environmental 
initiatives.  But it may well be this dimension of our localism that renders it uniquely 
fit to the tasks of real habitat protection and restoration in the twenty-first century.  
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2I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal framework governing the protection of habitat in America is not aging 
well.  Three and four decades ago, when statutes like the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Wilderness Act, the 
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act, and others were enacted, they were heralded as the synthesis of a 
national conservation system for America’s remaining wild places and wildlife.1 Today, 
it is becoming clear how woefully inadequate these laws are to the tasks of modern 
conservation—especially when it comes to habitat—in the vast and ever-expanding built 
landscapes of suburban America.  These statutes rely too heavily on public ownership 
and the ameliorative powers of judicial review (and the rationality) of administrative 
agencies.2 Their “science-only” requirements, originally seen as action-forcing,3 have 
been so enforceable that there is but one agency choice in federal habitat law today which 
is immune from legal attack by aggrieved stakeholders: delay.4
In short, these laws have made federal habitat conservation too costly and careful 
and therefore too exceptional.  The agencies charged under federal law with the 
 
1 See generally Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALABAMA L. REV. 416 (2005) 
(hereinafter “Colburn, Indignity”). 
2 See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1.  Judicial review is the lynchpin of the administrative process and has been 
throughout the modern era of environmental and natural resources law.  Compare LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965) (“The very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to 
proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found 
in the statutes at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the “common law,” and the ultimate 
guarantees associated with the Constitution.”) with Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989) (“The administrative state became 
constitutionally tenable because the Court’s vision of separation of powers evolved from the simple (but constraining) 
proposition that divided powers must not be commingled, to the more flexible (but far more complicated) proposition 
that power may be transferred so long as it will be adequately controlled.”). 
3 See THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 97-99 (1980); DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1164-68 (2002). 
4 In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004), the Court held that the Bureau of Land 
Management’s refusal to implement any policy at all to control off-road vehicle usage of a “wilderness study area” was 
not “agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore not subject to judicial 
review as such.  In Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998), the Court held that a Forest Service 
land management plan was nonjusticiable as long as it, itself “create[s] no legal rights or obligations.”  Id. at 733. 
3protection and restoration of plant and wildlife populations are to a fault too rational, too 
deliberative, too sequential in operation, and too focused on putting various tracts of 
public lands on protective pedestals.   
 Biodiversity conservation turns on protecting habitat: much more, it turns out, than 
has usually been admitted.5 Yet, increasingly, the analytical and legal burdens of 
protecting habitat under the rigors of the scientific method, together with the political 
realities of strategic action, budgetary scarcities, and the geography of public lands, are 
conspiring to make the federal law of habitat protection an incomplete means to its own 
ends.6 Today’s opponents of the ESA can devise no better way of further hobbling it 
than to subject all its major decisions to mandatory peer review.7 Not surprisingly, across 
a wide spectrum of such laws, agencies’ “finalization” of their habitat rules, policies, and 
plans has become their reward: the end to one conflict and the chance to tackle some 
other trouble they have been handed.8
5 One quantitative study evaluating 222 conservation targets suggested that the average percentages of area 
recommended for biology-based targets were nearly three times as much as those recommended in politically-driven 
proposals.  See Leona K. Svancara et al., Policy-driven versus Evidence-Based Conservation: A Review of Political 
Targets and Biological Needs, 55 BIOSCIENCE 989 (2005). 
6 Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 97 (1997) (“Our current approach to 
biodiversity conservation—an approach generally of inaction, except for panicked, last-ditch, costs-be-damned efforts 
to save individual species once they have reached the brink of extinction—may prove to be the most costly of all.”); 
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy,
75 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029, 1152 (1997) (hereinafter Doremus, “Listing Decisions”) (“[T]he impossible legislative demand 
that ESA listing determinations rest solely on scientific information has produced a number of undesirable effects.  It 
has encouraged the agencies to conceal the true bases for their decisions; led them to ignore several of the values 
Congress intended to protect through the ESA; caused them to miss significant opportunities to educate and inform the 
general public; made their decisions appear deceptively certain and objective; and ultimately undermined both political 
support for the protection of dwindling species and the credibility of science as a foundation for policy decisions.”) A. 
Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a “Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2004) (“The Corps has not attracted much attention from administrative law scholars, but 
it is a classic example of the increasing futility of our insistence on hyper-rationality to control administrative 
discretion.”).   
7 See J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 853 
(2005); POMBO BILL SYNOPSIS. 
8 See generally Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1.  Most wildlife and conservation biologists agree that “adaptive 
management” as a set of tenets embracing (1) institutional- and norm-flexibility throughout implementation, and (2) 
“feedback loop” learning through the continuous monitoring of implementation, is essential to successful ecosystem 
management.  Yet mandatory peer review is not necessarily helpful to such ends and indeed may even be positively 
inconsistent with them.  See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (Crawford S. Holling ed., 
1978); Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION 
4A fixation on species already facing oblivion to the exclusion of the rest of the 
ecosystem has long been the basis of a consensus criticizing the ESA’s very structure.9
Yet American culture’s fascination with nature’s “wild,” “untrammeled,” “pristine,”10 
rare, and imperiled, seems impervious to such criticism—even while humanity’s total 
domination of earth’s ecosystems becomes undeniable.11 “The special attracts our 
attention far more readily than the ordinary.  We need focal points.  Esthetic appeal, 
symbolism, and rarity all provide such focal points.”12 Tragically, though, too many 
species and places’ appeal are not special enough to our national political and 
administrative actors.13 And too little capital is marshaled at the federal level to manage 
all of the threats to viable populations even of those it does so identify.14 
The federal system is even more fundamentally unfit to the public end of protecting 
habitat, though, for it has a structural bias against habitat as a land use priority. The faults 
 
BIOLOGY 48 (1997); John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from a River? Managing Uncertainty in Species 
Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 760-62 (1999).   
9 See Craig R. Groves, Candidate and Sensitive Species Programs: Lessons for Cost-Effective Conservation, in 
ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS 227 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 
1994); Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Age of Mass 
Extinctions, 22 WM. & MARY ENV. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 278-83 (1997); Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, supra 
note 6, at 20; Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: 
Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45 (2002);  
10 See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev’d ed. 1973) (1967); DANIEL B. BOTKIN, NO MAN’S
GARDEN: THOREAU AND NEW VISION FOR CIVILIZATION AND NATURE (2001); William Cronon, The Trouble with 
Wilderness, Or Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 69 
(William Cronon ed., 1995) (hereinafter “UNCOMMON GROUND”). 
11 See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text. 
12 Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 344 (2002) 
(hereinafter Doremus, “Saving the Ordinary”); see also Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under 
the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333 (2002) (hereinafter Klein, “Monumental Landscapes”) (arguing similar 
thesis about the longevity and successes of the Antiquities Act’s notion of monument preservation).  Even from an 
expert’s perspective, “indicator species” that supposedly serve as surrogate measures of ecosystem health—artificially 
finite and imperfect as they necessarily are—have been indispensable to most agency habitat programs.  See Sandy J. 
Andelman & William F. Fagan, Umbrellas and Flagships: Efficient Conservation Surrogates or Expensive Mistakes?,
97 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 5954 (2000). 
13 See generally JOHN TERBORGH, REQUIEM FOR NATURE (1999).  There is a smaller scale at which such losses can be 
measured, though, and it is paradoxically at this smaller scale that losses of the sort may be more powerful politically.  
See ROBERT MICHAEL PYLE, THE THUNDER TREE: LESSONS FROM AN URBAN WILDLAND 145 (1993) (describing an 
“extinction of experience” wherein the loss of locally significant wildlife “endangers our experience of nature” because 
a “species becomes extinct without our own radius of reach”). 
14 TERBORGH, supra note 13, at 187-208. 
5of “multiple use” statutes such as the National Forest Management Act are well known.15 
Yet this bias is most evident in the many federal laws equating the protection of scenery 
with the protection of habitat. The two are very different.16 Whether it is a 
“wilderness,”17 a “wild and scenic river,”18 wildlife “refuge,”19 or even a “roadless 
area”20 as the particular, legally protected enclave, the national commitment to saving 
plant and wildlife habitat has skewed pronouncedly in the direction of the aesthetically 
 
15 See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of “Multiple 
Use, Sustained Yield” for Public Land Management, 53 COLO. L. REV. 229 (1981). 
16 Our highly synthetic concepts of “wild,” “natural,” and “pristine,” after all, are often in direct tension with the sort of 
land management techniques (such as prescribed burns, exotic species removal, etc.) that are increasingly necessary to 
the support of extant biodiversity.  See TERBORGH, supra note 13, at 102-20.  An aside is appropriate here on the 
intermingling of the regulation of aquatic habitat with “habitat” more generally, especially in connection with the 
problems of sprawl. See, e.g., GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 3, at 399-410.  In fact, watershed-based land use 
controls are becoming increasingly popular with local governments.  See Chester L. Arnold Jr. & C. James Gibbons, 
Impervious Surface Coverage: The Emergence of a Key Environmental Indicator, 62 J. AMER. PLAN. ASS’N 243 
(1996).  Nonetheless, I count aquatic habitat issues as importantly different from those surrounding the protection of 
terrestrial wildlife and its habitat needs—due largely to the relevant legal structures.  While local governments 
necessarily must constitute a large part of the solution to aquatic habitat loss and degradation, see Robert W. Adler, The 
Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL.
L. 29, 54-75 (2003) (hereinafter Adler, “Lost Books”), the Clean Water Act as currently structured dictates very 
different federal and state roles in that future from those for terrestrial habitat issues. Cf. Environmental Defense 
Center, Inc. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the roles of EPA, the states, and municipalities in the 
management of impervious surface growth under the Clean Water Act and finding that EPA’s role must be primary).  
Thus, this article is confined to considerations of terrestrial habitat and the needs of organisms over and above those 
associated with aquatic ecosystems. 
17 The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136, established a system of wilderness preserves comprised of 
areas designated by act of Congress.  These areas are defined “in contrast with those areas where man and his own 
works dominate the landscape,” as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where 
man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”  16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
18 The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1284, created a system for designating and protecting 
(the minority of) rivers left in America that have not be significantly altered by means of channelization, damming, 
diverting, armoring, etc.
19 The National Wildlife Refuge System, drawn together from a legally and politically fragmented history predating the 
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee, today consists of about 550 
individuated refuges administered according to disparate policies and priorities.  The Act was overhauled in 1997 in the 
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252, placing the Fish and Wildlife 
Service under a new duty to prioritize wildlife habitat throughout the system and to establish long range management 
plans for each refuge, but only to the extent consistent with the individual establishment acts creating the particular 
refuges.  See ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A CONSERVATION SYSTEM 
THROUGH LAW 163 (2003). 
20 On January 12, 2001 (after the 2000 election but before the change of administrations), the Forest Service 
promulgated what it called the Roadless Area Conservation Rule pursuant to the authority granted it in the Organic Act 
of 1897, NFMA, and the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960.  See U.S. Forest Service, Notice of Final 
Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,244, 3,252 (2001). The rulemaking consisted of a system-wide inventory of remote lands 
with few or no access roads and was purportedly intended to protect “roadless area values.”  The inventory was 
ultimately comprised of 58.5 million acres (almost 2% of the nation’s land), although a common attack mounted to the 
finalized rule highlighted the fact that no definitive maps of these areas were created specifying their boundaries.  See, 
e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp.2d 1231, 1244-46 (D. Idaho 2001).  The Service estimated that, 
of the 58.5 million acres, only about 24 million were located within “prescriptions” (plans, regulations, statutory 
controls, etc.) already prohibiting road construction.  See U.S. Forest Service, Background Paper on Proposed Rule to 
Replace the Roadless Area Conservation Rule with a State Petitioning Process for Inventoried Roadless Area 
Management (July 2004), available at http://roadless.fs.fed.us/documents (copy on file with author). 
6exceptional.21 For the last 40 years, while we have struggled through ferocious political 
conflicts to place a lot of public lands on highly prescriptive legal pedestals, we still find 
too many of our native plant and wildlife populations declining.22 Indeed, the restrictive 
administration of public lands for their scenic values arguably amounts to a majority of 
American conservation policy in the Twentieth century, notwithstanding that policy’s 
vast departures from one based in biology.23 
Absent revolutionary reforms, the concentration of effort upon our various kinds of 
public lands will be of diminishing utility at best to actually sustaining extant flora and 
fauna populations over the medium- and long-term.24 First of all, private control of land 
 
21 See generally NASH, supra note 10; see also Doremus, Saving the Ordinary, supra note 12;  Holly Doremus, The 
Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23 ENVIRONS ENV. L. & POL’Y J. 3 (2000); Federico Cheever, From 
Population Segregation to Species Zoning: The Evolution of Reintroduction Law Under Section 10(J) of the 
Endangered Species Act, 1 WYO. L. REV. 287 (2001); Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, supra note 10, at 88 (“The 
myth of wilderness . . . is that we can somehow leave nature untouched by our passage.  By now it should be clear that 
this for the most part is an illusion.”).   This focus on the aesthetically exceptional has been true of our species 
protection laws, too. 
The most fundamental problem with a biodiversity strategy focused on the special, the unique, or the extraordinary 
is that it inevitably defines the objects of our concern as something sharply apart from our everyday experiences 
and our ordinary world.  It allows, even encourages us to put nature out of sight and out of mind except during 
those rare moments when we specifically choose to seek it out. . . . [W]e are drawn to ever greater separation 
through a strategy of nature zoning, dividing the world into human and natural sectors, with very little overlap. 
Doremus, Saving the Ordinary, supra note 12, at 340; REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE’S
LEGACY: PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY 27 (1994) (describing state species protection laws as focused on 
“vertebrate groups popular with the public”).  
22 See generally Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1.   
23 This is perhaps the deepest legacy of Progressive conservation. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE 
GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959).  It has been palpable in the 
eleven western states and Alaska.  See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).  At the same time these enclaves of public land have been “preserved” they have 
often been wholly unmanaged and have, consequently, actually degraded as habitat.  See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 
1, at 33 n.156.  The lack of an effective political constituency for active and adaptive habitat management has 
diminished agency effectiveness even where conservation has been the objective. See J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the 
Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 403 (2002) (“Whereas [those who view nature as resource] and preservationists 
have battled to “lock in” positions through fixed rules and standards and preserve every inch of incremental ground 
gained, an adaptive management framework is more experimentalist, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination, 
performance standards setting, outcome monitoring, and standard recalibration.  This brand of adaptive management 
has evolved well beyond an idea . . . [and into] the only practical way to implement ecosystem management.”). 
24 First and foremost, federal lands are overwhelmingly concentrated in particular regions, especially the Rocky 
Mountain West.  In the 26 states east of the Mississippi, for example, all federal realty combined—including national 
parks, wildlife refuges, National Forest System lands, military bases, and everything else—averages less than five 
percent of the total surface area.  See ALMANAC OF THE FIFTY STATES: BASIC DATA PROFILES WITH COMPARATIVE 
TABLES, 2003 EDITION 421 (Louise L. Hornor ed., 2003) (table). The Wilderness Act is often hailed as creating the 
most protective zoning categorization for federal realty under its umbrella.  But the National Wilderness Preservation 
System as a whole has been criticized for being oblivious both to species diversity and habitat needs, see MICHAEL J. 
BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 314 (3d ed. 1997) (“It has been said that 
“without wildlife wilderness is mere scenery.””), and in its selection of ecosystems to be protected.  See NOSS &
7is the norm across most of the nation and the politics (if not the economics) of public 
acquisitions today usually rule out all but the marginal.25 Equally problematic, though, is 
the very notion of creating biodiversity patches and thinking them ecologically sufficient.  
Quite demonstrably, they are not.26 Finally, because private property ownership in the 
American system is not limited by physical space—it is limited only by how many times 
estates in property can be further subdivided—there is no upper bound on the number of 
parties governing the spaces surrounding and separating our islands of public land.27 
Thus, as habitat becomes increasingly fragmented—beset by troubles of “inter-mixed 
ownership,” interagency-conflict, and ignorance28—integrating the various pieces of a 
 
COOPERRIDER supra note 21, at 173-74 (“[D]esignated wilderness areas do a poor job of representing ecosystem 
diversity.  Many are truly rocks and ice.”). 
25 See TERBORGH, supra note 13, at 197-208. 
26 The notion of creating immense nature “preserves” for the “wild” began in nineteenth century Progressive politics.  
See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, ‘A Rich Man’s Paradise’: Constitutional Preservation of New York State’s Adirondack 
Forest, a Centenary Consideration, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193 (1992). But the record reveals how such proclaimed 
enclaves gradually lose their species diversity, regardless of their size or managers’ acumen.  See, e.g., William D. 
Newmark, Legal and Biotic Boundaries of Western North American National Parks: A Problem of Congruence, 33 
BIO. CONSERV. 197 (1985) (describing species loss from most major national parks in the West).  Indeed, conservation 
biologists have confirmed the many ways in which preserves of all sorts are separate from the environments 
surrounding them in “legal space” only.  See T.E. Lovejoy, et al., Edge and Other effects of Isolation on Amazon Forest 
Fragments, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY, at 257 (Michael Soulé ed., 1986) 
(hereinafter “SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY”); Stuart L. Pimm, Community Stability and Structure, in SCARCITY AND 
DIVERSITY, supra, at 309; Daniel H. Janzen, The Eternal External Threat, in SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY, supra, at 286, 
287 (“Animals and plants move.  While a preserve’s boundaries may serve well enough to stop direct human 
transgressions, the boundaries per se will mean nothing to most organisms.”). 
27 See Hannoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 581-602 (2001).  The economic 
process of property subdivision has catalyzed some of the most successful “private” habitat initiatives (like land trusts 
and conservation easements) of the last forty years.  Yet the profit to be made from such subdivision and resale 
constitutes a powerful motive to forego such “altruistic” options. See, e.g., Kevin Krajik, Edge Walking on the Urban 
Fringe, CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE 29 (April-June 2005).  The conversion of space into suburban environments is not 
just a function of population growth, though, as myriad examples demonstrate.  Between 1970 and 1990, population in 
the New York metropolitan region grew by only 8% while the geography it encompassed increased by some 65%.  See 
Henry L. Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan, Healthy Land Makes Healthy Communities, in LAND USE IN AMERICA at 1, 4 
(Henry L. Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan eds., 1996).  In Los Angeles, population growth over the same period was 
45%, but expansion of the urban and suburban landscape was an eye-popping 300%.  Id.  
28 Professor Keiter has explained the problem of “inter-mixed ownership” as a condition in which the multitude of 
owners of comparatively small parcels is beset by insuperable obstacles to effective coordination to the ends of 
conservation.  See Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity Conservation and the Intermixed Ownership Problem: From Nature 
Reserves to Collaborative Processes, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 301, 323 (2002) (“With habitat being the key to species 
survival, public and private lands must be knit together into an integrated ecological entity.”).  On the similar barriers to 
interagency cooperation even among different elements of the federal and state governments, see CRAIG W. THOMAS,
BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY (2003) 
(hereinafter THOMAS, “BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES”); Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The 
Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VERMONT L. REV. 363 (1995).  
On the inherent contingency of most population viability analyses, see infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.  
8solution from the top-down is beginning to seem highly improbable.   
 Quite possibly, the “ossification” and bureaucratization of the federal habitat 
programs—conditions that are inimical to the practice of “ecosystem management”29—
are just what our political, administrative, and judicial institutions bring to conservation 
in the modern state.30 As I have argued elsewhere, the paradox is that the more serious 
we become about biodiversity protection today, the less success we are having in actually 
protecting flora and fauna populations.31 The more “sovereign” and dignified with 
statutes, bureaus, and legal procedures public conservation becomes, the less it measures 
up to what applied science has said effective conservation demands.32 
Many have proposed structural reforms and some have conjectured that it must be a 
turn toward local government.33 But the two dominant notions of localism today are 
themselves blocking the path toward a pragmatic model of local conservation.  First is the 
notion of local government as vehicle for our democratic and participatory values.34 In 
reality, this is too far from the truth about local governance in practice.  It may be that 
some particular local governmental process turns out, improbably, to be participatory, 
transparent, and just.  But localism is more typically factional, opaque, and self-dealing in 
 
29 See Gary K. Meffe et al., Ecosystem Approaches to Conservation, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 467, at 
468, 481-84 (Martha J. Groom et al. eds., 3d. ed. 2005). 
30 See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text. 
31 See generally Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1. 
32 See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.. 
33 The legal and democratic authority of the municipality has been the subject of a lively scholarly debate at least since 
Professor Gerald Frug’s seminal article, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) 
(hereinafter Frug, “City as a Legal Concept”).  But localism’s role strategically has only recently occupied 
environmentalists.  See, e.g., MARK R. DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC: Federalism and the Politics of Locally 
Unwanted Land Uses, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 283 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A Houck eds., 2005). 
34 Roderick M. Hills, Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 2009 (2000).  Hills was reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS (1999) (hereinafter FRUG, “CITYMAKING”). 
9nature.35 Much of what little consensus there is about “sprawl” and the building of 
suburbia is how undemocratic modern land use law is and will probably remain.36 
The other unrealistic picture of localism today is one billing it as the 
“devolutionary” reform of laws like those mentioned above.37 This notion is that existing 
federal regulatory authorities like those in the ESA can be devolved and put in the hands 
of state and local governments according to “cooperative” management arrangements, 
region-wide land management plans, and other legal controls.38 Such “decentralized” 
versions of the federal programs, the argument goes, are both more democratic and more 
rational as means to collective ends like the protection of biodiversity than are 
administrative agencies acting alone.39 Misplaced in most of these claims is the 
incredible power of, and ambivalence toward conservation by, our land development 
markets.40 Local land use policies, after all, have too often allowed individual localities 
 
35 A skeptical subtext in the scholarly debate about local government law over the last two decades has asked to what 
degree liberals have worn the proverbial rose-colored glasses in envisioning the local polis. See Joan C. Williams, The 
Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: the Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. 
REV. 83 (hereinafter Williams, “Constitutional Vulnerability”).  See infra notes 243 and 252 and accompanying text.  
36 See generally ROBERT FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS (2000); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism,
48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2000). 
37 Accounts promoting the devolution of federal authority in biodiversity protection include Fischman & Hall-Rivera, 
supra note 9; Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to Extinction, 33 
GEORGIA L. REV. 413 (1999); and J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws 
Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 661-671 (1995). 
38 For example, ESA § 6 permits the Secretary to engage any state with an “adequate and active program for the 
conservation of endangered and threatened species” in a cooperative agreement that essentially delegates the 
Secretary’s authority to the state.  16 U.S.C. § 1535(a)-(f).   
39 A number of avenues are available to the Departments of Interior and Commerce within the ESA to “delegate” their 
authorities to state and local officials.  See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 9, at 132-68. 
40 See John Turner & Jason Rylander, Land Use: The Forgotten Agenda, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 60 (Marian R. Chertow &  Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997). The terms “sprawl” 
and “suburb” equally characterize the many landscapes where “[l]and use is the forgotten agenda of the environmental 
movement.”  Id. at 61.  But “suburbia” no longer denotes only the near-in radial development of detached homes 
encircling the “true” cities.  It now encompasses vast and ever-expanding webs of low-density development in which 
humans and wildlife alike inhabit a semi-built landscape.  Each of its kinds of localities is equally the object of 
delegations of the police power and land use authorities analyzed below.  The technological and socioeconomic 
empowerment of landowners to live where they choose, i.e., based as much or more on environmental amenities than 
on proximity to a workplace, etc., are trends that seem likely to continue well into the foreseeable future. 
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to shift the costs of their own policies onto their neighbors.41 Their maneuvers making 
neighboring locales compete for residents, tax revenues, and amenities are supposedly 
checked somehow within the cooperative federalist model.42 
Of course, centralized objective-setting with decentralized implementation is 
conceivably a solution to such troubles.43 But trying to achieve widespread cooperation 
by top-down mandate and professionalized expertise has been an abject failure for 
biodiversity and habitat conservation in practice, as I have argued at length elsewhere and 
summarize in Part II.44 Extending federal law’s reach to local governments, either as the 
agent of decentralized expertise or as the more democratic counterpart to it, is shaping up 
to be the major mistake of the modern conservation agenda.  That argument proceeds in 
four parts.  Parts II and III argue that the two most prevalent conceptions of local 
environmentalism today are actually blocking the rise of a pragmatic localist model of 
habitat protection and must be cleared away before real progress can be made.  Part IV 
situates local governmental authority in its full context—a context set chiefly by the 
 
41 See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 36, at 9-10; cf. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, 
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 87 (1999) (“Businesses looking to find low cost 
locations benefit not only from cheaper land prices on the urban periphery, but also may be able to elicit tax benefits 
and other financial packages from municipalities eager to attract new investment and an increased tax base.”). 
42 Kris Wernstedt, Terra Firma or Terra Incognita? Western Land Use, Hazardous Waste, and the Devolution of U.S. 
Environmental Programs, 40 NAT. RES. J. 157 (2000).  Known conceptually as “cooperative federalism,” localities are 
increasingly being incorporated into this thinking through a further devolutionary step “down” and the consequent 
widening of the subsidiarity principle.  See Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1321, 
1329 (1997).  Such top-down “cooperation” is also defended as clothing legally vulnerable actors like states and 
municipalities with legally powerful regulatory authority from federal administrative agencies.  Id. at 1326-27. 
43 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 
(1996); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National Perspective) for Federal 
Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997); Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of 
Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1998).   
44 See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1; cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem 
Management: Perspectives from American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 745, 747 (1997) (hereinafter 
Rodriguez, “Legal Innovation”) (“It is a commonplace to say that all layers of government—federal, state, and local—
ought to pitch in to tackle interconnected environmental problems. . . . Beyond the theory lies the reality.”).  Craig 
Thomas, in a careful empirical study of interagency cooperation—what he called the “philosopher’s stone” of habitat 
protection and restoration—found that cooperation depended most clearly of all on “the breadth of discretion given to 
staff and lower-level line managers to make decisions for and contribute resources on behalf of their agencies.”  
THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES, supra note 28, at 
 273.  Unfortunately, that is a management approach agencies traditionally have lacked any incentive to take.  See 
Frances Westley, Governing Design: The Management of Social Systems and Ecosystems Management, in BARRIERS 
AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS at 391 (Lance Gunderson et al. eds., 1995). 
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“Federalist” structure of our Constitution, modern mass markets, and the legal status of 
local priorities in the administrative state.  Finally, Part V considers the prospects for 
suburban local governance as an agent of ecosystemic habitat protection and restoration.  
Part V suggests that local governments possess several counterintuitive virtues that make 
them adaptive, capable of learning from others’ mistakes, and, in their own self-interest, 
highly mobilized and agile all at once.   
 
II. INSTITUTIONS AND ECOSYSTEMS: A COMING AGE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?
Twenty years ago it was path-breaking work that suggested humans and human-
caused disturbance dominate earth’s ecosystems.45 Today, in environmental studies of all 
kinds human-dominated ecosystems, as well as the information deficits about them with 
which we must cope if we hope to preserve what we value in these ecosystems, are the 
presumption.46 Deprived of the goal of restoring nature’s mythical “balance,” in short, 
the real challenge is to move from a general “ecological objective” to ones that can be 
 
45 See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 
(20th Anniversary edition, 2003) (1983). 
46 See, e.g., Steven R. Palumbi, Humans as the World’s Greatest Evolutionary Force, 293 SCIENCE 1786 (2001) 
(describing the massive effects of human-induced climate and habitat disturbances and the ways in which wildlife 
species are adapting thereto); Mark Lorenzo, Sizing Up Sprawl, 9 WILD EARTH 72 (1999) (proposing a method of 
assessing and valuing “ecosystem services” in order to empower advocates of wildlands protection relative to economic 
analysts); William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALABAMA L. REV.
537, 538-47 (2004) (arguing that the proper metric for assessing the Clean Water Act is on its record of managing 
human impact on aquatic ecosystems and on that metric the act has had extremely limited success); Michael E. Soulé, 
What is Conservation Biology? 35 BIOSCIENCE 727, 733 (1985) (“Conservation biology and the conservation 
movement cannot reverse history and return the biosphere to its prelapsarian majesty.  The momentum of the human 
population explosion, entrenched political and economic behavior, and withering technologies are propelling 
humankind in the opposite direction.  It is, however, within our capacity to modify significantly the rate at which biotic 
diversity is destroyed, and small changes in rates can produce large effects over long periods of time.”); see also 
DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).  
While more than 700 extinctions have been documented since 1600, RICHARD PRIMACK, ESSENTIALS OF 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 166 (2002), most ecological systems display significant time lags between causes and 
observable effects.   Moreover, whatever the cause, many extinctions simply go unobserved.  See D. Tilman et al.,
Habitat Destruction and the Extinction Debt, 371 NATURE 65 (1994);  Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp.2d 
1154 (D. Or. 2001) (acknowledging the difficulty of verifying that a “distinct population segment” of coho salmon 
species is dwindling in size given the inherent difficulties of detection, measurement, and analysis).  A descriptive 
ecology of human-driven habitat disturbance at broad scales is being sketched today.  See, e.g., RICHARD T.T. FORMAN,
LAND MOSAICS: THE ECOLOGY OF LANDSCAPES AND REGIONS (1995) (hereinafter FORMAN, “LAND MOSAICS”). 
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achieved with actual institutions and possible rules of law.  This is a doubly tall order 
given the instabilities in most ecosystems and our finite capacity to perceive them.47 
Preservation of biodiversity is just such an ecological objective:48 the preservation of all 
extant species, subspecies, and populations as a public purpose is at once too immense 
and too indefinite.49 Moreover, amidst the constantly shifting equilibriums of human-
caused disturbances, it is clear just how hard it would be to preserve every extant 
population of every species in a world of so many people taking so much from the 
ecosystems they inhabit.50 As a result, other, more discrete goals within that wider 
matrix are coming into being.  And as this Part explains, the twenty-first-century struggle 
to protect biodiversity has become a struggle over what different human communities 
value in nature as much as it is one about regulatory technique. 
 
A. Ecosystemic Habitat Protection and Restoration: Pragmatic and Unbounded 
 
47 Mark T. Imperial, Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework, 24 J. ENV. MGMNT. 449 (1999); NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23; CARL WALTERS,
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (2001); PRIMACK, supra note 46.  The history of ecosystemic 
thinking, though, has been a history of attempts to isolate sources of “stochasticity”—unpredictableness—the better to 
predict biophysical outcomes.  However, that overarching goal is one with which modern ecologists have grown 
increasingly disenchanted, see FRANK BENJAMIN GOLLEY, A HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY 200-05 
(1993), especially as the practice of modern ecology reveals nature’s disorderliness and unpredictablitity.  See DONALD 
C. WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 400-33 (2d ed. 1994). 
48 The overall importance of plant and animal diversity and the magnitude of its institutional challenges is analyzed in 
NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23; see also PRIMACK, supra note 46, at 85-157.  
49 It is too indefinite because of how little we know about what constitutes a “species” and too immense because of how 
much of the biotic world is perishing in our hands.  Cf. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 152-57 (1992) 
(noting the inherent arbitrariness of biology’s hierarchical classification of organisms);  Doremus, Listing Decisions, 
supra note 6, at 1087-95 (noting how the choices that inhere in biology’s taxonomic-structural organization of genetic 
and organism diversity become problematic in the legal processes of listing endangered species pursuant to the 
Endangered Species Act); see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
50 Compare Barton H. Thomson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1127 (1999) (describing the deference of the federal government to private land owners and quoting one 
conservation professional as saying that “[t]he trend is to consider the need of the landowner.  Because when you force 
it down their throats it usually backfires.  People will find a way around it.”) with BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 
278 (“In the last twenty years, we have moved from viewing ecosystems as stable, closed, and internally regulated, to a 
new picture of more open systems in constant flux, usually without long-term stability, and affected by a series of 
human and other stochastic factors.  Resource conservation and ecosystem change consequently are characterized by 
uncertainty.”). 
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Conservation practitioners today have reluctantly turned their attention to saving 
the assemblages of plant and animal species humanity has made.51 The interconnections 
of native, introduced, stressed, and over-abundant flora and fauna populations (and what 
must be done to ensure the long-term viability of as many as possible) have driven the 
practice of conservation research for over two decades.52 Observed dynamism, both in 
society and nature,53 has forced the further, deeply pragmatic questions of actual 
implementation, i.e., how to protect a particular population against chance environmental 
and genetic threats.54 Having to answer such questions—having to conjecture on the size 
and range of a “viable population”55—has rendered this practice pragmatic in two related 
 
51 PRIMACK, supra note 46, at 547-637; Georgina M. Mace et al., Assessment and Management of Species at Risk, in 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT DECADE 11 (Michael Soulé & Gordon H. Orians, eds. 
2001) (hereinafter “RESEARCH PRIORITIES”).  The localism inherent in such a biological/ecological methodology was 
noted over two decades ago.  See Soulé, What is Conservation Biology?, supra note 47, at 728-29 (noting the uniquely 
immediate scales of conservation biology as compared to other branches of biological science).  
52 The demography of a particular wildlife population and its environment frame the practice of “population viability 
analysis” for conservation biologists.  Viability of any population is finite in a long enough timeframe because, in 
theory, every living population eventually goes extinct.  See Gary E. Belovsky, Extinction Models and Mammalian 
Persistence, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION 35 (Michael Soulé ed. 1987) (hereinafter “VIABLE 
POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION”).  Many conservation biologists have grown wary of forecasting what does or does 
not constitute some “minimum viable population,” though, because of how such information has been misused in the 
past, either to reduce a population significantly as long as it is not below the hypothesized minimum or to ignore the 
plight of a stressed population because it is already too far gone.  See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 313.  For 
purposes of simplicity, thus, I focus exclusively on the general notion of viability. 
53 Hugh P. Possingham et al., Making Smart Conservation Decisions, in RESEARCH PRIORITIES, supra note 52, at 225 
(identifying as the central challenge in sustaining minimum viable populations the “development of active adaptive 
management programs on real conservation problems”) Soulé, What is Conservation Biology?, supra note 47 (same). 
54 See Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Populations: Coping With Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR 
CONSERVATION supra note 52, at 69.  Many populations of widely dispersed species ought to be protected for their 
significance within their local ecosystems.  See, e.g., John Terborgh et al., The Role of Top Carnivores in Regulating 
Terrestrial Ecosystems, in CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION: SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF REGIONAL RESERVE NETWORKS 
39,  (Michael E. Soulé & John Terborgh eds., 1999) (hereinafter “CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION”)(“[W]idespread 
elimination of top predators from terrestrial ecosystems the world over has disrupted the feedback process through 
which predators and prey mutually regulate each other’s numbers.”). 
55 Natural population distributions in theory create “metapopulations”: sets of populations {n} comprised of individual 
subpopulations {p1, p2, p3. . .} linked together through the potential for interbreeding and genetic exchange.  A 
metapopulation’s pooled genetic resources represent a much better survival potential over the long term because of 
genotypic and phenotypic variations and a wider distribution’s capacity to insure against environmental threats to 
distinct subpopulations. See Shaffer, supra note 54, at 69, 71.  Particular subpopulations can, thus, be measured in their 
persistence in a single locale against the larger distribution of like populations {p + n} and thus be compared as finite in 
two ways: temporally and spatially.  Id. at 81 (arguing that discussions of “preservation” without a definite timeframe 
and definite probability of survival in mind are pointless).  Nonetheless, this also implies that extirpation of individual 
subpopulations like p can have broad-scale implications for the metapopulation.  Thus, the utility of the metapopulation 
concept likely turns on the scales being assessed.  See S. Harrison, Metapopulations and Conservation, in LARGE 
SCALE ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, at 111, 112-27 (P.J. Edwards et al. eds., 1993). 
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senses: (1) it must routinely reconstruct itself as implementation reveals new information 
and new perspectives, and (2) it must make use of provisional findings of fact.56 
Conservation biologists have found that habitat conversion and fragmentation 
constitute the major obstacle to sustaining biodiversity today.57 Any regulatory response 
must adapt to fit this problem.  Yet, “[w]ith the exception of public parks and [similar] 
state and federal lands,” the “American land ethic has been thoroughly private in 
nature.”58 The prerogative that comes from real property ownership in our legal system 
has meant hyper-fragmentation, forcing conservation practitioners to focus on the 
achievement of potential connectivity of one extant habitat patch to the next.59 Indeed, 
 
56 This conception of pragmatism is taken from Pierce, Dewey, James and other turn-of-the-century philosophers. See 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); 
ROBERT WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 293-318 (1991) (describing Dewey’s pragmatic 
theory of democracy and its ultimate reliance upon a localist conception of politics committed to the long-term benefits 
of experimentation with means and ends) (hereinafter, WESTBROOK, “DEWEY AND DEMOCRACY”);  SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO 
& ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 14-16 (2003); Quite 
similarly, in a work of tremendous synthesis over a decade ago, Professor Kai Lee hypothesized that such pragmatism 
should be incorporated into the writing of rules and regulations such that their authoritativeness would depend upon 
their organizational problem-solving capacities as such. See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING 
SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1993) (“A strategy for using bounded rationality to learn rapidly is 
deliberate experimentation, which isolates part of complex reality, makes simple changes in it, and watches for results. 
. . . Because human understanding of nature is imperfect, human interactions with nature should be experimental.”) 
(emphasis added).  Lee is one of several ecologists and organizational theorists who helped assemble a methodological 
approach to ecosystems now known widely as “adaptive management.”  It is a philosophically pragmatic method 
predicated upon both the structure of biological knowledge and the organizational and management realities of 
administration in the modern state.  See generally Westley, Governing Design, supra note 44.  
57 There is wide, long-standing agreement among conservation biologists that habitat degradation and fragmentation are 
the leading threats to extant wildlife populations.  See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981); Brian A. Wilcox & D.G. Murphy, 
Conservation Strategy: The Effects of Fragmentation on Extinction, 125 AMER. NATURALIST 879 (1985); Edward O. 
Wilson, The Biological Diversity Crisis, 35 BIOSCIENCE 700 (1985); NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23; David S. 
Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607 (1998); Michael 
Soulé & John Terborgh, The Policy and Science of Regional Conservation, in CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION, supra note 
54, at 1, 12 (“Connectivity . . . is a sine qua non for conservation.  Originally nature was connected on the scale of 
continents . . . .”);  TERBORGH, supra note 13. 
58 WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 55 (2000). 
59 See generally J. Michael Scott et al., The Issue of Scale in Selecting and Designing Biological Reserves, in 
CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION, supra note 54, at 19; Andy Dobson et al., Corridors: Reconnecting Fragmented 
Landscapes, in CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION, supra note 55, at 129; NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 129-77; 
DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR’S SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 41-47 (1999); REED 
F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT 73-110 (1997); FORMAN, LAND MOSAICS, supra note 46; ANDREW F. BENNETT, LINKAGES IN THE LANDSCAPE: THE 
ROLE OF CORRIDORS AND CONNECTIVITY IN WILDLIFE CONSERVATION (2d ed. 2003). Connections between populations 
augment the survival prospects of all by combining the available genetic resources.  See supra notes 55-58 and 
accompanying text; Gary E. Belovsky, Extinction Models and Mammalian Persistence, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR 
CONSERVATION supra note 52, at 35. Michael E. Gilpin & Michael E. Soulé, Minimum Viable Populations: The 
15
the connectivity preserved or restored between patches has probably become the 
barometer of long-term viability for most flora and fauna populations and thus the single 
most powerful metric of conservation progress and performance.60 
But which populations ought to command scarce resources?  The goal is the 
potential for connectivity, after all, because so little is known about what constitutes 
actual connectivity for most species.61 Even our expert federal agencies have proven 
unable to discern the uniquely rational answers to such questions,62 to say nothing of the 
fact that they have neither the jurisdiction nor the human or budgetary capital to ensure 
 
Processes of Species Extinctions, in SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 13, 28-34 (“[A] minimum viable 
population is not one which can simply maintain itself under average conditions, but one which is of sufficient size to 
endure the calamities of these various perturbations and do so within its particular biogeographic context.”).  
60 See generally ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
LANDS (2003); FISCHMAN, supra note 19; NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23; THOMAS, supra note 28; Richard J. 
Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 98-131 (1994); 
Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, supra note 6.  
61 Soulé & Terborgh, The Policy and Science of Regional Conservation, supra note 58, at 12 (“Rarely will haphazard 
reassembly of habitat patches restore an ecologically viable landscape. . . .  The goal is to reverse the terrible 
consequences of fragmentation at the habitat and landscape scale—to restore the effective exchange of individuals and 
materials among sites for genetic maintenance, for demographic stability, for migration, and for the sake of other 
ecological processes.”).  Connectivity in this sense has two dimensions, one structural and one behavioral.  Structural 
connectivity is the totality of environmental features that permit or encourage emigration/immigration and the 
consequent exchange of individuals between distinct populations.  A recent report of the World Conservation Union 
(“IUCN”) stressed the importance to policymakers of bifurcating the analysis of potential connectivity into these two 
distinct components.  See BENNETT, supra note 59, at 7-10.  Whereas structural connectivity “is determined by the 
spatial arrangement of habitats in the landscape” and “is influenced by factors such as the continuity of suitable habitat, 
the extent and length of gaps, the distance to be traversed, and the presence of alternative pathways or network 
properties,” behavioral connectivity relates to the responses of wildlife to disturbed environments, or “the scale at 
which a species perceives and moves within the environment, its habitat requirements . . . [and] the life stage and 
timing of dispersal movements.”  Id. at 9.  Because of the behavioral component, “even though living in the same 
landscape, species with contrasting behavioural responses (to habitat disturbance for example) will experience differing 
levels of connectivity.”  Id.   
62 Kendi F. Davies et al., Habitat Fragmentation: Consequences, Management, and Future Research Priorities, in 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT DECADE, 81 (Michael E. Soulé & Gordon H. Orians 
eds., 2001).  “Science cannot tell us whether a group of organisms has value to society, or what risk of extinction 
society should tolerate.  Thus, while the scientific foundations of the ESA no doubt are sound . . . [b]ecause so little is 
known about so many disappearing species, the best available scientific evidence is often highly uncertain.”  Doremus, 
Listing Decisions, supra note 6, at 1035-36.  
The administrative process has proven good at getting agencies and stakeholders alike invested in a particular 
bureaucratic equilibrium instead of leaving all decisions permanently open for revision through the constant 
involvement of the public. See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note 60, at 219-272; SHUTKIN, supra note 
58, at 189-208; CHARLES F. SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 6-8 (2000).  Tragically, that is a 
structural reality particularly incompatible with what conservation biology and pragmatism more generally tell us is 
necessary to successful implementation. See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1, at 491-93 (arguing that environmental 
impact analysis under the NEPA is beset by litigation that focuses too heavily on the rationality of some particular 
decision at a particular moment in time without considering larger troubles in implementation). 
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viability of very many populations themselves.63 They simply cannot control for the 
infinitely numerous actions of land owners today producing greater and greater 
fragmentation throughout our vast suburban and exurban “middle landscapes.”64 In 
short, for the ecological objective of preserving biodiversity (and thus habitat), the task is 
something akin to “reweaving the landscape”65 even while we lack the capital, know-
how, and legal institutions to do so.66 
63 See generally BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY, CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 154-63 (2001) (arguing that the magnitude of cumulative effects of many small 
landowners and decentralized decisions is far too pervasive for the federal government to regulate);  NOSS &
COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 334-38 (arguing that habitat conversion by development is the leading threat to wildlife 
habitat); Hal Salwasser et al., The Role of Interagency Cooperation in Managing for Viable Population, in VIABLE 
POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION supra note 52, at 159, 162-64 (describing the necessity of multi-agency coordination 
when attempting to manage grizzly bears in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem). 
64 Between the dichotomized “wild” (natural) and “urban” (cultural) landscapes lay our vast “middle landscape” of the 
two’s coexistence in our suburban and exurban nation.  I take the sense of this phrase from Nora Mitchell & Rolf 
Diamant, Stewardship and Sustainability: Lessons from the “Middle Landscape” of Vermont, in WILDERNESS COMES 
HOME: REWILDING THE NORTHEAST 213 (Christopher McGrory Klyza ed., 2001).  They defined it as a place “where 
civilization and wilderness meet.”  Id. at 216 (“This middle landscape traditionally has not received great attention 
from the conservation community.  Yet [it] provides a vital connection between remote areas of wilderness and the 
places where most people live and work.”).  Thoreau receives credit for the original notion.  See Henry David Thoreau, 
Walking, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS at 597 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1950); BOTKIN, NO MAN’S GARDEN, supra 
note 10.  Quite optimistically, Mitchell and Diamant envision a “re-wilded Vermont”—places in a rural state once 
cultivated/developed and now being reforested—as “lands where people can build a strong association to place and a 
connection to nature.”  Mitchell & Diamant, supra, at 217.  Thoreau viewed the nineteenth century forest west of 
Concord as the critical area of transition between wilderness and city, see Walking, supra, at 602, and that transitional 
zone as critical to our ideas about both—something environmental ethicists have recently emphasized.  Cf. BOTKIN, NO
MAN’S GARDEN, supra, at 250 (“A willingness to appreciate both civilization and nature leads to a [Thoreauvian] 
perspective on cities.  City environments should not be dismissed as bad places that we can only attempt to make less 
awful.  Urban life will succeed when we recognize the positive potential of urban environmental settings.  Wilderness, 
in turn, will benefit as cities are improved as human habitat.”).  Of course, as our national fascination with the natural 
and “wild” has matured in the shadow of our sprawl, Americans have begun to attach a significant cash value to the 
authentically ‘wild’ fragments still remaining.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
65 Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 28.  Importantly, there is an activist strain of localism in 
environmental politics today that will play an increasingly important role in this mission.  See generally JOHN CRONIN 
& ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS: TWO ACTIVISTS FIGHT TO RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC 
HUMAN RIGHT (1997). 
66 The growth of human settlement and cultivation across the nation, in short, is also the “insularization” of wildlife 
habitats into patches, remnant isolates of a once immense and continuous landscape, such that interbreeding and/or 
periodic colonization (or re-colonization) is, for many species, rendered effectively impossible.  Bruce A. Wilcox,  
Insular Ecology and Conservation, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 95 
(Michael Soulé ed. 1981) (hereafter “EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE”) (“One of the most profound 
developments in the application of ecology to biological conservation has been the recognition that virtually all natural 
habitats or reserves are destined to resemble islands, in that they will eventually become small isolated fragments of 
formerly much larger continuous natural habitat.”).  While “dispersal” (individuals striking out in search of new 
habitat, prey, mates, etc.) has the potential to link such isolates into a unitary population (metapopulation), the 
actualities of dispersal can be far short of “potential,” especially as we further fragment the landscape.  BENNETT, supra 
note 59, at 67-95; RICHARD T.T. FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY: SCIENCE AND SOLUTIONS 151-67 (2003) (hereinafter 
FORMAN ET AL., “ROAD ECOLOGY”). 
 It is striking, in this connection, how even those few bold initiatives that exist today envisioning a much 
better connected landscape for the future are so heavily dependent upon the private land economy—even in the Rocky 
Mountain West where public lands are so common.  See DAVE FOREMAN, REWILDING NORTH AMERICA: A VISION FOR 
17
 
B. Romantic Visions of Local Environmentalism? 
Localism has been pushed into this breach by a few.67 Among the heraldry of a 
new local environmental law, Professor John Nolon stands out.  Nolon produced an 
avalanche of writing about a new trend, focusing on the profusion of local land use and 
aesthetic ordinances from municipalities across the country.68 The corpus of plans, 
ordinances, and other regulatory mechanisms he and others have publicized spans an 
impressive spectrum of issues, from watershed protection,69 to invasive species control,70 
to agricultural and recreational use controls,71 to forestry practices,72 and, of course, sub-
division, aesthetic-architectural, and growth controls.73 
Yet Nolon’s descriptive work on these developments joins a broad and deep field 
of conflict over local governments as regulators.74 The “devolution” of regulatory 
 
CONSERVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).  Even there, no feasible plan can even be envisioned without significant 
cooperation from private landowners.  Id. at 188-90. 
67 See Rodriguez, supra note 45;  A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 
U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 574 (1993); SHUTKIN, supra note 58; DOWIE, supra note 34; WILLIAM B. HONACHEVSKY,
ECOLOGICALLY-BASED MUNICIPAL LAND USE PLANNING (1999).  Several others have implicitly advocated local 
environmentalism through their critiques of the federal system.  See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of 
Conservation Biology: As They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893 (1994). 
68 Much of this writing has taken the form of anthological collections of local ordinances, plans, and management 
practices.  See, e.g., JOHN R. NOLON, OPEN GROUND: EFFECTIVE LOCAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING NATURAL 
RESOURCES (2003); JOHN R. NOLON, NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).  Some of it 
has been pedagogical: Nolon recently joined as an editor of a leading land use law casebook and took the lead (one 
assumes) in the book’s addition of a chapter on local environmental law.  See MORTON GITELMAN ET AL., LAND USE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 699-824 (6th ed. 2003).  Some of it has gone in a more theoretical direction.  See, e.g., John R. 
Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 365 (2002) 
(hereinafter Nolon, “Parochialism”); see also Tarlock, supra note 68; JAMES M. MCELFISH, JR., NATURE FRIENDLY 
ORDINANCES (2004). 
69 Included here would be local regulations of wetlands, aquifer/ground water withdrawals, stormwater runoff, 
floodplain development, and slope protections. See NOLON, OPEN GROUND, supra note 69, at 193-500; see also A. Dan 
Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149 (2002)   
70 MCELFISH, supra note 68, at 129-31. 
71 MCELFISH, supra note 68; Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 389-97. 
72 See MCELFISH, supra note 68, at 184 (describing Carroll County, Maryland ordinances on surety requirements for 
logging); Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 405. 
73 See John R. Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart Growth, 35 URB. LAW. 15 (2003). 
74 See, e.g., Rachel Harvey, Labor Law: Challenges to the Living Wage Movement: Obstacles in a Path to Economic 
Justice, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL. 229 (2003); Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding 
Operations: Concerns, Limits, and Options for Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 503 (1999) (hereinafter Head, 
“CAFOs”); Michael A. Woods, The Propriety of Local Government Protections of Gays and Lesbians from 
Discriminatory Employment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515 (2003); Shelley Ross Saxer, “Down with Demon Drink!”: 
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authority and its supposed capacity to solve incorrigible problems has been a mainstay of 
environmental legal and policy debates for over a decade.75 The list of federal statutes 
constituting the fields of pollution control and natural resources law has been called the 
most ambitious and far-reaching assertion of federal regulatory authority in the 
administrative state76—and that is truly saying something.  Yet these laws split the atom 
of sovereignty between nation and state while federalism and state autonomy are not the 
 
Strategies for Resolving Liquor Outlet Overconcentration in Urban Areas, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123 (1994); 
Randall E. Kromm, Town Initiative and State Preemption in the Environmental Arena: A Massachusetts Case Study, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241 (1998); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001); 
Alexander Willscher, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption Challenges to State Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 
(2000). 
75 See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER,
SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE (2005); Denise Scheberle, Devolution, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: CHALLENGES, CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES 361 (Robert F. Durant et al eds. 2004); 
SHUTKIN, supra note 58; DEWITT JOHN, CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND 
COMMUNITIES (1994).  The debate has covered a broad cross-section of issues and a deep reconsideration of federal, 
state, and local partnering (and/or competitive) arrangements.  See, e.g., TOMAS M. KOONTZ, FEDERALISM IN THE 
FOREST: NATIONAL VERSUS STATE NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY (2002); Head, CAFOs, supra note 75; Robert W. Adler, 
Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999); 
Cymie Payne, Local Regulation of Natural Resources: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Fairness of Wetlands Permitting 
in Massachusetts, 28 ENVTL. L. 519 (1998) (hereinafter Payne, “Local Wetlands Permitting”); Daniel C. Esty, Toward 
Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1495 (1999); Kromm, supra note 75; DENISE SCHEBERLE,
FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION (1997); Wallace E. Oates, 
Thinking About Environmental Federalism, 130 RESOURCES 14 (1998); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental 
Standard-Setting: Is there a ‘Race’ and Is It ‘To the Bottom’?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997);  Barry G. Rabe, Power to 
the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S, at 31-52 (Norman J. 
Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed. 1997); Michael C. Finnegan, New York City’s Watershed Agreement: A Lesson in 
Sharing Responsibility, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 577 (1997); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and 
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. & L. & 
POL’Y REV. 23 (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE ON REG. & L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996); 
Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 28; Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical 
Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995); Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in 
Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the 
States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242 (1995); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s time for a New Look to Our 
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV.
347 (1994); Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 50 
(1993); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992) (hereinafter Revesz, “Interstate 
Competition”).  Going back even further, “environmental federalism” has been fertile intellectual ground, see, e.g.,
John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania’s Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment 
of How “Cooperative Federalism” Can Make State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 9-3 
(1986); Susan Bartlett Foote, Beyond the Politics of Federalism: An Alternative Model, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 217 (1984), 
since it was first plowed in what must constitute one of the most significant legal critiques of a generation.  See Richard 
B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National 
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (hereinafter Stewart, “Pyramids of Sacrifice?”).    
76 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 
379-80 (2005). 
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same things as localism and local autonomy.77 Probably the chief impediment for the 
latter, in fact, is the breadth and depth of state and federal preemption in America today.  
Between federal and state statutes, regulations, and guidance, local initiative in 
conservation is foreclosed to a stunning degree,78 comprising an anchor that many argue 
is stifling innovation.79 
Even more basically, though, it is virtually impossible today to give a general 
description of local governmental authority.80 The academy is just as divided as the 
bench and bar over how to view the local government as an arm of the state.  The 
seemingly general notion of “home rule” turns out, on reflection, to be a mosaic of 
 
77 Cf. United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 77, 839 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Federalism was our 
Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”); see 
generally Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 76 (describing the role judicial federalism has played in many federal 
environmental programs and predicting that the future of various federalism doctrines will only create more complexity 
and compromise).  “The very premise of much environmental regulation is that ubiquitous ecological interconnections 
require broad, if not all-encompassing, federal regulation.  This premise is contrary to that of a federal government of 
limited and enumerated powers.”  Id. at 380. 
78 Paul Weiland and others have skillfully detailed the ways in which federal and state law so dominate the fields of 
pollution control and natural resource protection. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental 
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2000) (hereinafter “Critical Analysis”); Paul S. Weiland, 
Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for Local Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 467 (1999) (hereinafter “Local Efforts”); Paul S. Weiland, Environmental Regulations and Local Government 
Institutional Capacity, 22 PUBLIC ADMIN. Q. 176 (1998); Kromm, supra note 75.  A generation ago Professor Currie 
labeled the Clean Air Act’s preemption of state and local laws curbing automobile emissions a “disgrace” for its effects 
on public health (and its Detroit-based motivations).  See David Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority 
and Federal Preemption, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1083, 1102 (1970); see also Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 75.  
Since then, the complexity of preemption in environmental law—whether as a result of stakeholder-generated 
legislation and regulation or simply the difficulty of creating rules at the federal level—has only mushroomed.  See, 
e.g., Jack W. Campbell, IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 805 (1988).  
Indeed, even where pollution control statutes expressly preserve the operation of local law, as is the case with the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, there is little security against the threat of 
regular challenges to state or local action by aggrieved stakeholders.  See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. 
Ct. 1788 (2005); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991). 
79 Even assuming a willingness on the part of state regulators, sorting out whether and to what degree devolution of 
authority is legal under the mass of pertinent laws is a mammoth task with respect to virtually any local initiative.  
Weiland, Local Efforts, supra note 78, at 497-503; cf. Town of Wendell v. Attorney General, 476 N.E.2d 585, 589-91 
(Mass. 1985) (analyzing the “particular circumstances” of a statute to determine whether the legislature evidenced a 
“preemptive intent”).  “Combined with federal preemption of environmental law, state preemption of environmental 
law places significant restrictions upon local government authorities to formulate and implement environmental 
protection laws.”  Id. at 473.  Moreover, there may be structural reasons that those seeking to avoid duplicative 
environmental controls will over-utilize the national political process in an effort to curtail diverse local regulations.  
See, e.g., Weiland, Critical Analysis, supra note 78, at 243 (“Centrally set maximum standards foreclose the possibility 
that regulated entities will have to deal with multiple legislatures, laws, agencies, and rules.”); SCHOENBROD, supra 
note 75, at 59-64, 124-43. 
80 See infra Part V. 
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starkly different traditions distributing state and local authority.81 And even backers of 
local autonomy acknowledge its parochialism82: local land use law is acknowledged by 
virtually everyone for its role in producing post-Brown racial and socioeconomic 
segregation.83 
Generally limited in their sovereign capacities,84 effectively preempted from 
regulating in many fields altogether,85 and relatively small in territory as they are,86 local 
governments are often just ignored as agents of environmental progress.  And, quite 
tellingly, our localism is viewed favorably from one theoretical perspective: the law and 
economics refrain on the personal freedom of entry/exit as optimizer of individual 
welfare.87 Prominently missing both from the “new” local environmentalism story and 
the theory of localism as vehicle of neo-classical efficiency, though, is any critical 
engagement with our localism’s “privatist” shortcomings.88 
81 See generally DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY STATE HANDBOOK (2000); Terrance Sandalow, 
The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 708-21 (1964) 
(hereinafter Sandalow, “Home Rule”); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem 
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 856 (1983) (hereinafter Rose, “Planning and Dealing”); Clayton P. Gillette, 
In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 959 (1991)   
82 Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68; see generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism, Part II–Localism and Legal 
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (hereinafter “Localism and Legal Theory”) (emphasizing the private origins 
and leanings of local governments); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism, Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (hereafter Briffault, “Structure of Local Government Law”) (same). 
83 See generally Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807 (2004). 
84 On the inherent limitations of individual local governments, see PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981). 
85 See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1999). 
86 See FRUG, CITYMAKING, supra note 34.   The territorial limitations of localities make for an objection to state-based 
environmental governance as well.  Cf. Butler & Macey, supra note 76, 35-41 (discussing the “externalities” of 
interstate pollution transport). 
87 See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); VINCENT OSTROM 
ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW 
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001) 
(hereinafter FISCHEL, “HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS”); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND POLITICS (1995) (hereinafter, FISCHEL, “REGULATORY TAKINGS”). Of course, this group is for local government for 
precisely the reasons most progressives are so skeptical of it: the “freedom” of “like-minded” wealthy people to live 
together—and thus segregate themselves from others. 
88 See infra Section IV.A. 
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Local governance is not the miniature version of federal or state governance and 
if premised upon that misunderstanding of the local public as “sovereign,” localism is 
surely an ecological bust.  Notwithstanding all the attention to private ordering, sub-
national environmental governance, and, in particular, the new local environmental law, 
thus, the legal structure of our conception of local autonomy (and, it follows, the legal 
structure of America’s ever-expanding built landscapes89) has been left out of the debate 
about devolution and democratization in modern conservation.  Part III explains how the 
defining reality of suburban and exurban local governance is private property itself. 
 
III. “OUR LOCALISM”90: PROBLEMS OF SCALE AND IDENTITY 
Collectivizing cities and suburbs into optimally scaled regional polities able to 
solve common problems like “sprawl” has been the stalled urbanist agenda for a 
 
89 “Sprawl” is a convenient label for something almost everyone is against lately.  See, e.g., DOLORES HAYDEN,
BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH, 1820-2000 (2003); MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & HUGH 
BARTLING, SUBURBAN SPRAWL: CULTURE, THEORY AND POLITICS (2003); OLIVER GILHAM & ALEX S. MACLEAN, THE 
LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE SPRAWL DEBATE (2002); ANDRE DUANEY ETAL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF 
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2001); DAVID J. RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING 
STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999) (hereinafter RUSK, “INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME”); JAMES HOWARD 
KUNTSLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MANMADE LANDSCAPES (1994); 
ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1990) (hereinafter FISHMAN, “BOURGEOIS 
UTOPIAS”); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).  But 
in the debate about its nature and causes, several good descriptive accounts of the socioeconomic environment of our 
localism have been written.  See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1992); JON C. TEAFORD,
POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE EDGE CITIES (1997) (hereinafter, TEAFORD, “POST-SUBURBIA”); see 
infra Section VI.A.   
Especially when the habitat-fragmenting effects of amenities like golf courses, ski slopes, vacation homes, 
roads, transmission lines, cell towers, and other incidents of human society are added up, housing subdivisions or big 
box retailers in themselves can be kept in proper perspective.  See Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, supra note 6, at 
70-84; NOSS ET AL., supra note 60, at 5-9.  Thus, my use of “suburb” and suburbanization ought to be understood to 
refer not just to the “bedroom community” on the radial edge of a metropolis, but also to “exurban” places like the 
“urban archipelagoes” dotting the remote forests of the West, Great Lakes, New England, and elsewhere.  See James R. 
Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the American West: A New Reservation Policy?, 31 ENV. L. 1, 1 (2001) 
(hereinafter Rasband, “Urban Archipelagoes”); Jamie Sayen, An Opportunity for Big Wilderness in the Northern 
Appalachians, in WILDERNESS COMES HOME, supra note 65, at 124, 124-27.  In this much, the East and West are 
becoming more alike.  See Rasband, Urban Archipelagoes, supra, at 12-20.  Further, and perhaps most importantly in 
the East, sprawl includes the “edge cities”—places marked by: five million square feet of leasable office space or more, 
six hundred thousand square feet of retail space or more, a history in which, thirty years ago, it was “overwhelmingly 
residential and rural in character,” and “a local perception as a single end destination for mixed use—jobs, shopping, 
and entertainment.”  GARREAU, supra, at 425.  What all of these places have in common physically are their 
automobile- (road) and energy-dependence and their low-density human occupancy. 
90 Briffault, Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82. 
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generation.91 Surprisingly, one of the causes of that stagnation has been local 
government’s internally conflicted identity within our Constitution, an identity that puts it 
somewhere between sovereign and subject.  This Part argues that these scale and identity 
problems have become synonymous with various threats to habitat in America’s built 
landscapes and, thus, to viable populations for conservation over the long term. 
 
A. A Problem of Scale 
Conventional wisdom holds that municipalities are imperfect agents of the public 
welfare in matters like habitat protection for several reasons.  First, their geography 
prevents effective regulation of most public problems because they are too small to 
“enclose” the whole problem as a sovereign.  Lacking the size to regulate effectively, the 
argument runs, local governments are poorly fit to protecting “common pool resources” 
or solving similarly broad public problems.92 Habitat conservation and restoration is no 
exception here.  Most of the time, the habitat needs of a viable population will be much 
broader than any single town, county, or other municipal unit.93 Of course, as mentioned 
 
91 See Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable Development in the United States: 
Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.26 (2003); MYRON 
ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (rev. ed. 1998); PETER CALTHORPE &
WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY 7 (2001). 
92 A “common pool resource” may be defined as any natural resource that is susceptible to overuse in a general access 
system. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-3 
(1990) (hereinafter OSTROM, “GOVERNING THE COMMONS”). Wildlife is a prototypical common pool resource as most 
first year property law students learn in reading critiques of Pierson v. Post. See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 3, at 
124-25.  
93 Such “scale” issues have usually been noted with respect to states (compared to the federal government) or particular 
land management agencies.  But the problem is much more widespread where conservation is concerned.  Cf. SABEL ET 
AL., supra note 62, at 10 (“[U]nder complex and changing conditions, problems just outside the regulated zone will 
frequently turn out to be just as significant as those within it.”);  BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 428-29 (“Rarely . 
. . have local governments undertaken to regulate land use for the purpose of conserving wildlife or related resources.  
Were they to try to do so, moreover, they would find themselves in a similar situation to that of the states with respect 
to migratory birds prior to enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: The positive efforts of one could be negated by 
the action or inaction of another.”).  Conservation biologists both in and out of government have long identified 
jurisdictional boundaries as a problem of the first magnitude.  See, e.g., NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 328-
29.  More recently, though, fragmentation has been studied as a function of the multi-agency administrative state itself. 
See THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC LANDSCAPES, supra note 28, at 67-152. 
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above, the reification of legal boundaries inhibiting necessary cooperation is just as much 
a failing of our federal habitat programs,94 but let us put that aside here.95 For if the 
knock on local government’s scale has long been the foundation of a conventional 
wisdom, that wisdom has long had its doubters.   
One consensus of Progressivism was that “spill-overs” from adjacent jurisdictions 
are simply too many and too significant to take local governance seriously for very many 
public problems like the protection of “common pool resources.”96 Following this 
theory, equally empowered local governments, in their diversity of means and ends, seem 
to contribute to each other’s own powerlessness and vulnerability.97 The critique of this 
conventional wisdom is that collectively efficient outcomes can be achieved by allowing 
the differences in priorities to be sorted by prices and property values—that is, by 
viewing local governments as vehicles for optimizing individuals.98 Now, at its deepest, 
this is a dispute about whose welfare to maximize: the individual’s or the locality’s.  And 
at that level of generality it is beyond resolution.  My claim is that, viewed pragmatically, 
 
94 See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1; Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of 
Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976); Robert Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the External 
Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1985); Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the 
Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 COLO. L. REV. 923 (1989); Robert B. Keiter, 
Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994). 
95 Regionalization of local governance in response to declines of various sorts has been the defining frame of reference 
for scholars of the field for many years.  See, e.g., FRANK I. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON 
GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 748-969 (1970).  An equal and opposite tradition venerates the boundaries of local 
governments as the provision of a “marketplace” in publicly funded goods and services, allowing citizens their choice 
of where to locate.  See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 87; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 199-202 (2003) 
(discussing empirical studies corroborating Tiebout’s hypothesis).  It is this aspect of scale that has become a growing 
part of the legal discourse of habitat protection.  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem 
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 207 (2002). 
96 Common pool resources must be protected because they are, generally speaking, “sufficiently large as to make it 
costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from [their] use.”  OSTROM.
GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 92, at 30.  Without such protections, that is, the resources themselves would be 
over-exploited and prevented from functioning optimally.  Id.  Once viewed as an unavoidable “tragedy,” collective 
action for the protection of such resources is certainly possible.  See Dagan & Heller, supra note 27, at 564-81. 
97 Some frame this as the central dilemma for cities and suburbs.  “Strengthening local autonomy from the states does 
not benefit all localities, but instead benefits those with the greatest local resources or the fewest public service needs, 
to the detriment of poorer places.”  Briffault, Localism and Legal Theory, supra note 82, at 355.    
98 See Tiebout, supra note 87, at 422 (“Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private 
market’s shopping trip.”); see also FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87.   
24
this has become a problem of scale for public ends like conservation.99 Pollution is the 
prototype but habitat is very similar.100 To put this problem simply, the geographic scale 
of local government is seen by many to be too small to do much about things ailing the 
public101 and by many others as the key to human liberty because governmental power 
itself is not necessarily the means to any legitimate end.102 Bounded municipalities, in 
 
99 The problem of scale stems in some measure from the boundaries of local governments. See Richard Briffault, The 
Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (1996) (hereafter Briffault, 
“Boundary Problem”).  
Boundaries are crucial to the interwoven set of political and economic arguments for local autonomy by 
helping to make local governments appropriate settings for political participation, for organizing the efficient 
provision of public goods and services, and for community self-government. . . . Yet, boundaries can also be 
the Achilles’ heel of local government law, subverting local autonomy even as they support its values.  The 
problem of local government boundaries nicely mirrors a central dilemma of local autonomy: the absence of 
any obvious metric for determining what constitutes a proper unit for the exercise of local autonomy.   
Id. at 1121.  The permeability of local legal boundaries complicates the effort of any municipality within a metropolitan 
region to, for example, provide adequate police services.  Id. at 1123-44.  Their relative permanence and the human 
tendencies to reify such boundaries present other types of problems as in, for example, the case of public school 
financing.  States have also been rejected on variants of this idea. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as modern 
environmental law was born, states were often characterized as being locked in a “race-to-the-bottom” for the most lax 
environmental controls given how incomplete their authorities and territories were and how likely it was that they 
would face competition for corporate taxpayers from neighboring states. Even then, though, some recognized the 
shakiness of the evidence for such conclusions.  See, e.g., Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 76, at 1226-29.  
Moreover, since then, the balance of scholarly opinion on states’ scale problems has shifted significantly.  See, e.g.,
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 
(2001) (propounding a public choice analysis of state autonomy and arguing that the prior theories gave insufficient 
attention to the incentives states have to regulate pollution stringently); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).  
100 As the description of potential connectivity above argued, preserving and maintaining a landscape that facilitates 
species dispersal probably necessarily entails large blocks of protected habitat in addition to “corridors,” as such, 
depending upon the species.  Thus, the emergence of barriers inhibiting dispersal within one locality can jeopardize the 
assemblage of species regionally, perhaps severing a small population from its larger, metapopulation.  See BENNETT,
supra note 59, at 41. Even beyond connectivity, though, “spill-overs” into protected tracts of habitat from neighboring 
jurisdictions constitute a major threat to preserve integrity as well.  Janzen, supra note 25, at 287 (identifying various 
groups of “external threats” and their importance to managers).  See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
101 This problem with the public’s scale can even be thought of as a complex of related problems in the delivery of 
public goods and services.  Spill-overs, after all, can be created or destroyed through the setting and changing of 
boundaries (common phenomena in local government). Cf. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 
(1978) (upholding extraterritorial “police jurisdiction” of city and stating that “[t]he imaginary line defining a city’s 
corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions.  A city’s decisions inescapably affect individuals 
living immediately outside its borders.”). This is true of contract-based inter-local bargaining, too.  See Clayton P. 
Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001) (hereinafter Gillette, “Regionalization 
and Interlocal Bargains”).  Whether the scale achieved permits the accomplishment of common ends (clean water, 
good schools, policing, etc.) is a complicated question of fact, to be sure.  But the scope of the territory and citizenry 
and the nature of the spill-over(s) involved are undoubtedly central to its answer.  
102 Cf. Ziegler, supra note 91, at 45-65 (describing the tension within anti-sprawl activism and its use of exclusionary 
zoning by showing the regional effects that such policies have); ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106 (1970) (acknowledging that “exit” is a favored 
solution for individuals in the modern state/economy and then puzzling that “exit has been accorded an extraordinarily 
privileged position in the American tradition, but then, suddenly, it is wholly proscribed . . . from a few key 
situations”).   
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other words, are either the ailment or the cure and this argument has itself assumed such 
proportions that it is becoming a barrier to progress in ecosystemic conservation.103 
B. A Problem of Identity 
Not surprisingly, a second and more penetrating set of objections has beset local 
governance—going to its very nature as government.   The modern condition of political 
authority is to question the publicity of “a public”: is it comprised of truly “public” rather 
than merely “private” motives or concerns?104 Are the citizens of the City of New York 
really members of a discrete polity with some set of unique interests?  Many Staten 
Islanders do not think so.105 Ostensibly public objectives like the protection of 
 
103 Of course, the philosophical dispute over public versus private welfare maximization cannot be addressed through 
empirical evidence.  But the fact that entry/exit and boundary fluctuation are core realities of local governance is 
pivotal to understanding its legal and political structure and its role in this wider theoretical dispute.  For, as 
jurisdictions grow or shrink in size, so do their revenue-raising and other collective capacities, potentially affecting 
their abilities to perform for their constituencies.  Finally, shrinkage to a more “local” scale can also be instrumental to 
the distortion of public opinion because the municipal “public” may lack the hallmarks of a deliberative body thought 
so vital to genuinely republican government since The Federalist. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.   
104 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927) (analyzing the confluence of factors that produces 
truly public opinion and allows the public to be self-governing as opposed to the aggregation and trading of private 
preferences); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (analyzing different voting rules and their tendency to effect legislative outcomes 
and advocating unanimity requirements as the best procedure to maximize the liberty of individuals);  BENEDICT 
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983) (analyzing 
the rise of nationalism within multi-ethnic states and the roles played by culture, language, political boundaries, and 
economics);  JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995) (analyzing 
the uses of federalism and confederalism to constitute a single polity from among different ethnicities each of which 
have their own distinct normative systems); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996) (setting forth a discourse theory of 
constitutionalism and requiring minimum conditions on the fair and rational conduct of politics that must be met in the 
“public sphere” for a majority rightfully to control the sovereign offices of a nation state); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM 
AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) (analyzing the use of majority rule in 
democracies meant to persist over time and arguing that present majorities can be unrepresentative and prone to 
discount the welfare of future generations). 
105 “Greater New York City” comprised of the five boroughs was established in 1898 at the height of Progressivism’s 
urban reform movement. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 1898 
1031-1246 (1999). And until a one-person, one-vote challenge invalidated the structure, the City’s budget, land use, 
and other polices were governed in an arrangement that weighted equally the borough of Brooklyn’s say to that of 
Staten Island’s, notwithstanding the fact that the former had roughly seven times the population.  See Morris v. Board 
of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983).  The ending of that borough structure precipitated the recent (yet thus far 
unsuccessful) push for Staten Island’s secession from the City.  See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and 
Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-
Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (1992) (hereinafter, Briffault, “Metropolitan Governance”). Municipal 
boundaries are a double-edged sword in that spill-overs occurring between any two or more municipalities can be both 
net positives and negatives, depending upon the territory or service in question.  See Briffault, Boundary Problem,
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biodiversity and habitat set this dilemma up directly: why is it in the common interest to 
protect a particular population or species?106 Voluntarism avoids such dilemmas, always, 
but the command and control of the regulatory state has made them widely apparent 
today.107 Unfortunately, most attempts to solve these dilemmas still begin from 
conventional theories of legislatures or simple-minded rejections of collective self-
government.108 A pragmatic reconstruction of localism must confront the question of 
 
supra note 99, at 1130-33.  Beyond simple town-to-town accounting, though, Briffault found that “in contemporary 
metropolitan areas, the most significant externalities may not involve the impact of one particular locality on its 
neighbor but may instead be a consequence of the aggregate of local policies across a region.”  Id. at 1133.   
106 One answer is that the genetic material represented by any species is a potentially significant natural resource with 
the possibility of untold benefits to present and future generations.  See, e.g., EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF 
LIFE 281-310 (1992).  This rationale tends to falter in many political debates, though.  See Doremus, Saving the 
Ordinary, supra note 12.  A second possible answer to the question, thus, focuses on the aesthetic beauty of the species 
or of the ecosystem it plays a role in maintaining.  See WILSON, supra, at 315; Cf. SABEL ET AL., supra note 62, at 3-9 
(describing local support that arose for the protection of a fringe-toed lizard in southern California); see supra note 55. 
107 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 56, at 274-83 (describing the general predicament of administrative agencies’ 
democratic legitimacy and the failure of various reform models to resolve it); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 26-28 (2002) (arguing that one of the best justifications for expert 
regulation by risk assessments in pollution control is that lay people usually misunderstand the magnitude of threats 
expressed in terms of probability).  It is a short distance from the premise that the public does not understand most 
regulatory choices to the premise that supposed public-regard is a convenient pretext for self-dealing.  A discourse 
theory of democracy generally explains this predicament of the administrative state as a continuation of power-
dominance within the abstract public sphere of today through the elite use of expertise and informational strategies.  
Such strategies, in turn, drive a hyper-differentiation of norms that insulates state officials from popular accountability 
and thus frees them from the “public” (while tying them to the powerful).  HABERMAS, supra note 104, at 359-87; 
FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (2000).  Solving 
public problems as complex and multi-jurisdictional as, for example, air pollution, has entailed the use of institutions 
and vocabularies accessible to exceedingly few.  See Jamison E. Colburn, The Future of Air Pollution Control in the 
Corporatist State, 34 ENV. L. RPTR. 10577, 10603 (2004) (arguing that air pollution control policy today is best 
described by a “corporatist” model of the state controlled by and on behalf of integrated, internally disciplined groups 
capable of maximizing political leverage through litigation and presidential elections) (hereinafter Colburn, 
“Corporatist State”).  Finally, many participants in the national search for public purpose find themselves forced to 
accept highly constraining roles and this critique is in no way intended to impute illegitimate motives to any particular 
constituency.  Compare HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 224 (1967) (“The individual 
legislator does not act alone, but as a member of a representative body.  Hence his pursuit of the public interest and 
response to public opinion need not always be conscious and deliberate. . . .  Representation may emerge from a 
political system in which many individuals, both voters and legislators, are pursuing quite other goals.”) with ROBERT J. 
BRULLE, AGENCY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATURE: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT FROM A CRITICAL THEORY 
PERSPECTIVE 275 (2000) (“The insider strategy involves many environmental organizations in the legal and 
technocratic policy process and thus requires them to develop professional staff and bureaucratic structures.  This . . . 
contributes to the creation of an organizational structure in which members have little room for participation.”). 
108 Madison diagnosed the causes of “instability” and “injustice” in parliamentary bodies as stemming not just from 
“faction” but also from a failure of scale.  See The Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed. 
1961) (“By enlarging too much . . . you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances 
and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these and too little fit to comprehend 
and pursue great national objects.”).  Madison’s not-so-novel solution was to achieve a “mean,” something he argued 
the Constitution had done. Cf. DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 98 (1984) (“Madison’s 
diction distinguishes local from national in a manner consistent with Montesquieu’s defense of small republics.  Men 
must be “acquainted” with the local good, but must “comprehend” the national; they can be “attached to” to the local, 
but “pursue” the national.  A smaller sphere yields a more simply accessible, immediate public good.”). Nevertheless, 
two centuries of practice have shed an unflattering light on his faith in such a legislature.     
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what a local public is, though, before it confronts problems of scale and regulatory 
technique109 and the local “public,” so often the subject of reverential generalities, is too 
often homogenized and inherently parochial. 
At its strongest, then, this objection goes to whether local governments are suited 
to assuming any sort of truly public authority.110 It questions the justice of a local 
majority’s will to subjugate an out-voted minority at the same time it doubts the 
 
The Madisonian account of popular sovereignty and the ameliorative powers of an “extended sphere” in 
which political coalitions were to operate one against another denied the stability and justice of smaller “republics” 
given the likelihood and degenerative effects of “faction.”  See Federalist No. 10, supra, at 83 (“The smaller the 
society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and 
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals 
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass with which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and 
execute their plans of oppression.”).  But the flaw of defining the ideal polity in the abstract as Madison does is that 
bounding the “society” to be self-governing should, in principle, be done by something other than historical accident.  
Yet Madison does exactly that in The Federalist. He hypothesized that Congress’s ability to resist “parties and 
interests” that are incompletely representative of the wider “public” and its overall stability would flow from the states.  
Who could know whether or why the different colonies alone or together were of a truly balanced (or balancing) scale?  
See EPSTEIN, supra, at 59-110; ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 119-31 (1989).  Of course no one could 
or did—leaving Madison’s theory open to a rather self-refuting critique. TULLY, supra note 105; see also LANCE 
BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 165-290 
(1995); SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 244-307 (1993).   
Moreover, as has long been the overall critique of the Madisonian legislature, a disparity of property and 
wealth undermines community and society among those given a vote in an economically diverse population by 
ensuring that some will be in a position to use their rights of participation and “voice” much more effectively than 
others.  That basic critique has always diminished the force of Madison’s defense of the representativeness of our 
federal system. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). This is not, however, to say that 
collective political action itself is so easily dismissed.  See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows 
at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).  
109 One particularly common form of “identity” conflict goes to the legitimacy of local action on a particular subject 
matter as compared to state action thereon.  See, e.g., McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834 (Md. 1990) (invalidating 
anti-discrimination ordinance as outside the scope of state home rule authority); City of Commerce City v. State, 40 
P.3d 1273 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting challenge brought by city to state statute mandating automated vehicle identification 
program on grounds that home rule rights did not encompass subject matters of statewide concern);  City of Atlanta v. 
McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (rejecting challenge to city anti-discrimination ordinance on statewide versus 
local concern grounds but by closely divided court).  Some local conservation initiatives have provoked judicial 
consideration of this legal aspect of municipal authority and, often as not, a judicial rejection of municipal as opposed 
to state prerogative.  Compare Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (invalidating local ordinance 
prohibiting oil and gas drilling on grounds that the matter was of state concern and preempted by state statute 
regulating oil and gas extraction generally) with Quick v. Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Texas 1999) (upholding local law 
regulating oil well construction for purposes of protecting an aquifer against challenge that city lacked authority to 
protect such a natural resource).  
110 The public choice literature on the (rational) maximization of self-interest by local governments is quite 
voluminous.  See MUELLER, supra note 95, at 182-204. And democratic theory and natural resources analyses generally 
agree with public choice scholars’ skepticism of local measures. Compare DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra 
note 109, at 193-209 (describing claims to local autonomy made from within modern democratic theory and concluding 
that it is impossible to establish the single most fair or just “unit” on the basis of principle) with KEITER, KEEPING FAITH 
WITH NATURE, supra note 60, at 299-327 (discussing “place based” ecosystem management initiatives and their 
reliance on collaborative bargaining, and ultimately questioning their legitimacy and their capacity to protect natural 
resources like wildlife habitat over the long-term). 
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rationality of that majority in pursuing the ends it does.111 As a matter of fact, the land 
use policies American local governments have adopted have often been patently 
discriminatory.112 Large lot requirements or “open space” ordinances are certainly good 
for snob zoning’s sake.  But they can sometimes be flatly inconsistent with real 
conservation.113 
Thus, the two problems logically lead to asking how ought some local political 
collective’s ends or physical dominion be defined?114 In public choice theory115 the 
framing hypothesis is that localities represent and protect their own interests first, best, 
and often to the detriment of the wider public.  Local government studies tend to confirm 
the hypothesis,116 although it is by no means uncontroversial.  Local government 
 
111 See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 30-49 
(1997); DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 109, at 208; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 109, at 2135-40. 
112 See Godsil, supra note 84, at 1858-71 (describing the use of modern land use law as a means of effectuating de facto 
segregation); DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995); Richard 
Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1365 (1997); JAMES S. DUNCAN & NANCY G. DUNCAN, LANDSCAPES OF PRIVILEGE: THE POLITICS OF THE AESTHETIC IN 
AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2004); cf. Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots 
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998) 
(arguing that local government law plays a big role in the disproportionate siting of undesirable land uses in poor and 
African-American communities). 
113 See Godsil, supra note 84; FORMAN, LAND MOSAICS, supra note 46, at 452-62; MCELFISH, supra note 68, at 85-109. 
114 Most often, states are compared unfavorably to the nation through the use of this question, especially with respect to 
ecological objectives like biodiversity conservation. See, e.g., BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 277-81.  But the 
question is equally apposite in comparing the relatively small locality to the state or nation. 
115 Public choice theory is the “economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economic 
to political science.”  MUELLER, supra note 96, at 1.  Its “basic behavioral postulate . . . is that man is an egoistic, 
rational utility maximizer,” a postulate that links contemporary public choice theorists to the traditions of Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Hume, Madison, and Condorcet.  Id. at 1-2. Compare BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 105, at 291 
(“Almost any conceivable collective action will provide more benefits to some citizens than to others, and almost any 
conceivable distribution of a given cost sum will bear more heavily on some individuals and groups than on others.”) 
with MASHAW, supra note 111, at 67 (“Montesquieu, Madison, and Condorcet were contemporaries.  And when 
Madison talks of the dangers of faction or of “ambition checking ambition,” he speaks a language that is the inspiration 
for the modern public choice approach, as James Buchanan has explicitly acknowledged.”).   Madison’s calculating 
analysis of democratic politics, though, largely neglected to account for the ways in which supermajority requirements 
enable the rule of interested or passionate minorities.  See DAHL, PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 109, at  
9 (“Neither at the Constitutional Convention nor in the “Federalist Papers” is much anxiety displayed over the dangers 
arising from minority tyranny; by comparison, the danger of majority tyranny appears to be a source of acute fear.”).  It 
is to this domination of democratic politics by acutely interested minorities—and exclusion of diffusely interested 
majorities—that most contemporary public choice theorists devote their attention. 
116 See Been, Exit as a Constraint, supra note 106 (arguing that many doctrines of local government law seek to control 
self-interestedness of localities by encouraging real inter-local competition).  The notion of collective “identity” 
developed here owes much to George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1993), and FRUG 
CITYMAKING, supra note 34, at 73-112.  Such questions are often asked with regard to states.  See, e.g., Robert A. 
Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1998) (“What is the 
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boundaries are legally fungible117 and yet, especially in suburbia, they often become 
entrenched at just the point externalities are realized.118 Indeed, local self-recognition 
today usually takes the form of “incorporation” or “secession”—hardly evocative of 
democracy at all.119 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of our local governments’ scale and identity 
problems—though broadly relevant in the administrative state—is that they are beginning 
to frame the prospects for real conservation in the twenty-first century.  So-called “place-
based” responses to the administrative state’s failures have never been more popular, 
even while the need for ecosystem-wide protections is so evident.  Even assuming, 
though (as is increasingly common), that a local majority possesses the will to protect 
habitat within its borders, what makes it an end with which this majority is properly 
concerned?120 That is, even granting that a local majority wishes to preserve or restore 
 
nature of the polity to which a state constitution corresponds? Is the state constitution a charter reflecting the 
fundamental convictions of an integral unit (“the People” of the state), or does the constitution merely provide a 
political framework for a diverse group that happens to inhabit a particular territory?”); James A. Gardner, The Failed 
Discourse of State Constitutional Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 780-91 (1991) (questioning the legitimacy of divergent 
judicial interpretations of state constitutional language resembling that of the federal Constitution by drawing into 
doubt whether states constitute distinct political identities); James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the 
Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1237 (2002) (hereinafter Gardner, “Political Community”).  
Although less common, they are now being asked of localities, too.  See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 
U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1993).  
117 See Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 755 (“[L]ocal government boundaries are fluid.  Cities and special purpose 
governments change and reorganize.  The reasons for change are complicated, but the very fact that local, intra-state 
boundaries are subject to reorganization represents a significant distinguishing feature of these governments when 
compared with the Federal Government and the fifty state governments.”).  Specific requirements vary by state, but 
most states have relatively permissive standards for incorporation and even sometimes for secession.  See Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Incorporation on the Urban Fringe, 36 TEX. L. REV. 271 (1958); cf. U.S. 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 22-23 (1993) (describing different requirements of incorporation, annexation, and 
secession across the fifty states). 
118 See infra Part IV. 
119 Teaford’s careful study of the cycles of metropolitan consolidation and fragmentation highlights the practical effects 
of this privatism in depth throughout the formative period of modern American local government law.  See JON C. 
TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1979) (hereinafter 
TEAFORD, “CITY AND SUBURB”).  
120 Any number of reasons—from the fact that many values are of higher priority than conservation to the practical 
reality of trying to regulate on a small scale—have been marshaled against its propriety.  See TIMOTHY BEATLEY,
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND URBAN PLANNING 200 (1994) (“It is problematic that 
conservation decision must be made without full and complete biological knowledge, and it is particularly troubling 
given the magnitude of the policy decisions based on the limited knowledge . . . and the speed with which theses 
decisions are to be made.  A basic contradiction exists between the timeframes of developers, who want relatively 
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certain habitat, what makes it a legitimate end of that local majority?121 One locality 
could perform superbly in protecting a tiny fraction of the habitat needed for a particular 
species or population and it could be extirpated all the same given the scale of the spaces 
involved.122 In light of the extent of habitat fragmentation and disturbance,123 the pivotal 
choice in conservation and restoration today is which parts of nature to try to save with 
scarce resources.124 Should it be a local or the wider public that chooses?  Which has the 
requisite authority or practical power to succeed?125 
quick conservation answers, and the timeframes of the scientists and wildlife biologists who may require many years of 
study to adequately understand the biology of even a single species.”); cf. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 428 
(“Vesting primary responsibility for land use regulation with local government serves many important public purposes.  
Effectively conserving wildlife, however, is not one of them.”).   
In an article written a decade ago, Professor Tarlock argued that “[b]iodiversity protection is a logical 
extension of the exercise of the police power to promote the general welfare.”  Tarlock, supra note 68, at 574.  That 
may be true of a “police power” jurisdictionally broad enough to encompass some significant portion of a species’ (or 
even a population’s) range and habitat needs.  But for a police power confined, as is often the case, to a mere few 
square miles, it might seem quite arbitrary where the habitat therein is but a tiny fraction of what is adequate for 
viability purposes.  Cf. Ziegler, supra note 91, at 6065 (noting how localities’ expressed ends of “smart growth” are 
either disingenuous or are being pursued irrationally unless and until they collaborate regionally to counteract reactions 
by neighboring municipalities).  I regard this as a significant challenge to the legitimacy of habitat protection at the 
local level and try to meet it below in Part V. 
121 Throughout much of American history this sort of localism has been constitutionally suspect in one way or another. 
To the contrary, though, environmental historians have begun documenting how localist, proprietary sentiments were 
instrumental in facilitating rather successful private conservation ethics.  See, e.g., RICHARD W. JUDD, COMMON LANDS,
COMMON PEOPLE: THE ORIGINS OF CONSERVATION IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND (1997). 
122 In local government law, this is the all-pervasive question of capacity.  See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of 
Commrs. of the Orleans Levee District, 640 So.2d 237 (La. 1994) (question of city jurisdiction over the levees of New 
Orleans when state statute constituted special purpose authority).  Of course, the reverse holds as well: one locality 
could obstruct the achievement of connectivity among habitat fragments regionally.  See supra note 55 and 
accompanying text.  This is the nature of the habitat protection and restoration objective inasmuch as the geographic 
range of many species is necessarily much larger than the jurisdiction of any particular local, state, tribal or provincial 
government.  Notably, localities as directed and constrained agents of a federal or state agency usually do not face this 
challenge.  So I assume that it is only faced by those localities engaged in purely local action.  A scale issue that would 
occasion such a locality’s dilemma would be, for example, the conversion of necessary habitat or release of harmful 
exotic species by neighboring or other proximate jurisdictions.  See, e.g., NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 20-
55; Michael Soulé & John Terborgh, The Policy and Science of Regional Conservation, in CONTINENTAL 
CONSERVATION, supra note 54, at 1.  Furthermore, what I have called the “identity” problems that could occasion the 
dilemma might be, for example, the total lack of expertise, organizational capacity, and capital resources to address the 
myriad technical and scientific obstacles confronting those who would protect an extant wildlife population in a given 
locale. See Daniel J. Simberloff et al., Regional and Continental Restoration, in CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION, supra 
note 55, at 65. 
123 See generally NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23. 
124 See Michael E. Soulé, Where Do We Go From Here?, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION supra note 52, at 
175, 181; Simberloff et al., supra note 123, at 91;  Terborgh et al., supra note 54, at 55 (describing the interaction of 
different local species, the biological pressures populations place upon each other when they are in a trophic 
relationship, and the common necessity of keeping large predators present if the objective is to keep other species 
present).  
125 This problem of identity, thus, strikes at the coherence of collective action itself as much as it does 
majority/minority concerns.  It focuses attention on what the ecologist William Odum called a ‘tyranny of small 
decisions’ in public efforts at conservation.  See William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of 
31
These are the most potent questions confronting localism in the modern state. 
Without a coherent answer to such questions, local initiatives appear quaint, beside the 
point, or worse.126 Impotence, though, is no less a critique of the federal (or most state) 
habitat protection programs: the multi-agency administrative state has struggled 
unsuccessfully to achieve jurisdictional and geographic integration to no less an extent 
than our fractious local governments—all while the national public remains deeply 
divided over its precise conservation and preservation priorities.127 
C. Scale and Identity: The Tyranny of Small Decisions128 
The problem of scale and the problem of local political identity are both central 
obstacles to the conservation and restoration of habitat in suburbia.  But each has been 
subject to a rather warped understanding in the administrative state.  ‘Our Localism’129 is 
comprised of numerous highly specific, interrelated legal relationships defining the 
legitimate authority and practical power of cities and towns relative to each other, their 
states, the federal government, and private parties.130 Yet this localism is constitutive of 
our regulatory traditions every bit as much as “our federalism”—if not more.  Indeed it 
has played perhaps the biggest single role in stalling the federal government and the 
 
Small Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 729 (1982) (“Much of the current confusion and distress surrounding 
environmental issues can be traced to decisions that were never consciously made, but simply resulted from a series of 
small decisions.”).  Individually minor actions that lead, in the aggregate, to the destruction of necessary habitat 
comprise the paradigmatic tyranny of small decisions. 
126 See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 23, at 429 (noting the probable ineffectiveness of local initiatives to protect 
wildlife); Edward H. Rubin, Charity Begins in Washington, D.C., 52 BUFF. L. REV. 793 (2004) (arguing that the most 
instrumentally effective charitable impulse is the one manifested at the (national) ballot box).  
127 See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1. 
128 Odum, supra note 125. 
129 See supra note 101. 
130 The most recent U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (“ACIR”) report on the question found 
the conditions of local legal personality, powers, and status dauntingly complex.  See U.S. ACIR, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION (1993).  See infra notes 
245-59 and accompanying text. 
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states from integrating ecosystemic approaches to habitat thus far.131 
Localism thus impedes initiative at a broad, “republican” scale.  Many of the harms 
of sprawl are certainly to the wider public (in some places to a multi-state public).132 
And most theories of regulatory federalism—especially the current Court’s “dignitarian” 
concept of state sovereignty133—presume that the power to redress such harms lay with 
the states, if not with Congress.134 Indeed, such state prerogatives have been the 
counterpoise to federal power in the evolution of modern environmental and natural 
resources law.135 Yet both the federal and state governments, in their deference to “local 
communities,” have shown themselves unwilling to redress these harms.  Apparently, 
their constitutional limitations and competitive positions relative to each other and the 
market have paralyzed them with respect to the many environmental costs of sprawl.136 
Localism’s potential for conservation progress is often lumped in with this negative role 
and ignored.   
 
131 KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note 60, at 25 (“[T]he greatest weakness of the centralized federal 
governance model may be its inability to accommodate both the ecological and social diversity prevalent across the 
public lands, whether rooted in different ecosystem structures, economic expectations, or social traditions.”). 
132 In one sense, the processes of sprawl are a typical collective action problem in that the costs and benefits of 
cooperation among localities of a region to reverse the process are not evenly spread and therefore there are risks 
involved for those choosing to “cooperate” and forego the benefits available from strategic action.  See Buzbee, supra 
note 41, at 77-88.  In quite a different sense, though, the pure collective action problem has yet to arise because of how 
deformed the incentive structures have been under our constitutional and statutory regimes bearing on this kind of 
localism.  Id. at 60 (“Urban sprawl’s causes are part social, part market-driven, and part the result of current legal 
structures and divisions of political authority.  Sprawl’s causes and effects cut across jurisdictional lines and are in part 
the result of institutional complexity.”); cf. Hills, supra note 34, at 2029 (“The truth may be that political 
decentralization will merely make citizens more able to use politics and more willing to trust government.  There is 
little evidence that it will also increase their benevolent toward their neighbors, the region, or the nation.”). 
133 See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose of 
state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is no more compatible with . . . independence and autonomy that 
[state] officers be “dragooned” . . . into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence 
and autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.”). 
134 The Supreme Court, even at the height of its substantive due process era, routinely acknowledged this police power 
of the states. See, e.g., Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 
11 (1895); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
47-105 (1998).  
135 See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 76; James E. Krier, The Irrational, National Air Quality 
Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974); KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra 
note 60, at 10-11; WILKINSON, supra note 23. 
136 Buzbee, supra note 41, at 91-128. 
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 Moreover, all localities are not created equal.  They are the product not of one 
overarching constitutional tradition, but of fifty traditions (fifty-one, counting the District 
of Columbia)—plus a federal overlay.  As many have argued, the popular myth 
valorizing the New England town for its participatory self-governance valorizes 
something that began as a private enterprise.137 But as Part IV explains, our prototypical 
municipality was “reconstituted” midway through its history into an arm of the sovereign 
state and, in this, has assumed a uniquely schizophrenic position in our constitutional 
order.  At the same time, the ubiquity of “suburbia” and its profusion of municipalities 
have entwined conservation with our problems of scale and identity.  In this process, 
most municipalities have been wedged into an ambiguous position somewhere between 
sovereign and subject,138 all while the predicament continues to grow in significance as 
more and more habitats are fragmented and homogenized.  Part IV argues that the shaky 
legal foundations of localities should be linked explicitly to our growing habitat problem. 
 
IV.  LOCAL AUTONOMY IN THE SUBURBAN NATION 
Historically, the judiciary that abided the national consolidation of public health, 
safety, and welfare regulation was at the very same time developing the rhetoric of “local 
 
137 See, e.g., JOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, PROFITS IN THE WILDERNESS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE FOUNDING OF NEW 
ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1991); STEPHEN INNES, CREATING THE COMMONWEALTH: THE 
ECONOMIC CULTURE OF PURITAN NEW ENGLAND (1995).  More than just New England, though, the whole public/private 
divide has been hazy in local governance. See SAM BASS WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE 
PERIODS OF ITS GROWTH (1968); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2255 (2003) (hereinafter Barron, “Home Rule”). 
138 The constitutional structure of the states’ “police power” has been uncertain throughout its history. Compare ERNST 
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904) with CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN,
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER (1886). But it became more so following the New Deal.  See Frank P. 
Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
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control” over real property and neighborhoods.139 Whether “conservative” or 
“progressive,” the vision of a green suburbia and a local public’s right of self-direction 
toward that vision played a critical role in the making of modern local government and 
land use law.140 Of course, suburbs have been, in virtually every aspect but legal form,141 
the opposite of the metropolis.142 The prototype for property ownership in the suburbs 
was—and, to a degree, has remained—a “miniaturization of the great estate;” an 
 
139 See CUSHMAN, supra note 134; see generally Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: 
Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 74, 95 (1989) (hereinafter 
Rose “Ancient Constitution”). 
140 See Been, “Exit” as a Constraint, supra note 106, at 528-43; Timothy Alan Fluck, Euclid v. Ambler Realty: A
Retrospective, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 326, 328-33 (1986); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The 
Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158 (2002).  Today, tracing the rise of the administrative 
agency as a response to Progressivism’s failure to achieve its agenda through the legislative process is a multi-
disciplinary enterprise.  See CUSHMAN, supra note 134; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY at 145-67 (1992); MASHAW, supra note 112, at 4-49; MUELLER,
supra note 96, at 506-34. The judicial interpretations of the home rule constitutional developments during the same 
timeframe, though less studied, are described in GORDON CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL 
AUTONOMY 171-82 (1985); Barron, Home Rule, supra note 137, at 2322-34; Fluck, supra.  Independent of local 
government empowerment, though, the gradual federalization throughout the twentieth century of traditional “police 
power” fields as diverse as sewage treatment, see Andreen, Evolution of Water Pollution Control—Part I, supra note 
232, smoke and air pollution abatement, see Weiland, Local Efforts, supra note 78; flood control, see Allison Dunham, 
Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098 (1959); consumer product regulation, see Robert S. 
Adler & Richard C. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895 (1994), roads 
and transportation policy, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235 (2003); 
waste disposal, see Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce Clause,
50 OKLA. L. REV. 155 (1997), and many, many others. 
141 Briffault, Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82; Briffault, Localism and Legal Theory, supra note 83. 
142 Briffault, Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82, at 18-64; TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB, supra note 
119; NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 
(1994); TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 119, at 30-36.  By the mid-1920s, the Supreme Court had validated the 
vision of suburban autonomy.  The Court reconciled municipalities’ comprehensive zoning and planning with 
individual rights of property, liberty, and due process, setting (perhaps inadvertently) the legal conditions for a 
metropolitan region held together by little more than geography.  Cf. JACKSON, supra note 89, at 20-44 (tracing the 
modern suburb to a transportation revolution that allowed relatively affluent, residential communities of citizens 
making their livelihoods in the cities to exit and emerge as independent localities outside of the city); Michael Allan 
Wolf, Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This the Twilight of Environmental and Land Use Regulation, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 961 (1996) (hereinafter Wolf, “Euclid”). 
This property-based freedom of exit (and the suburban manor) predictably dominated the concept of local 
governance in twentieth century America, situated as the suburb has always been between wilderness and metropolis.  
FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS, supra note 89, at 134-81; WARNER, supra note 137, at 205-14; RICE, PROGRESSIVE 
CITIES, supra note 160, at 9-11 (describing the impetus behind Progressive municipal reform and arguing that business 
experiences were more important to reformers in their efforts than “municipal precedents”); MONKKONEN, supra note 
169 at 218-37.  The low density of suburban population renders most forms of public transit—the prototypical urban 
public service—virtually impossible, leaving only the automobile and its demands for roads and all of the 
infrastructural choices that are driven by road-dependence.  Id. at 169-81; Christopher B. Leinberger, Metropolitan 
Development Trends of the Late 1990s: Social and Environmental Implications, in LAND USE IN AMERICA, supra note 
27, at 203, 209 (describing a “geometric” increase in the physical size of many metropolitan areas and the consequent 
“monopoly of the automobile”).  
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“affordable pastoralism” for a middle class away from the congestion of the city.143 Even 
near-in suburbs have always traded on communing with “nature” in a way that cities 
cannot.144 Furthermore, American cities very early became “public” and “sovereign” in 
personality in ways suburbs never have been.145 In fact, it almost looks as if this 
dichotomy and its implications for local legal autonomy (i.e., the apparent double 
standards it creates for cities and suburbs146) were meant to promote the low-density, 
private profit-based, exclusionary development of land we call sprawl.147 
143 See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (“The police power [delegated to suburbs] is not confined to 
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.  It is ample to lay out zones where . . . the blessings of quiet seclusion 
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”); DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 112, at 47; cf. FISHMAN,
BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS, supra note 89, at 191-94 (describing the role of the housing construction industry in the process of 
suburbanization); JACKSON, supra note 89, at 58-60. 
144 “Natural” and “wild” are both terms used in contradistinction to culture, urbanity, and settlement.  See Cronon, The 
Trouble With Wilderness, supra note 10.  And the very ideal type of the suburb holds out the (synthetic) notion that 
nature can be parcelized and rendered benevolent.  Yet the ecological costs of the suburban ideal’s relationships to 
land—for example, the lawn: a core attribute of suburban pastoralism—prove its elevation of the scenic over the truly 
natural (or biological) within the suburban land ethic.  See F. HERBERT BORMANN ET AL., REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN 
LAWN: A SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY (2d ed. 2001).  This is not to say that local concerns for scenery are 
necessarily incompatible with real habitat conservation and restoration.  Cf. Wal-Mart Stores inc v. Planning Bd. of the 
Town of North Elba, 238 A.D.2d 93 (N.Y. 1998) (affirming town’s denial of permit to build large retail outlet and 
parking on grounds it would negatively impact scenic views of nearby Whiteface Mountain).  It is, however, to 
distinguish a lot of what counts for local environmentalism, see, e.g., Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 402-04 
(describing ordinances protecting “scenic resources and ridgelines), from the pursuit of potential connectivity or the 
protection of viable populations.  Cf. BORMANN ET AL., supra, at 81 (“A surprising amount of water for residential use 
goes to watering lawns.  This is especially true in drier regions. . . . Growing a lawn under such adverse conditions 
requires virtually constant watering.”). 
145 See TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 89, at 11-12, 59-70.  On New York City’s legal transformation 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from a corporation exerting power through its prerogatives of 
ownership to an agent/extension of the sovereign legislature, see HARTOG, supra note 137.  
146 Some scholars of local government law view Dillon’s rule and other general doctrines as a series of double 
standards, one disempowering version applying to cities and one empowering version applying to suburbs.  See, e.g.,
FRUG, CITYMAKING, supra note 34, at 54-69, 122-64. But in two massive studies of local government law, Briffault 
confronted the grounds of local legal authority and rejected the powerlessness thesis others attributed to Dillon. 
Local authority, according to black-letter law, is merely a delegation from the state, to be exercised by the locality 
as agent on behalf of the state as principal.  But, sustained by legal doctrines, embraced by powerful economic and 
political interests and legitimated by academic theorists, local autonomy has been transformed from a principle of 
administration to a faith in the decentralization of responsibility for the provision of public services and the 
exercise of public power. 
Briffault, Localism and Legal Theory, supra note 82, at 452.  Of course, the scale of a suburb surely makes it more 
“local” and less “public” in the eyes of the law than a true “city” could ever be.  See Briffault, Structure of Local 
Government Law, supra note 82; Sandalow, Home Rule, supra note 81, at 685-707; Libonati, Home Rule, supra note 
238, at 59-69.  It certainly renders it more local in the sense of common interests uniting its electorate as Professor 
Mansbridge hypothesized in her “unitary” versus “adversarial” categorization of democratic assemblies. See JANE 
MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (rev’d ed. 1983) (1980).  
147 See Buzbee, supra note 41, at 63-77; Barron, Home Rule, supra note 137.  Confronting the history of our localism is 
the possibility that its prototype has always been more like Mount Laurel than Athens.  Mount Laurel was the township 
in New Jersey famous for its efforts to preclude any but the wealthiest homebuyers from locating into the town through 
the use of various zoning mechanisms.  When the township first began solidifying its identity in the mid-1960s, “[t]own 
officials said frankly that they wanted Mount Laurel to be transformed into an “executive-type town,” a place [where 
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Suburban and exurban local governments more resemble entrepreneurial joint 
tenancies than they do arms of the state.  Yet in their powers to decree land use districts, 
to collect ad valorem taxes, and to provide common services,148 they have created a 
system of inter-local competition driven by a right of exit (both by individuals and 
seceding groups).  And if local government today is broadly preempted by the federal 
structure of our Constitution and by federal and state product and public safety, pollution 
control, and natural resources laws,149 it is thereby focused even more intently on its tax 
base and the aesthetics of the land within its borders.150 As a result, its common interests 
are less about democratic self-governance than about property values.  And as a result, 
suburbs’ land use authority—originally delegated in the hopes of creating the rationally 
 
g]arden apartments for the working poor were as out of place . . . as dandelions in the well-tended suburban garden.”  
KIRP ET AL., supra note 112, at 48.  The homogeneity of a citizenry able to afford living in such a town is stark, id. at 
50-54, although the use of land use zoning authority to achieve various barriers to entry is quite common.  See 
ORFIELD, supra note 92, at 55-73 (summarizing data); cf. FRUG, CITYMAKING, supra note 34, at 9 (“In my view, the fear 
of self-aggrandizing autonomous entities articulated by critics of decentralization—particularly collective groups of 
individuals like cities—is not unreasonable.  Prosperous suburbs, after all, have exercised their zoning authority and 
other local powers in precisely the selfish way that opponents of decentralization claimed they would.”). 
148 On the rise of the “dues mentality” in suburbia that views property taxes as fees for the provision of local services, 
see Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government,
56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004). 
149 This is not to say that local governments lack initiative or regulatory authority as a general proposition.  It is rather 
to say that local governments regulating in ways corporate-commercial interests find costly face the chilling threat of 
legal challenges on grounds the state or federal regulators have preempted a “field” of one sort or another.  See 
Weiland, Local Efforts, supra note 78, at 498-99, Barron, Home Rule, supra note 137, at 2347-61. 
150 Cf. Briffault, Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82, at 101-06; Rose Ancient Constitution, supra note 
81, at 94-104 (describing the counterpart influences of Federalist and Anti-Federalist thinking in the modern legal 
conception of localism in the administrative state).  The dominant conception of localism in the administrative state is, 
in short, exclusionary and real property oriented.  See Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1824, 1852 (2003) (“The Supreme Court, it appears, has granted local boundaries a heightened status—one that tends 
to reflect and reinforce the suburbanite’s sense of collective jurisdictional ownership.”); Been, “Exit” as a Constraint,
supra note 106, at 500.  The authority to engage in planning and zoning was originally promoted along with the 
rationalist “city manager” and “commission” model of local government, which were in turn promoted as providing the 
efficient “business model” that corporate-liberal progressives idolized.  See RICE, PROGRESSIVE CITIES, supra note 160, 
at 100-05.  And relatively quickly it was commonplace for courts to defer to local planners both as to the ends of their 
land use planning and as to its most expedient means.  See, e.g., Bartram v. Zoning Comm’n, 68 A.2d 308 (Conn. 
1949) (“How best the purposes of zoning can be accomplished in any municipality is primarily in the discretion of its 
zoning authority; that description is a broad one; and unless it transcends the limitations set by law its decisions are 
subject to review in the courts only to the extent of determining whether or not it has acted in abuse of that 
discretion.”).  But the wider result—parochialism—was somehow left out of the debate until long after zoning powers 
were cemented as incidents of local autonomy.  See Haar & Wolf, supra note 140, at 2174-2203.   
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planned metropolis—has been an important driver of fragmentation: disparate property 
values, splintered publics, and fragmented ecosystems.151 
Yet it is in their entrepreneurialism of place that suburban and exurban 
municipalities represent perhaps the surest source of countervailing power to an 
increasingly globalized mass-market economy.152 Even if their authorities are not 
“inherent,” suburbs are relatively local in democratic scale, permanently place-based, and 
they possess, within most state constitutions, real regulatory choices in setting their land 
use priorities.153 Many are embracing conservation today.  And, importantly, in doing so 
they face neither the juridified processes of the administrative agency nor the 
“deliberative roadblocks” (or partisan gridlock) of the legislature.154 Of course, all this 
means that middle landscape municipalities have a unique potential to go astray, too.  
These circumstances effectively undermine both the devolutionary and romantic models 
of localism described in Part II.   
The real nature of localism’s ecology is considered in this Part.  Section A 
describes the suburban public, its landscape, and the reality of that public’s mixed 
motivations toward land.  Section B argues that this localism is paradoxically a good fit, 
both practically and legally, to the applied science of habitat conservation today.  Finally, 
Section C suggests ways that landscape-scale connectivity might be achievable from the 
 
151 Turner & Rylander, supra note 40, at 62-66; Diamond & Noonan, in LAND USE IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 13-42; 
Ziegler, supra note 91. 
152 Compare Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, 
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J.257, 312 (2001) (describing municipal and private use of data from the 
Toxic Release Inventory and how it changed multi-national corporate operating procedures) with SCHOENBROD, supra 
note 75, at 124-43 (noting the growing power of localities in opposition to EPA policies written by national and 
transnational economic elites). 
153 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480-84 (1968) (describing the general purpose local government as 
one of many different authorities); see generally KRANE ET AL., supra note 81.  
154 See supra notes 3-33 and accompanying text. 
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ground up by commandeering the strengths of this localism instead of indulging its 
myths.    
 
A. The Homevoter: Localism and Conservation in the Suburbs  
The federal Constitution is studiously silent about the status of a local public.155 
Evidence suggests that localist, agrarian resistance to a then-emerging commercialism 
played a critical, catalyzing role for the entire Philadelphia Convention.156 The Federalist 
vision of the “compound republic” certainly understood localism and factions (both 
“interested” and “passionate”157) as the root of democracy’s troubles.  Madison and 
Hamilton, drawing on a wealth of early modern political thought, argued that the control 
of political self-dealing could come by “extending the sphere” in which politics would 
operate, allowing society’s many interests and locales to check each other within an 
aggregated legislature, and then again through a nationally elected executive, and yet a 
third time in a judicial process before “neutral” and life-tenured judges.158 
155 Cf. CLARK, supra note 170, at 60 (“For all its rhetorical appeal in the United States, the concept and meaning of local 
autonomy remain incredibly opaque.  In principle, local autonomy us desired by the left and right even though, in 
practice, it is often interpreted quite differently by these different groups.”); Gardner, Political Community, supra note 
116, at 1256-67 (noting the tension between one person, one vote, and the practice of municipality-based representation 
that predominated prior to the Warren Court).  The philosopher Hannah Arendt once remarked that “the political 
importance of the township was never grasped by the founders,” a failure she felt constituted “one of the tragic over-
sights of post-revolutionary political development.”  HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 234-35 (1965) (quoting LEWIS 
MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY (1961)).  Yet even the Progressive era debates assumed the founders expected a 
robust localism.  Cf. Amasa Eaton, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
299, 303 (1916) (“No one will deny, probably, that from the very beginning all of our constitutions have been framed 
with a system of local government in view.”).   
156 See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 58-61 (1980); SAUL 
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999); 
BANNING, supra note 108, at 104-07.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the rural towns of New England were particularly 
hostile to the growth of commercial society at the time, uniting an agrarian revolt that would have otherwise been but a 
sidelight in American history.  Cf. SZATMARY supra, at 120 (“The crisis atmosphere engendered by agrarian discontent 
strengthened the resolve of the nationalists and shocked some reluctant localists into an acceptance of a stronger 
national government, thereby uniting divergent political elements of commercial society in the country at large.”). 
157 EPSTEIN, supra note 109, at 59-110; SZATMARY, supra note 156, at 92-98, 127-34; see supra note 110. 
158 See The Federalist Nos. 9, 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 77-131 (1993).  Madison’s 
language is the most familiar.  See The Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 83 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(“Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority 
39
The Federalist bench in turn assumed a role our judiciary still plays within that 
synthesis: the role of disciplining municipalities for the protection of the extra-local 
public and its commercial welfare.159 Similarly, the Progressive era movement for the 
reform of city governance in the last decades of the nineteenth century—which consisted 
in everything from the bureaucratization of city services for the public good160 and the 
centralization of metropolitan administration161 to legal-doctrinal critique—erected 
presumptions against inherent local sovereignty.162 It has been that Federalist and 
Progressive thinking on popular sovereignty, checks and balances, liberty, and property 
shaping our localism ever since.163 And, in tandem with the Warren Court’s reinvention 
 
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”); id. at 82-83 (“[A]s each representative 
will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for 
unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages 
of the people being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the most 
diffusive and established characters.”); BEER, supra note 108, at 244-307; BANNING, supra note 108, at 111-91; 
EPSTEIN, supra note 109.  
159 JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF MODERN URBAN GOVERNMENT, 1650-1825, 
at 82-115 (1975); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977) 
(hereinafter “TRANSFORMATION I”); SZATMARY, supra note 156, at 120-34; NEDELSKY, supra note 108, at 141-202.  
Horwitz cogently links those doctrinal developments to the transformation of American concepts of property.  Id. at 31 
(“As the spirit of economic development began to take hold of American society in the early years of the nineteenth 
century . . . the idea of property underwent a fundamental transformation—from a static agrarian conception entitling 
an owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, instrumental, and more abstract view of property that emphasized 
the newly paramount virtues of productive use and development.”).  As real property drifted away from republican 
political liberty and became increasingly commodified, writers like Kent “moved toward an uncoupling of property 
from the public sphere.” ALEXANDER, supra note 157, at 130.  “For Kent, as for most elite American lawyers, conflicts 
between existing property rights and new entrepreneurial property interests posed a basic tension between their 
premodern concern with security and natural order, on the one hand, and their modern desire to facilitate the release of 
individual energy in the marketplace, on the other.”  Id. at 131. 
160 See JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1900 (1984); MARTIN J. 
SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA, 1800-1920 (1977); 
BRADLEY R. RICE, PROGRESSIVE CITIES: THE COMMISSION GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1901-1920 (1977) 
(hereinafter RICE, “PROGRESSIVE CITIES”). 
161 Progressive politics of city government reform splintered as the twentieth century opened over much of what 
eventually became modern municipal corporation law.  One common theme was the necessity of expertise and 
professionalism to the rational and efficient administration of local law and the provision of city services.  The creation 
of “Greater New York” (and other metropolitan cities) (1898), the rise of the commission and city manager forms of 
government (1900s and 1910s), and the Hoover Commission’s proposal of a Standard Zoning Enabling Act 
emphasizing comprehensive plans (1920s) all show this theme at work.  See BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 105, at 
1230-35; Haar & Wolf, supra note 140;  RICE, PROGRESSIVE CITIES, supra note 160, at 3.  
162 Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 35, at 92-100; FRUG, CITYMAKING, supra note 34, at 45-48. 
163 BANNING, supra note 108, at 250-55, 357-61, 472 n.77.  This is not to say that Federalism as an ideology achieved 
consensus either at or following the founding.  See Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 139 at 95.  Localism 
certainly had its proponents at the founding.  See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 7-14 
(1987).  Nevertheless, “in 1787 one perspective did triumph, and the other (or others) became submerged.”  NEDELSKY,
supra note 108, at 171.  The Federalist synthesis of liberty, property, and the separation of powers, thus, has been the 
matrix in which our localism has evolved.  See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
40
of state and local representation,164 it has been this conflicted concept of the local public 
growing out of such traditions grounding American local government law (however 
ambivalently).165 
Today, the Constitution’s latent “Federalism”—bolstered by modern public 
choice theory—constantly questions the legitimate scope of local “police power.”166 
Adding a Progressive critique of their lack of expertise167 puts local governments in a 
corner.  Of course, in the abstract, the authority of local governments to regulate land use 
and ownership is quite settled.168 Most recently the Court reluctantly acknowledged that 
 
164 Of course it is not the Federalists’ conception of equality to which the Constitution now adheres.  Most of the 
Warren Court’s attack on malapportionment and other modes of disenfranchisement within our localism were as 
separate from Federalist ideology as they were from the laissez-faire constitutionalism promoted by Cooley, Dillon, 
and other early figures in modern local government law.  See Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 35, at 
138-49.  It was not, after all, until the 1960s that, “as a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to 
select persons by popular election to perform government functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment require[d] that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that decision. . . .” 
Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). 
165 See generally David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
487 (1999).  Municipalities were virtually invisible in Federalist constitutional thought.  No mention is made of local 
government in the text of the Constitution, an omission that has made it a puzzle ever since.  Thus, while “public” 
corporations like municipalities were recognizably unfit for Federalism’s legal protections of other corporations’ 
“vested rights” and the like, nowhere was the inferiority of this public corporation clearer than in Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward and similar cases. See The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819);  New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. 164 (1812).  It is fair to say that this attitude was 
hostile toward public instrumentalities, although even in the Dartmouth College opinion the hostility was passive.  
Federalist doctrines of “vested rights” as a necessity of protecting commerce are well-known.  Their eventual 
replacement with more sophisticated concepts of liberty and property in cases such as Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 
(1827), and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 420 (1837), are discussed at length in SEAVOY, supra 
note 199, at 53-76, 237-52; KUTLER, supra note 199; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 160, at 233-44, 258-82, 701-03; 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1 (1st ed. 1978).   
Though faith eventually waned in the sanctity of vested rights and other, more sophisticated concepts of 
private right and commerce emerged, localism continued to clash with such doctrines in controversies over real 
property within the bounds of particular municipal corporations.  See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 159, at 
114-39, 253-66.  That is, the public/private distinction remained confused as to “public corporations” long after the 
famous Supreme Court opinions characterizing them as such.  See HARTOG, supra note 137, at 195 (“[H]owever 
ineluctable the implications of the decision in Dartmouth College, and however clear New York City’s identification 
with the public side of the public-private dichotomy, in legal theory the place of an institution like the corporation of 
the city of New York remained unclear.”). 
166 Indeed, much of the legal debate about the administrative state is still carried on over the legitimate bounds of the 
police power.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (2004); 
Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000). 
167 On the Progressive “gospel” of efficiency of rational centralization for public goods like conservation, see HAYS,
supra note 23, at 261-76; but see JUDD, supra note 122 (contesting the authenticity of this Progressive model of 
conservation and suggesting that local communities in northern New England developed strong traditions of 
conservation unrelated to the prescriptions of experts).   
168 Courts construed statutory delegations of land use authority to local governments quite broadly, virtually from their 
inception.  See, e.g., Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldng. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920) (upholding the 1916 New 
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local governments can even take property from A and give it to B if B’s use is reasonably 
calculated to be better for the local public as a matter of “economic development.”169 
Able to authorize or proscribe the development and redevelopment of land, to legislate 
zones of use-types—and even, when necessary, to appropriate land for the local public 
good—local governments frame the public dimensions of twenty-first-century 
conservation.  Yet they do so in a curiously private way:170 their delegated “sovereignty” 
is almost always transmuted into the tools of amassing and defending equity in the land 
within their bounded spaces.  Thus, the suburban initiatives publicized lately171 are easily 
questioned as motivated by the economic concerns of “homevoters.”172 
York City ordinance);  Brett v. Bldng. Comm’r, 145 N.E. 269 (Mass. 1924) (upholding the creation of a single family 
residential district);  Chudonov v. Bd. of Appeals of Bloomfield, 154 A.2d 161 (Conn. 1931) (upholding the exclusion 
of a chicken coop from a residential district);  City of Fairfax v. Parker, 44 S.E.2d 9 (Va. 1947) (upholding the levying 
of a burden of proof onto the applicant seeking permission for a requested use within a restricted use district);  Granger 
v. City of Des Moines, 44 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 1950);  Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1955) (upholding the 
exclusion of motels from a residential district);  Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824 (N.J. 1955) 
(upholding the creation of an industrial use district); City of New Orleans v. La Nasa, 88 So.2d 224 (La. 1956); People 
ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders v. Village of Morton Grove, 157 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. 1959) (upholding the 
establishment of an exclusively residential district). 
169 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
170 Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 415 (describing “documented biases and limitations” of local governments).   
171 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
172 The “homevoter” is a political agent economist William Fischel describes as someone whose primary asset—the 
market value of their home—is intimately affected by the fiscal and regulatory choices of their local government.  
When the homevoter acts politically, she acts to protect her single largest investment: her home.  FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87, at 7.  Teaford found such motives to be one of the primary determinants in the persistent 
fragmentation of the metropolitan area—and the rise of suburbia—in the first place.  See TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB,
supra note 119, at 6-31; see also BURNS, supra note 142, at 116-17. Politics at the local level is certainly heavily 
influenced by the voter’s self-regarding defense of his or her equity in land.  FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra 
note 87, at 163 (“Even if the homeowner does not care about local air quality, traffic, and noise from industrial 
development, she knows that prospective buyers of her house do care about it.  If she has any say about the prospective 
plant’s location—and she certainly does at numerous local public hearings at which the plans can be examined—she 
will fight the development unless its owners offer something that offsets its costs to her.”).  Indeed, most sophisticated 
analyses today take a NIMBY-style race-to-the-top by ‘backyard environmentalists’ as a more realistic assumption 
about local politics.  SABEL ET AL., supra note 62, at 6 (“If the lesson of the first generation of backyard 
environmentalism was that citizens living in threatened communities, near polluting firms, or drawing on contaminated 
watersheds would not be overrun by distant corporate and governmental bureaucracies, the experience of the 
succeeding generation teaches that citizens with the new allies can fundamentally reshape regulatory systems.”). But to 
what degree people ever engage in a truly “other-regarding” altruism in local politics is a question beyond the scope of 
this article.  Cf. Gardner, Political Community, supra note 116, at 1267 (contemplating the possibility that a “liberal 
politics of self-interest . . . may simply be an unavoidable price of modern life: self-interest just may be the only 
realistic basis upon which political relations may be successfully conducted in the kind of immense, mass democracy 
characteristic of modern western society”). 
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Self-regard is the continuation of a long tradition intertwining land investment 
and the American municipality.173 That privatism is constantly being rooted out by the 
doctrines constituting our federal system174 and also constantly undermining the claim 
that a local public is entitled to any sovereignty at all.175 So completely has suburban 
local government been entwined with the real property owners within its borders, in fact, 
that today the most accurate predictor of its political choices are their effects on home 
values and the tax base.176 In short, the control of land development and use has been the 
bellwether of local autonomy in the administrative state and the aesthetics of those 
 
173 See HARTOG, supra note 137; Williams, Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 35; MARTIN, supra note 137. 
174 A dirty little secret is that the single most common subject of modern dormant commerce clause scrutiny—as well, 
perhaps, as modern preemption doctrine—are state and local environmental protections reacting to the consequences of 
interstate markets in consumer products, land, and natural resources.  See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 
(1979); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982);  
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Wisconsin Public 
Intervenor v . Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).  The landfill access and 
financing cases alone have kept the federal courts’ dockets full with dormant commerce clause work. See SSC Corp. v. 
Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 504 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A law professor at Harvard is said to have remarked 
facetiously, a generation ago, that the greatest constitutional cases had concerned the sale and distribution of milk. . . . 
Although the flood of milk cases has receded in recent years, it has given way to a federal docket that is just as clogged 
with—of all things—garbage.”).  Just at the Supreme Court recent experience is significant.  See, e.g., City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 503 U.S. 334 (1992); 
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Dept. of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).  “For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and 
disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”  USA Recycling, Inc v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 
1272, 1275 (2d Cir. 1995). 
175 Cf. J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2270 (1997) (“The [Mt. Laurel] court did not 
deny that exclusionary zoning might be in the rational interests of a majority of a suburb’s residents, but insisted that 
the “general welfare” which zoning long had been constitutionally required to advance was that of the state as a 
whole.”). Of course, even if the local public cannot constitute a legitimate locus (or agent) of “sovereignty” 
traditionally conceived, it can be a self-recognizing collectivity that expresses preferences.  Professor Costonis, in a 
path-breaking article over two decades ago, argued that aesthetic regulations of all sorts ultimately must rest on a 
“cultural stability rationale,” that is, as a “self-defining political and cultural choice whose validity must ultimately rest 
on its compatibility with shared community values.”  John R. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and 
Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 431 (1982).  This thick conception of aesthetics may be quite 
instrumental to addressing the local identity problem introduced in Part II.  See Part V. 
176 Vestiges of the entrepreneurial origins of town foundings such as poll taxes and property qualifications were struck 
down as violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses throughout the twentieth century.  The Warren 
Court’s one person, one vote jurisprudence, for example, evinces a deep skepticism of any notion of community 
representation over the representation of individuals.  See Gardner, Political Community, supra note 116, at 1237, 
1249-50.  Yet, even in this body of doctrine the Court eventually retreated from its absolutism in favor of a 
“practicable” proportionality test for local elections.  See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983); Brown v. 
Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983).  Indeed , the Court allowed special purpose local governments to evade such 
scrutiny almost entirely.  See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Ball v. 
James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
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choices have been their principal determinant.177 In fact, democratic or not, this authority 
is often so strong in court as to trump serious competing constitutional interests.178 
More fundamentally, though, pushing top-down “coordination” on actors who are 
proprietary competitors is unrealistic.  That competitiveness is what makes modern 
conservation’s overarching goal of landscape scale connectivity so infeasible for the 
administrative agency at the same time that it makes virtually any democratic idealism 
about the local public seem so naïve.  Most municipalities have assumed a powerful right 
to set aesthetic norms within their boundaries and to exclude land uses they deem 
offensive at precisely the juncture those who are seeking to decentralize conservation 
argue municipalities can be collectivized from the top down.179 
177 This has been so regardless of individual state traditions, constitutional developments, or of particulars in the 
delegations of sovereignty—and notwithstanding the fact that such powers are wholly unrelated to any “rational” 
pursuit of the public health, safety, or welfare.  Only 25 years after the Court first held that local government did not 
“take” property or deny due process by zoning per se, the Court held that even purely aesthetic concerns constitute 
legitimate grounds for the exercise of such power by a municipality.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 25 (1954).  State 
judiciaries have since widely ratified that as a principle of state law. See, e.g., Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos 
Verdes, 103 Cal Rptr.2d 165 (Ca. Ct. App. 2001); Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 
(N.M. 1982); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1975); Berberian v. 
Housing Auth. of City of Cranston, 315 A. 747 (R.I. 1974); Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Schapiro, 210 N.W.2d 211 
(Minn. 1973); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough 
of Metuchen, 198 A.2d 447 (N.J. 1964); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963). But see 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Schwartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828 (Md. 1973); Stephen F. Williams, 
Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1977).   
178 The freedom of speech’s yielding in the face of local ordinances controlling billboards for aesthetic purposes are 
pivotal affirmations of local power over aesthetics, as are the prongs of the Court’s analyses of obscenity bowing to 
“community” standards of decency.  In Metromedia, Inc v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), a plurality of the 
Court invalidated portions of San Diego’s ordinance on grounds that it differentiated billboards according to content, 
but the Court has gone out of its way to affirm the legitimacy of the aesthetic purpose itself.  See, e.g., Members of the 
City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-827 (1984); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding ordinance effectively excluding adult theatres from city limits); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (incorporating inquiry into whether the “average person applying 
contemporary community standards” would find the speech “prurient” as part of the definition of “obscenity” as 
unprotected speech); cf. Schad et al. v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 88 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing the Court should defer to “local expressions of choice” in zoning nude dancing out of town).  Finally, it is 
critical to note that Justice Brennan’s opinion in the landmark regulatory takings case Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), directly linked the local protection of aesthetics as a legitimate public purpose to 
concerns for the “quality of life.”  Id. at 108.   
179 Interestingly, the Supreme Court early on struggled with ordinances erecting neighborhood-consent requirements 
for permission to build or develop.  See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (invalidating ordinance 
conditioning permit to build upon the obtaining of the consent of petitioning neighbors); Cusack Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917) (upholding ordinance prohibiting building of billboards on residential blocks unless the 
owners of a majority of property on the block consented); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 
U.S. 116 (1928) (invalidating ordinance conditioning the building of a philanthropic house for the aged poor on the 
obtaining of consent from the neighborhood).  But the Court soon enough made its peace with the right of an 
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Yet there is a hidden potential here for real conservation that we would do well to 
understand and find a way to tap.  Rejecting the restoration of nature’s mythical 
“balance” as some uniquely fixed priority,180 conservation biology today has embraced an 
ethic of conservation—protecting what we value in ecosystems181—just when the 
municipalities of our vast and expanding “middle landscape” have been entrenched in 
their role as custodians of local land use aesthetics.182 If premiums continue to attach to 
suburban properties abutting forest preserves, lakes, riparian corridors, and other habitat-
based amenities (and there is no reason to believe they will not),183 the “homevoter” 
might actually be made an instrument of conservation, given the right inducements.   
Virtually all suburbs and exurbs share at least three attributes: (1) they need not 
enclose a whole public problem to regulate; (2) they need not address a problem’s root 
causes like a sovereign, rational actor; and (3) they are always seeking ways to brand and 
market themselves as better than their neighbors.  Section B explores the potential that 
 
incorporated municipality to exercise such power, and the Court has since showed itself quite deferential to a local 
public controlling the rights of property usage—as long as that local public is one legally constituted as a municipality.  
See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976);  James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); 
Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local 
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1978) (critiquing Eastlake, Roberge, Eubank, and Cusack from a public-
choice perspective and denying neighborhood-veto statutes of the sort are valid exercises of local power).  
180 The central importance of disturbance regimes to most ecosystems of North America today, as mentioned above, 
deprives managers of the goal of maintaining some “natural balance.”  But simulating disturbances and protecting 
against invasive species or other trophic web changing events in our commercial society is a matter of some (local) 
labor. See G. Motzkin & D. Foster, Insights for Ecology and Conservation, in FORESTS IN TIME: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF 1,000 YEARS OF CHANGE IN NEW ENGLAND 367, 373 (David R. Foster and John D. Aber eds., 2004) 
(“One of the paradoxes of New England’s history of intensive land use is that it has created landscapes that are often 
attractive to us and harbor plants and animals that we value but that depend on continued human disturbance for their 
perpetuation.”).  
181 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 48-66 and 139-51 and accompanying text.  
183 One study of the values of privately owned property within New York’s Adirondack Forest Preserve found that 
being adjacent to preserve land increased the property value by some 17.5%.  See David H. Vrooman, An Empirical 
Analysis of Determinants of Land Values in the Adirondack Park, 37 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 165, 173 (1978).  As this 
research has grown in sophistication it has become clearer which sorts of amenities property buyers will capitalize.  See 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2003) (reviewing 
literature).  Among them, preservation of habitat and recreation opportunities associated with habitat are ascending the 
list.  Cf. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 199-202 (1999) 
(describing the growing economic and political power of preservationist policies); Jennifer Price, Looking for Nature at 
the Mall: A Field Guide to the Nature Company, in UNCOMMON GROUND, supra note 9, at 186, 197-202 (describing the 
commodity values of nature, physically and conceptually, and how suburbia is willing to pay for a connection to 
nature) (hereinafter Price, “Looking for Nature at the Mall”). 
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these three core attributes of suburbs and exurbs represent in a future with more and more 
of our “middle landscape.” 
 
B. Habitat Patchiness, Suburban Real Estate Markets, and Homevoters 
If municipalities are today expected to take self-regarding actions and to be 
checked in court as such, the doctrines asked to do this work are in desperate need of 
updating.  Under the federal constitution, dormant commerce clause and other forms of 
judicial checking of localist tendencies are supposedly meant to protect the national 
market and individual citizens as its participants.184 Local self-regard is exactly what 
disqualifies the municipality as agent of the Madisonian (or, for that matter, Progressive) 
republic and exactly what sustains wide skepticism of the local even as the administrative 
state founders.185 Too many suburban localities today literally define themselves by their 
exclusionary ethos—what has been called their evolving compromise “between polis and 
firm.”186 Equal protection and due process challenges to local zoning law have long been 
 
184 See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 81, at 893-910; Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent 
Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (1998); TRIBE, supra 
note 165, at § 6-6. On the capacity of takings doctrine to check these tendencies, see Been, “Exit” as a Constraint,
supra note __.  And on the utility of contemporary Fourteenth Amendment doctrines in checking such tendencies, see 
Barron, Cooley’s City, supra note 165, at 599-610. 
185 See Colburn, Corporatist State, supra note 108, at 10596-10602. 
186 Briffault, Localism and Legal Theory, supra note 82, at 392-99; Schragger, supra note 150. Local taxes and the 
basket of goods and services delivered by local governments are somewhat flexible, producing what Tiebout argued 
amounts to a market in local governance.  Tiebout, supra note 87, at 420 (“Every resident who moves to the suburbs to 
find better schools, more parks, and so forth, is reacting, in part, against the pattern the city has to offer.”).  But it is its 
noncentralized structure that dooms “devolution” from the start.  For example, to better manage “sprawl,” at least 
thirteen states have legislated state-wide “growth management” controls, all of which incorporate significant room for 
“local autonomy.”  See Linda Breggin & Susan George, Planning for Biodiversity: Sources of Authority in State Land 
Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 91 (2003) (describing statutes from California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawai’i, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington).  Many state agencies 
play an increasingly direct role in local zoning and planning practices. Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of 
Programs State by State, 8 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 148-49 (2002).  Yet each of these states still 
remain very deferential toward their localities’ overall preferences and processes in land use—leaving all participants 
locked in a process regardless of its overall performance.  Breggin & George, supra, at 92 (“In most cases, the state has 
taken a more active role in land use planning, either by planning directly at the state level or by providing clear 
direction and goals to localities to use in their land use planning efforts.  Nevertheless, localities in states with growth 
management laws typically continue to have primary responsibility for land use planning but their planning tends to be 
subject to more specific state goals, requirements, or guidance than under traditional land use planning enabling 
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aimed at this ethic to little avail.187 The typical municipality is still unworthy of the 
sovereignty of the wider public.188 But this locally meaningful drive to be better than the 
neighbors is gradually encompassing the restoration and preservation of a better natural 
environment, as the new local environmental law story vividly illustrates.189 How 
ecosystem goods and services can be capitalized into modern real estate markets, thus, 
measures the prospects for localism’s ecology better than any other single metric190 and it 
is beginning to seem that no single, overarching goal captures the diversity of such goods 
and services better than habitat connectivity—or potential connectivity.191 
1. Capitalizing Habitat in Suburban Real Estate Markets. So many people have 
learned how the standard practices of low-density development cause such pronounced 
road-dependence, degrading aesthetics, and low overall landscape integrity that there is 
today a potent “anti-sprawl” movement.192 Such conditions so clearly threaten overall 
quality of life—and the market value of many real property investments—that, in turn, 
their continued creation is coming under increasing local scrutiny.193 Conversely, the 
premium that preserved “open space” affixes to adjacent properties and the scarcity of 
 
laws.”).  And if regionalization by top-down management must tame local tendencies to compete with those around 
them, too few regulators have noticed.  Most suburbs that possess it jealously protect their own sense of the “natural” or 
of a “wilderness” aesthetic independent of (even as opposed to) those around them.  See generally DUNCAN & DUNCAN,
supra note 112.  
187 See M. DAVID GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 279-312 (1984). 
188 American Federalism and Progressivism both viewed the local public with suspicion (though at different historical 
moments and for different reasons).  Both sought to sew their visions into the law.  Compare TRIBE, supra note 165, at 
§ 6-3 (“The Madisonian interpretation [also held by Marshall] was premised on the widely-held belief that the Articles 
of Confederation had failed in large part because . . . state governments had been too responsive to local economic 
interests, with the result that interstate economic competition was conducted more through political processes than 
through the marketplace.”) with Haar & Wolf, supra note 140, at 2176 (“Progressive jurisprudence evolved in the hands 
of judges who . . . were eager to draw lessons and insights from the common law, as well as a special agility with new, 
superseding sources of legal authority originating in the legislative chamber.”). 
189 See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
190 See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 870 (2005). 
191 FORMAN, LAND MOSAICS, supra note 46, at 449-56; BENNETT, supra note 59, at 13-36; DAN L. PERLMAN & JEFFREY 
C. MILDER, PRACTICAL ECOLOGY FOR PLANNERS, DEVELOPERS AND CITIZENS 114-18 (2005). 
192 See Barron, Home Rule, supra note 137;  Parris N. Glendenning, Smart Politics, ENV. FOR. 21 (Jan./Feb.2004) 
(describing the political coalitions built in Maryland in combating sprawl).  
193 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 89, at 180-82 (describing “homevoter” opposition to further subdivision and 
growth on Long Island, Orange County, and St. Louis); MCELFISH, supra note 69, at 149-50 (tying the popularity of 
natural resource zoning to quality-of-life concerns).   
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certain wildlife species that already makes them big business194 are both becoming real 
incentives for local government attention to sprawl.  And there is no reason to doubt that 
suburbia’s affinity for “nature” and the “wild” will continue to grow as a political force 
while it deepens in sophistication.   
Just as variations in local taxes and services were capitalized into real estate 
markets throughout the post-war boom,195 then, so too might the market value of a 
genuine connection to (and respect for) nature be incorporated into real estate values.196 
The principal challenge is in collectivizing competitors to create habitat-based, 
landscape-scale organizations, however loosely federated they will be.  To that, it bears 
recognizing that outright habitat conversion is not the only, nor even necessarily the 
worst, threat to habitat in many places.197 Invasive species,198 the loss of natural checks 
 
194 See, e.g., Parenteau, supra note 9, at 235-38 & n.61 (citing data that visitation to Yellowstone increased 10 percent 
after the reintroduction of wolves and data from the World Bank that “eco-tourism” accounts for $2 trillion in global 
GDP); Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 265, 272 (1991) (reporting estimate that some 60 million Americans engage in bird watching).  The better 
question, thus, is whether the short-term profit of a present owner outweighs the long-term welfare of the municipality 
in which the land sits. For the “existence value” suburbia attaches to extant wildlife populations and their habitat, while 
certainly variable across different communities and different species, is real and has been so throughout suburbia’s co-
evolution with our modern concept of “wilderness.” Cf. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 
1314, 1322 n.27 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Existence value refers to that feeling some people have just knowing that somewhere 
there remains a true wilderness untouched by human hands, such as the feeling of loss people might feel upon the 
extinction of the whooping crane even though they had never seen one”). 
195 FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 87, at 253-88; FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87, at 4-
71; Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUDS. 205, 209 
(1975) (arguing that local governments’ zoning power has allowed them to manage the kinds of trade-offs Tiebout first 
argued they were capable of offering).  Indeed, the economist William Fischel has forcefully argued that suburbs are 
actually best thought of as being in a “race-to-the-top” when it comes to protecting local environmental amenities.  See 
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87, at 162-77; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 87, at 269 
(“[T]he phenomenon of capitalization makes it reasonable to suppose that future generations will be taken into account.  
The notion that voters care only about present cash benefits and not future costs is confuted by the fact that future costs 
and benefits affect the present value of their major asset, their homes.”). 
196 Research has shown that cost structures in suburban development can adapt to habitat mitigation quite readily, as 
long as it is directly linked to the development itself and not some generalized, rent-seeking pretext of existing 
residents.  See BEATLEY, supra note 120, at 212-13. 
197 For example, because of how roads have been designed and built in the past, many lack basic wildlife passage 
mitigations of any kind.  Yet needed capital for retrofitting these roads will often be unavailable, leaving a bad design 
in place well after its defects have become apparent.  FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY, supra note 66, at 139-67.  No 
single solution exists because different species and environments call for different mitigation techniques, not all of 
which are well understood.  But the needed capital for retrofitting often comes when road upgrades are made.  Id. at 
166 (“Prior to upgrading a two-lane highway to a four-lane divided interstate highway (I-75), 5 [Florida] panthers of a 
total population of roughly 50 were killed by vehicles annually.  Ten years after the construction of underpasses and 
bridge replacements designed to allow panthers to cross the I-75 highway, panther road –kills were reduced sharply and 
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on various organisms or ecological processes,199 and the many ways overall habitat 
connectivity is reduced are all of mounting significance as well.   While at its broadest 
ecosystemic habitat protection and restoration are necessarily larger than any single 
population or habitat patch, our political culture has shown it needs “focal points”200 and 
particular species in particular places provide them.   
Thus, starting with populations and particular habitats and promoting the inter-
local cooperation and bargaining necessary to attain a scale needed for broader issues as 
they arise—without at the same time losing the strengths of small-scale, self-interested, 
place-based action—might provide solutions to both of our problems: scale and 
identity.201 Local protection of habitat keyed to locally meaningful populations of flora 
and fauna has proven its political and legal traction.202 Moreover, its comparatively small 
scale and the distributed decision-making of peer-to-peer cooperation ensure that no one 
 
successful movements across the highway increased.”) (citations omitted); see also PERLMAN & MILDER, supra note 
191, at 151-68. 
198 This is particularly true of the sprawled metropolis.  Cf. Ortiz, supra note 37, at 170-71 (“Human preferences for 
non-native species and for pets . . . forces local species to compete for food and habitat with non-native species that 
have no natural predators in the locale.  Sometimes the native species lose.  In addition, domestic dogs and cats 
profoundly impact ecosystems by becoming non-natural predators of area wildlife.”).  A good deal more scholarly 
attention is being paid lately to the nature of invasive species and the legal issues they present.  See, e.g., HARMFUL 
INVASIVE SPECIES: LEGAL RESPONSES (Marc L. Miller & Robert N. Fabian eds. 2004).  Executive Order 13,112 is the 
only federal law or directive governing the spread of all harmful invasive species per se. Yet all it did was create an 
inter-agency “Invasive Species Council” charged with drafting a very general “National Invasive Species Management 
Plan.”  Executive Order 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1999).  The plan itself has had little direct impact thus far, although 
it has alerted disparate elements of the federal government to the issues, initiating the process of a federal response. See 
Marc L. Miller, NIS, WTO, SPS, WIR: Does the WTO Substantially Limit the Ability of Countries to Regulate Harmful 
Nonindigenous Species?, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1059, 1065-70 (2003).  Some of the most intractable problems 
associated with the spread of harmful invasive species are tied to the inadvertence of most the behavior that leads to 
their transport and release.  See id. at 1060-64. 
199 See Brian Miller et al., The Importance of Large Carnivores to Healthy Ecosystems, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES 
UPDATE 202 (2001); Terborgh et al., supra note 54.  Prototypical “sprawl” of the sort Rasband describes in the rural 
west, see Rasband, Urban Archipelagoes, supra note 90, at 13-19, of course, can have a directly negative implication 
for large-bodied mammals (especially large predators), given their range requirements.  See, e.g., Scott et al., supra 
note 60, at 29 (“Average home range size during the breeding season for a male cougar is 29,300 hectares. . . .”). 
200 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
201 Inter-local cooperation for habitat, after all, is not so far removed from the planning and land use regulation that 
communities have done for many years.  “A reservoir capable of holding the once-in-50-year flood may be grossly 
inadequate for the once-in-100-year flood.  What level of variation and catastrophe to anticipate in determining viable 
population sizes is very much an open question, but it is crucial to view the population in this way.”  Shaffer, supra 
note 54, at 11.   
202 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 75; JOHN, CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 75; Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 
68. 
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participant’s being bogged down by the uncertainties of ecology or stakeholder conflict 
will derail a whole enterprise.203 Commandeering the practical power and social and 
geographic proximity to the human behaviors that must be better managed, all while 
keeping the adaptiveness and incrementalism necessary to address a changing matrix of 
threats to habitat today, would be the fullest utility of any such enterprise.204 
Local government fits the public role in conservation as we have come to 
understand it, then, only so long as individual local governments can effectively partner 
with others in better pursuing landscape connectivity.  Partnerships of self-interest, after 
all, are inherently flexible205 and presumptively open to adjustment as new facts are 
found.206 Local governments’ legal capacity to promote necessary landscape work, to 
encourage development in some areas and discourage it elsewhere,207 to manage the 
 
203 This distinguishes inter-local cooperation from much of what has gone wrong in the administrative state’s wildlife 
habitat programs.  See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1, at 455-65. 
204 Compare Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 28, at 421 (“Advances in the understanding of 
biological diversity and ecosystem functions have led to a search for new forms of collective decision-making that can 
transcend existing jurisdictional boundaries, adapt flexibly to new information, and integrate human economic needs 
with fundamental ecosystem constraints.”) with KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note 60, at 325-26 
(“Even with all the relevant scientific data, our commitment to ecological conservation on public lands will require a 
corresponding political commitment, which will inevitably reflect our collective values.  If we can manage to conjoin 
people and place through a communal ecological perspective then we may begin to comprehend fully the array of 
species, resources, and communities that depend on our policy decisions and managerial judgments.”).  Some of what 
has been called the new local environmental law nods in such directions.  See, e.g., MCELFISH, supra note 68, at 13-14.  
However, none of its publicists to my knowledge link its basic utility to such conditions.  
205 Speed and simplicity of decision-making, after all, are the signature strengths of those motivated by self-concern 
and an ability to quickly react to new information has been one thing missing from administrative agency habitat 
programs. Cf. NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 298-307 (describing organizational breakdowns in monitoring 
programs carried out by public agencies not directly interested in the success or failure of the population); Westley, 
supra note 44, at 401-05 (describing the design of a “changeful organization” and the need to give organizational 
superiors a direct interest in the successful gathering of accurate information from the field as operations are 
implemented); cf. Salwasser et al., supra note 63, at 162-64 (describing the multi-agency arrangement that evolved to 
manage grizzly bears in Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and noting how many years it took to coordinate the federal 
agencies into a workable cooperative arrangement given each of the standard operating procedures). 
206 See Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 525-29 (2004).  Federal and state regulatory agencies have a role to play in such a bootstrapping model, but it is 
chiefly to stop facilitating (or even mandating) further fractures among competing localities and to instead supply 
needed capital or expert analyses wherever they will aid inter-local cooperation.  See Ziegler, supra note 91, at 35-37; 
Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, 29 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1529, 1532-35 (2002) (arguing that state and federal agencies incentivize haphazard construction of 
important infrastructure, encouraging haphazard development of housing). 
207 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 416 (2d ed. 2001) (“[D]elegations to 
municipal governments of the power to zone are today found, to varying extents, in all states.”). 
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growth of impervious surfaces and protect isolated wetlands and forest patches,208 to 
assemble land either through fee/easement acquisitions or regulatory exactions,209 and 
their authority to inculcate through local schools a normative respect for nature, all 
combine to make them potent mechanisms for the real of work of restoring and protecting 
what this article has called potential connectivity.210 The multi-dimensionality of 
preserving or restoring potential connectivity is where the noncentralized, proprietary 
structure of our localism is key and why subordinating it to more “sovereign” agencies 
ignores its most pragmatic virtues.211 
2. Becoming Public: Pushing Inter-local Cooperation. Instead of imposing 
habitat protection and restoration under the aegis of centralized expertise, it could be 
done one “patch”212—one locally special remnant of nature—at a time by combining the 
economic incentives driving local government decision-making with gradual and subtle 
changes in the legal doctrines checking those exercises of discretion.  If conservation is 
 
208 See Adler, Lost Books, supra note 16, at 75; Payne, Local Wetlands Permitting, supra note 75, at 540-46. 
209 See BEATLEY, supra note 120. 
210 Of course, the use of the law for purposes of connectivity or viable populations will not always be by the local 
government itself.  Conflict is, to be sure, the single constant in conservation today. See LEE, supra note 56, at 88-91. It 
will just as often be a subset of citizens within the local government pressing the legal conflict for the ends of 
conservation.  See, e.g., Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County, 93 P.3d 885, 893-95 (Wash. App. 
Div. 2004) (ad hoc environmental group successfully challenging grant of development permits by county for lack of 
sufficient riparian buffer zones).  But in our system of inter-mixed ownership, local land use autonomy, and an 
incapacitating administrative process that prevents experts from delivering the comprehensive rationality their superior 
knowledge promises, the landscape-scale ambition of reconnecting fragmented habitat patches arguably must begin 
from a bottom-up, proprietary approach.  The advantages of its incrementalism consist in the freedom to revisit past 
judgments on a rolling basis, cf. Westley, Governing Design, supra note 44, at 421-27, and combine with the possibility 
of political community at the only scale where it is still imaginable. See Gardner, Political Community, supra note 116. 
211 Regardless of whether county, city, town, township, or other unit is at issue, municipalities and special purpose local 
governments are possessed of the regulatory authority over the development and cultivation of land, the siting of roads 
and other infrastructure, and the provision of water, sewer, and other services—authorities that are absolutely necessary 
to the protection or restoration of anything as complex as “potential connectivity” across a landscape or region.  See 
Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 28; Rodriguez, supra note 45; BEATLEY, supra note 120, at 194-
206.  And if “community” will remain a weak force at the local level no matter what, see Gardner, Political 
Community, supra note 116, at 1261-64, the protection of equity in land is and will continue to be a strong force.  See 
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87, at 260-89. 
212 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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predisposed to focus on the aesthetically “special,”213 and continued urbanization is 
homogenizing the nation into an increasingly uniform “middle landscape” (disturbed) 
habitat, there is a surprising symmetry between homevoters’ incentives to protect locally 
significant nature and the means at their disposal.  Stewarding a local wildlife population 
or habitat can have real payoffs in property values at the same time it fulfills more 
meaningful needs.214 
Actively shaping the roles in any municipal-level approach to protecting habitat 
would begin from the premise that there exists a spectrum of judicial challenges to local 
regulatory capacity215 and that a majority of these include some form of means/ends 
scrutiny.216 As has been recognized throughout, probably the greatest risks inherent in 
 
213 See Doremus, Saving the Ordinary, supra note 12.  Given its atomized legal structure, suburbia’s preoccupation with 
exceptional scenery—and not the viability of local biota per se—is much less of an institutional failing than the 
administrative state’s: locally significant parts of nature are much more common today than nationally significant parts.  
Yet as locally significant remnants of nature or habitat patches become threatened, inter-local bargains face a real risk 
of non-cooperation.  Legal challenges to local governments on grounds they have ignored the wider municipality’s 
welfare in favor of a particular developer are becoming more common and more commonly successful in habitat 
conservation questions, though.  See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Board of County Commrs. Of Gallatin 
County, 25 P.3d 168 (Mt. 2001).  Of course, localities always have the option of simply working around the non-
cooperator, isolating such municipalities and insularizing them, for the weakness of small scale can also be a 
counterintuitive strength.  The economically-minded in real estate development would certainly have an incentive to do 
so if their permission to subdivide and build turned on their ability to deliver extra-local commitments of whatever sort 
in consideration.  See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 81, at 900-910; OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS,
supra note 92 at ___182-213. 
214 Compare Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENV. L.J. 245, 
253 (1998) (“Although no empirical study has been conducted, the bulk of the benefits from most land conservation 
may not constitute public goods. . . . If governments did not furnish parks, public beaches, and other public commons, 
some private landowners would find it economically profitable to provide access to open space and beaches in return 
for user fees . . . . Other landowners will choose to preserve portions of their land because they personally enjoy the 
view or ecosystem services provided by the land.”) with Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and 
Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 423 (proposing the creation of “special nature districts” with limited regulatory authority that would act in 
step with local attitudes toward land and biodiversity as a solution to the problems of intermixed ownership and 
fragmented regulatory authority).  A common objection that localities lack the expertise to engage in so scientifically 
complex an endeavor lacks the force it once had.  For not even the federal government has shown it has all the 
expertise needed in-house; expertise itself has been commodified in our open-source, networked society.  Thus, if 
FWS, EPA, the Forest Service or any other federal agency has lacked the know-how it has needed for a particular 
deliverable, they simply contractually engage them or mine the tremendous universe of technical research that most 
professionals now make widely available.  See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 543, 638-43 (2000). 
215 See supra notes 174 and 184. 
216 It is perhaps an oversimplification to lump together challenges to exercises of local police power on Due Process, 
Equal Protection, Commerce Clause, or Privileges and Immunities Clause grounds with so-called “Dillon’s rule” 
scrutiny and like state-law doctrines.  There surely are differences, not least in the nature of the judicial personnel as 
between federal and state courts.  Functionally, though, the familial resemblance is clear.  Each works, at least in part, 
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our localism stem from the very real local tendencies to fence out those thought 
“undesirable.”217 And, as we have recognized, the potential exists for “local 
environmental law” to be a convenient pretense for such a tendency.218 Thus, ensuring 
that local laws actually enhance potential connectivity and/or the viability of extant flora 
and fauna—that they pursue effective conservation and/or restoration and not just the 
rent-seeking of snob zoning—is a task particularly suited to adjudication.219 
Furthermore, such bottom-up, overtly aesthetic conservation has proven the most 
politically durable.220 Once a local public has capitalized a cost into the value of its real 
 
to “flush out” unconstitutional or otherwise illegal ends that have been papered over with a pretense of valid regulatory 
purpose.  Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146 (1980) (arguing that 
this is the nature of any legal test challenging the classifications used by legislation).   
217 See BURNS, supra note 142, at 35-37, 83-86; KIRP ET AL., supra note 112; Ford, supra note 1369-1400.  Of course, 
overt or intentional use of suspect classifications to exclude is per se illegal.  See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
218 See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text. 
219 Even under deferential standards of review, the adjudicative testing of local government’s rationales for land use 
choices can reveal improper motives or ill-conceived means.  See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Gallatin County, 25 P.3d 168 (Mont. 2001) (county approval of development in corridor 
area traversed by grizzly population invalidated for insufficiently considering impact on grizzlies and alternatives to 
development as proposed).  Such deferential review invariably permits development and land use that may be habitat-
destructive, to be sure.  See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. Collier County, 819 So.2d 200 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (in suit 
by local environmental organizations seeking more habitat-protective planning measures by country and state agency, 
court defers to government’s reading of pertinent statutes that allow various forms of growth in areas allegedly used by 
Florida panther).  Of course, in this much, municipalities are similar to agencies in their delegated authority and their 
relationship to the adjudicative testing of their fidelity to law.  Cf. JAFFE, supra note 2, at 327 (“[W]ithin a determined 
context there may be a sense of contradiction sufficient to create social distress; and it is one of the grand roles of our 
constitutional courts to detect such contradictions and to affirm the capacity of our society to integrate its purposes.  
The statute under which agency operates is not the whole law applicable to its operation.  An agency is not an island 
entire of itself.”). 
Thus, as practice reveals information deficits and habitat-protective measures are drawn into question, state 
court judges and other adjudicators are in a unique position to notice.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Dept. of Natural Resources,
833 A.2d 563, 573-77, 595-96 (Md. 2003) (invalidating local critical area regulation as applied for, among other things, 
failing to take account of site-specific information brought forward by landowner).   
220 See WILLIAM R. JORDAN III, THE SUNFLOWER FOREST: ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION AND THE NEW COMMUNION WITH 
NATURE (2003); BILL BIRCHARD, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW THE NATURE CONSERVANCY 
BECAME THE LARGEST ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD 108-13 (2005) (describing TNC strategies for 
enacting major public spending for lands acquisition and the decision to play to sympathies other than “biodiversity”). 
As for the legitimacy of this kind of regulation by resort to local “police powers,” the 1970s debate over local 
ordinances on aesthetics and historic preservation is exemplary. Costonis argued that a “community’s decision to 
preserve is not preordained but is a self-defining political and cultural choice whose validity must ultimately rest on its 
compatibility with shared community values.”  Costonis, supra note 175, at 431 (emphasis omitted). He rejected the 
idea that some set of objective canons of beauty might be enforced by the courts, id. at 432, rightly in my view.  But he 
nevertheless took seriously the involvement of the courts in the testing of the rationales offered by local aesthetes for 
the restrictions they enact. Id. at 434-58.  The selection of species in a wildlife-focused local conservation plan—and 
thus the matrix of habitat requirements that locality will promote—is most certainly a kind of “anchor that keeps 
communities together and reestablishes pride and economic vitality.”  Id. at 460 (quoting a 1981 policy of the 
Department of Interior on historic preservation).  Whether the choices any particular locality makes are ecologically 
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property, its members are literally invested in the successful achievement of the ends 
from which that cost stems221—whatever the structural defects of the “public sphere” by 
which it communicates.  This market dimension of a habitat-based approach to local 
conservation gives it a popular foundation most administrative agencies lack.222 At the 
same time, the incrementalism of building networks from the bottom up will keep at least 
some high-stakes judgments provisional and relatively small in scale, exactly as 
conservation biology would have them.223 
C. Suburban Habitat Conservation and Restoration: Pragmatic and Unbounded  
Individual localities with local priorities may not be adjuncts of our rationalist, 
compound republic synthesized piecemeal from the traditions of Federalism and 
 
sound is another matter, and one that will bear further investigation of case study.  As Fennell argued, “[c]apitalization . 
. . is a double-edged sword.  It translates human preferences into home values, regardless of whether those preferences 
are worthy or base.”  Lee Anne Fennel, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 649 (2002).  In short, adjudicative testing of 
this aesthetics-based model of habitat protection and restoration is a necessary adjunct to localism’s ecology, as is 
discussed in Section C. 
221 Cf. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87, at 80-99 (describing the influence an real property investment 
has on local voters’ propensity to participate in local politics); Jon C. Sonstelie & Paul R. Portney, Profit Maximizing 
Communities and the Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 5 J. URB. ECON. 263 (1978) (arguing that communities 
strive to maximize property values over the long- and short-term, whether through expansion or local expenditures, but 
that they are, for a variety of reasons, unlikely to achieve their optimums because of the variations in investment in any 
particular locality at any particular time).  Interestingly, Jordan attributes the widespread neglect of CCC-planted 
forests and other manipulated sites throughout the late twentieth century partly to the fact that the agency’s employees 
were “nonresidents of project areas and therefore lacked a close association with the projects.”  JORDAN, supra note 
220, at 176. This made it that much easier for “society to lose interest in the old CCC sites and to neglect or exploit 
them.”  Id.   
222 See Colburn, “Democratic Experimentalism,” supra note 190, at 351-55, 383-89; see supra note 107. 
223 Cf. SABEL ET AL., supra note 62, at 40-46 (describing a variety of federal mechanisms that might achieve a locality-
by-locality approach); Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, supra note 102, at 263-69 (describing various 
alternatives to formal contractual obligations and arguing that “regionalization” is more likely to be achieved by such 
soft arrangements).  Local, entrepreneurial pursuit of public objectives does not mean the wholesale exclusion of civil 
society.  Fish and game departments can be a rich source of expertise and information—much the same as university 
environmental studies departments, private nonprofits studying habitat issues, land trusts, and other members of the 
conservation community.  An example of a private firm doing such work, Keeping Track,™ is a Vermont nonprofit 
that provides a networking service for those towns, businesses, citizens, and agencies looking to inventory and track 
local wildlife populations.  Since 1994, this firm has worked to educate citizens about the presence of wildlife and to 
cultivate a concern for its habitat.  Mitchell & Diamant, supra note 64, at 222-24.  Wildlife observations by trained 
volunteers are entered into town databases that are then shared regionally in the effort to achieve or protect connectivity 
at a landscape scale.  Id. at 223.  By 2004, it had linked over ninety communities in this fashion (across Vermont, New 
Hampshire, Maine, Quebec, Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut, and had branched out to Pennsylvania, 
Arizona, and California).  Id.  The organization’s web site makes the example it has set widely accessible.  See 
http://keepingtrack.org/article/view/3648/1/390.
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Progressivism.224 But the more we are learning about reweaving a landscape, the more 
we are finding that a diversity of experiments is probably more important than that any 
one of them succeed.225 Local governance, though, is inherently tied to property 
investment and entrepreneurship.226 And if our suburbs and exurbs truly are 
entrepreneurs of place, then the public problem of sustaining extant flora and fauna 
populations seems surprisingly congruent with the legal structure of the municipality in 
our suburbanized localism: the scarcer nature becomes, the more willing its “consumers” 
will be to pay for it as an amenity capitalized within their property values.227 Yet to do so 
effectively, they will have to cooperate with others. 
1.  Piecing Together A Whole: A Role for the Judiciary. Most of what must be 
done in pursuit of the common purpose of protecting and restoring habitat is necessarily 
focused either at a relatively small scale or at a truly immense one.228 Thus, given (1) the 
 
224 See supra Part IV.  The political left’s skepticism of localities today traces to the Warren Court’s one person-one 
vote revolution as much as Progressivism’s faith in expertise.  But conservatives seem more interested in the Federalist 
traditions and are often skeptical of any arm of the state as an obstacle to individual welfare maximization. See, e.g.,
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackstone for the 
original meaning of the Takings Clause and criticizing the majority of the Court for allowing a compensated taking for 
“public use” that resulted in land being taken from one person and deeded to another). 
225 One public/private hybrid organization today working from the ground up, called “Beginning with Habitat,” pools 
local professional talents of several kinds with state and private data and GIS capabilities to evaluate various habitats 
and local breeding populations of native flora and fauna.  See http://www.beginningwithhabitat.org. The University of 
Maine’s Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit initiated it, but it has since evolved to include municipalities, 
Maine’s Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  Similar hybrids have 
emerged in New York’s Hudson Valley, see Krajik, supra note 26, at 32, and elsewhere.  See infra note 264. 
226 This must be made to work for conservation, especially if the strain of activist localism mentioned above, see supra 
note 66, turns its attention toward the incorporation of new towns, townships, or villages where a group of residents 
seek better protections for nature than their existing locality provides.  See Rodriguez, supra note 45.  The first right of 
suburbia is still much the same as it was even prior to the founding: the right of exit. Cf. NANCY ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 140 (1998) (“Local governments are “frequently created and defended . . . to insulate one 
set of local people or interests from the regulatory authority and population of another local government””) (internal 
citations omitted); TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB, supra note 119; MONKKONEN, supra note 169, at 141-43; Briffault, 
Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82, at 72-85 (describing law of incorporation, annexation, and 
secession and noting its deference to local preferences); BURNS, supra note 142.   
227 Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 380.  This stems ultimately from the perversity of the suburban land ethic 
itself: the atomized experiencing of “nature,” one parcel at a time.  See generally Breckenridge, Reweaving the 
Landscape, supra note 28.  It is beyond the power of the judicial system to change this ethic, though, at least directly. 
228 Compare Ortiz, supra note 37, at 190 (“Maintaining plants and trees will also provide food (in the form of fruits, 
nuts, and insects attracted by the vegetation) and sanctuary for birds, bats, and other small wildlife.  This in turn can 
have a beneficial impact on species populations and diversity and may contribute to sustenance of larger wildlife.”) 
with FOREMAN, supra note 66 (setting out a vision of habitat protection at a continental scale and arguing that only that 
comprehensive an approach can even possibly succeed).  Buffers along riparian zones of no more than thirty meters 
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inherent contingency of our knowledge of disturbed ecosystems, (2) the irreducibly 
political task of agreeing to the ecological objectives to pursue with scarce resources, and 
(3) the rather “private” motives of most American municipalities, a somewhat complex 
jurisprudence to support this approach is beginning to come into focus.  A practicable 
means-ends judicial scrutiny able to “smoke out” illicit motives229 without ossifying 
implementation would be the ideal in the abstract.230 In any particular legal challenge to 
local land use policies or other exercises of the police power, courts must inevitably 
scrutinize the instrumentalism of the municipality.231 That scrutiny should be assiduous 
 
have been linked to important habitat-ameliorative mechanisms, as have roadside vegetation management regimes.  See 
BENNETT, supra note 59, at 97-122; FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY, supra note 66, at 75-138, 319-50. But the cost of 
managing roads as immense as the federal interstate highway system has meant that state and federal administrative 
agency attention to such minor matters has often as not resulted in practices like the spread of kudzu (Pueraria 
thunbergiana), a fast-growing but highly destructive vine, planted to mitigate road-side erosion (which it does) without 
regard for its wider impacts on local vegetation (which are significant).  See id. at 79. 
229 An explanation of federal anti-discrimination norms and doctrine that casts judicial scrutiny in these terms was 
given by Justice O’Connor in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., for the 
plurality); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003). 
230 Compare Sandalow, Home Rule, supra note 81, at 708-14 (linking skepticism of localism to the “protection of basic 
values”) with Barron, Home Rule, supra note 137, at 2340 (“In a range of policy areas, analysts have begun to 
recognize that effective, generalizable policy solutions often are best revealed through consideration of broad problems 
within a local context.  Working out a problem in a more localized setting can expose potential solutions that more 
abstract consideration of the problem would not identify.”).  Over two decades ago, in a major synthesis critiquing the 
democratic legitimacy and justice of local land use planning in practice, Carol Rose argued that “[h]owever much or 
little local governments may structurally resemble the Federalist legislature in general, they are very unlikely to be 
restrained by the Federalist safeguards in making the specific piecemeal land decisions.  In making these decisions—
which involve only a few interested parties meeting only on single issues, [local] legislatures are restrained neither by a 
coalition-building process that assures the fairness of the decisions, nor by a clash of interests that gives time for sober 
consideration.”  Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 81, at 856.   
Rose’s ultimate solution was a new test of legitimacy for municipal decision-making based directly on the 
“dealing character” of land use planning as it is actually practiced.  Id. at 857.  The piecemeal nature of most local land 
use decisions—whether as part of a “steady leak” of variances from “comprehensive plans” or as public referenda on 
particular zoning/planning decisions—undermined the notion that comprehensive plans so vaunted within the model of 
standardized zoning practice were actually having any rationalizing effect.  Id. at 857-82.  Rose’s solution was a test 
keyed directly to the property values at stake and the susceptibility of the controversy in question to some form of local 
government-sponsored mediation, id. at 883-900, backed up, of course, by the fairness safety-net of the right of “exit” 
from the subject municipality.  Id. at 900-01.  Rose argued such a test would validate the municipality seeking a pocket 
park or subway entrance from the developer asked to “mitigate his building’s effect on sunlight and traffic conditions,” 
id. at 908, so long as the developer had been “forewarned that such a quid pro quo may be asked if planning studies or 
impact analyses had shown that the community has studied its sunlight and traffic congestion conditions and thus 
signaled its concern with the subject, and if its planning studies have identified benefits that might be part of a 
negotiated package.”  Id.  “It is precisely because exit is relatively available at local governmental levels that 
predictability can test fairness.  While predictability makes exit possible, the likelihood of exit acts as a check on local 
bodies: they will want to act reasonably so that potential developers will not decide that any investment in their 
community is simply too costly.” Id.  It is this sort of judicial management of local environmental regulation that may 
be its best catalyst for genuine conservation progress in the future.   
231 Challenges may be brought against local government police power on a number of state and federal constitutional 
grounds and a myriad of state statutory and common law grounds.  See KRANE ET AL., supra note 81, at Appendix: 
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enough to disentangle the legitimate aesthetic goals and adaptive management of local 
proprietorship from the well-known tendencies of municipalities toward discrimination 
and pretended “public” purposes.232 
Embracing local conservation’s link to real property values might be no more than 
a path to judicial deference unless the next steps are taken.  Faith in the market and 
respect for accrued equity in land explains local power more than any other variable, no 
matter the specific doctrinal question.233 However, just because it is in suburban local 
 
Home Rule Across the Fifty States; RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 89; REYNOLDS, supra note 207, at 
§§ 27-34, 37-44, 49-53, 141-45, 151-60.  Of course, the “scope of review” of any one of these challenges will vary with 
the precise legal doctrines to some degree.  But deference is the norm and discriminatory motive is the most common 
target.  See, e.g., Board of County Commrs. of Routt County v. O’Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Colo. 1996); MORE. 
232 “Dillon’s rule” and other forms of such scrutiny are already plentiful in local government law. Barron, Home Rule,
supra note 137.  But it is surprising how symmetrical such scrutiny could become with what conservation biologists 
have argued must happen for public conservation to improve as a means to its own ends.  Cf. Soulé, What is 
Conservation Biology?, supra note 47, at 728.  For the near-universal demand in the administrative process for provable 
rationality is, in an important sense, incompatible with the achievement of potential connectivity through adaptive 
management, patch-by-patch, population-by-population.  Localities choosing local flora and fauna and habitats to 
protect and restore, of course, need not act only on such provable rationality as a justification for their choices.  They 
need only articulate a preference for the aesthetics of a local landscape with such “natural” characteristics over one 
without them.  This kind of preference-based justification for local lawmaking, often on an abuse of discretion 
standard, is well-established in most states’ land use and zoning enabling laws, as well as many states’ positive law of 
“home rule.”  See, e.g., State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1955); Reid v. 
Architectural Bd. of Review of City of Cleveland Heights, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963); Piscitelli v. Twp. Comm., 248 
A.2d 274 (N.J.L. Div. 1968); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 368 A.2d 163 (Conn. 1976); State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 
821 (N.J. 1980); Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982); Coscan Washington, 
Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Com., 590 A.2d 1080 (Md. App. 1991);  Breneric Assocs. v. City 
of Del Mar, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 324 (Cal. App. 1998);  Rolling Pines Ltd. partnership v. City of Little Rock, 40 S.W.3d  
828 (Ark. App. 2001); Transylvania County v. Moody, 565 S.E.2d 720 (N.C. App. 2002).   
Police power and zoning controls for historic preservation are another, similar source of authority for 
restrictions on new construction as well as affirmative duties of maintenance and care following or cognate to 
construction.  See Heithaus v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 779 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2001); Farash Corp. v. City of 
Rochester, 713 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 2000); Van Horn v. Town of Castine, 167 F.Supp.2d 103 (D. Mass. 2001); 
Berberian v. Housing Authority of the City of Cranston, 315 A.2d 747 (R.I. 1974). Tellingly, where municipalities 
stand the greatest chance of reversal of ordinances based upon aesthetics today may be those initiatives derived from or 
in some way subordinate to state or federal initiatives!  See, e.g., Subdivision Servs. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 784 
A.2d 850 (Pa. Commw. 2001) (reversing municipality in its denial of permit to erect billboard on grounds denial was 
inconsistent with state’s Highway Beautification Act regulations).  Thus, it is very possible that the more independent 
the local initiative, the less likely it is to be rolled back or otherwise frustrated by the legal process.   
233 Compare Duncanson v. Bd. Supervisors of Danville Twp., 551 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (Minn. App. 1996) (upholding 
moratorium on development of feedlot because legitimate concerns were raised where effects of the feedlot “were 
simply unknown” and town was justified in preventing unregulated, unplanned development) with Construction 
Industry Assn. of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908  (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding plan with tight 
restrictions on development in deference to city’s expressed desire to “preserve its small town character”).  In short, 
their scale (making them inherently incremental) and their legal foundations (making them inherently self-interested) 
are the strengths to be commandeered from localities, not their connections to community or democracy.  Of course, 
there is no necessary distinction between community and the guarding of property values.  FISCHEL, REGULATORY 
TAKINGS, supra note 87, at 285-88.  Yet reification of local boundaries for the purpose of protecting property values 
accepts a notion of political community that is deeply contradictory of most normative conceptions of democracy. 
Compare Schragger, supra note 150, at 1847-48 (“[A]ttention to local boundaries is a product of the political economy 
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governments’ nature to be self-regarding does not mean exclusionary motives should be 
allowed to constitute their identity. Adjudication might be able to foster solutions to the 
challenges of scale these collectives face without denying their independent identities.  
Thus, viewing particular conservation or restoration actions as being a function of a 
competitive market and local aesthetic preferences—preferences that define a locale’s 
relationship to its land—could render the legal processes of our localism more 
instrumental to the wider public good.  Distributing the costs and benefits234 of sustaining 
a common pool resource like extant habitat is necessarily an iterative process235 and 
probably best thought of as a judicially managed one where our localism is concerned.236 
Developers and municipal officials choosing where and how to locate new 
construction or what to do to enhance the amenities of existing housing stock have 
 
of privatized local government.  If one believes that one has “paid” for a particular service by buying entry into a 
jurisdiction, then any distribution across jurisdictional lines raises the specter that one is not getting what one has paid 
for.”) with MANSBRIDGE, supra note 146, at 26 (“No group of people, however small, ever has completely identical 
[political] interests.”); cf. Hills, supra note 34, at 2011 (“Community building, sadly, might be critically related to the 
building of walls.”).  
234 Especially as active, affirmative manipulation of the landscape becomes increasingly necessary—as habitat 
restoration becomes the principal task in achieving potential connectivity—those with the capital to invest are quickly 
becoming the indispensable party in population viability work.  See Simberloff et al., supra note 123, at 73-78 
(describing the needs of active management, including the control of the abiotic disturbance regime, reintroduction of 
native species, controlling exotic species and other management techniques to restore connectivity); James A. 
MacMahon & Karen D. Holl, Ecological Restoration: A Key to Conservation Biology’s Future, in RESEARCH 
PRIORITIES supra note 52, at 245, 247 (same); FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY, supra note 66, at 380-81 (noting the 
dramatic increase in state and local attention to mitigating the fragmenting effects of roads when the Federal Highway 
Administration began earmarking federal subsidies for that purpose). 
235 Tellingly, one of Tiebout’s examples of rational inter-local cooperation was Dutch elm disease, an invasive fungus 
that eliminated much of a beloved species of tree from North America beginning in the 1930s.  Cf. Tiebout, supra note 
87, at 423 (“In cases in which the external economies and diseconomies are of sufficient importance, some form of 
integration may be indicated.”).  Mechanisms that internalize the benefits of habitat expenditures to those localities 
making them and/or excluding those that do not would incentivize cooperation. Cf. Stephen M. Meyer, End of the Wild,
29 BOSTON REV. 20, 22 (2004) (“[F]or sustainable development to have an impact on conservation it must be tied 
directly to local demand, where the costs of overexploitation are borne by those who benefit from it.”); OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 93, at 2-28 (describing the consequences of individuals’ opportunity to behave 
strategically and free-ride on the cooperation of others protecting common pool resources).  Property value premiums 
might be used to do so.  See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87. 
236 Compare Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 34, at 1074-80 (describing the role of legal concepts in the 
definition of city character) with Briffault, The Structure of Local Government Law, supra note 82 (describing the 
“structure of local government law” by reference to the major precedents of the twentieth century on school finance and 
exclusionary zoning, local government formation, and local autonomy as recognized in federal constitutional law). 
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growing fiscal incentives to pay careful attention to habitat.237 But they should start 
having judicially crafted incentives to recognize the limited horizons of their own efforts 
and, therefore, the necessity of extra-local cooperation.  Specifying that duty is inherently 
contextual and not properly ascribed to any particular municipality in the abstract.  But 
the most likely market rewards for conservative or restorative choices by these actors are 
the price premiums that attach to development that is not the same old homogenizing 
sprawl238 and the most ready fiscal/legal rewards are those stemming from judicial 
deference to properly justified exercises of regulatory power.239 
Judicial policing of self-regarding motives by factions and locales is inherent in 
our constitutional system240 and this is where courts fit into a pragmatic localist model.241 
237 See generally Charles P. Lord et al., Natural Cities, Urban Ecology, and the Restoration of Urban Ecosystems, 21 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 329-31 (2003); Rutherford H. Platt, Toward Ecological Cities: Adapting to the 21st Century 
Metropolis, 46 ENVIRONMENT 11, 23-26 (2004); James A. Kushner, Smart Growth: Urban Growth Management and 
Land Use Regulation Law in America, 32 URB. LAW. 211, 229-30 (2000); PERLMAN & MILDER, supra note 191.   
238 So far as I was able to detect, no court has yet, in scrutinizing a local habitat-based initiative, suggested that its 
validity or scope ought to turn on that locality’s efforts to engage extra-local cooperation.  On the other hand, several 
state courts have surmised (whether from the submissions of parties or otherwise) that extra-local action is a necessity 
to the effective pursuit of the conservation ends articulated in some challenged initiative.  See, e.g., Long Island Pine 
Barrens Society, Inc. v. Planning Bd. Brookhaven et al., 606 N.E.2d 1373 (N.Y. 1992) (in challenge to multiple town 
approvals of development in sensitive pine barrens ecosystem court recognizes that “the facts in this case demonstrate 
the need for centralized planning by a single regional agency”); Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Natural Resources, 271 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 1978) (local ordinance prohibiting state-licensed use of herbicide within city 
limits was invalid use of police power because it was “implicit” that pesticide regulation was under the jurisdiction of 
the state); Fafard v. Conservation Comm’n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66 (Mass. 2000) (holding that though town may 
have authority to regulate the construction of piers on public trust lands, it did not have authority to further the “public 
interest” by regulating use of such lands generally as this was power reserved to the state). 
239 Pragmatically, given the technical richness and scientific uncertainty inherent in such judicial endeavors, there is 
perhaps no better measurement of efficacy under the circumstances than the municipality’s efforts to enlist those 
beyond its borders.  Judicial scrutiny gently incentivizing inter-local cooperation to the end of landscape connectivity, 
that is, could be a pragmatic balancing of many competing values without degenerating into judicial imperialism.  
240 Cf. The Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 78 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Liberty is to faction what air 
is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. . . . But the most common and durable source of factions has 
been the various and unequal distribution of property.  Those who hold and those who are without property have ever 
formed distinct interests in society.”). 
241 See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. L. REV. 183 (1997); 
MICHELMAN & SANDALOW, supra note 95, at 8-26; RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 81-148 (6th ed. 2004); BAKER & GILLETTE, supra note 207, at 83-135; see generally ORFIELD, supra 
note 92;  Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 197.  Professor Nolon’s paradigmatic local environmental law, the 
“surprising origin of smart growth” in the Town of Ramapo’s infrastructure concurrency requirements, was upheld 
against a challenge to its validity on a finding that it was not an effort to flatly prohibit others from building within the 
town.  See Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d 291, 301 (N.Y. 1972); Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations, supra 
note 73, at 24.  New York’s courts and others have shown themselves willing and able to scrutinize local land use 
measures of that sort, both as to the validity of the local ordinance, see, e.g., Medical Services, Inc. v. City of Savage,
487 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. App. 1992); Rancourt v. Town of Barnstead, 523 A.2d 55 (N.H. 1986); Board of County 
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Instead of old-line “Federalism” keyed to the welfare of the wider commercial public or 
old-line Progressivism dismissive of non-expert regulation altogether, judicial scrutiny 
might be updated to incentivize inter-local bargaining and the pooling of efforts to 
preserve or restore connectivity of a landscape.  At its best, such scrutiny could catalyze 
regional cooperation in ways that differentiate snobbery from genuine plans to “reweave 
the landscape.”242 Large lot zoning or aquifer protection ordinances, after all, can 
sometimes be no more than a good pretext for fencing people out—at the same time they 
are actually contrary to wider, habitat-protective goals.243 Even on a deferential review, 
real judicial scrutiny of articulated habitat concerns and the means used is legitimate and 
can reveal prejudice masquerading as “environmentalist” activism.244 
Comm’rs v. Condor, 927 P.2d 1339 (Colo. 1996); City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 
1979), and as to the possible takings and other constitutional claims therein.  See, e.g., Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 
1295 (N.Y. 1977). 
242 Inter-local cooperation has been touted as a means to regional ends by Nolon among others.  See, e.g., John R. 
Nolon, Grassroots Regionalism Through Intermunicipal Land Use Compacts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011 (1999); 
Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations, supra note 73, at 63-64; MCELFISH, supra note 69, at 26-28; Breckenridge, 
Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 28, at 406-416. 
243 By itself, a large lot requirement only assures that more space will be fragmented in ownership and development to 
accommodate the demand for land.  Ziegler, supra note 91, at 62; PERLMAN & MILDER, supra note 191, at 116; Wolf, 
Euclid, supra note 142, at 985-89.  Whether the quality of the space under such controls is indeed feasibly maintained 
as habitat will be a species-by-species question and this is not to deny that relatively small spaces can be important.  Cf.
Phillip G. deMaynadier and Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr., The Relationship Between Forest Management and Amphibian 
Ecology: A Review of the North American Literature, 3 ENV. REV. 230, 251 (1995) (predicting that microhabitats may 
support viable populations of amphibians).  But just as critical in new construction is the careful management of local 
vegetation during construction as well as its continued propagation.  JORDAN, supra note 220, at 10-27.  Builders are 
learning as much.  See PERLMAN & MILDER, supra note 191, at 234-37.  In Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 657 
N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 2003), a town that chose to develop some of its lands itself, in part because it was confident its 
development would preserve sensitive area wetlands and the necessary connectivity the parcels supported (and that 
other development in the area might not), was upheld over a challenge to the town’s authority to do so.  Id. at 353-57.  
Choosing the right “in-fill” development opportunities, of course, depends heavily on accurately forecasting local and 
regional real estate markets. In the Beloit case, the “town ultimately determined that it was its duty to ensure that an 
ecologically fragile area was properly developed, and the best way to accomplish this goal was to carry out the 
development itself.” Id. at 350.  
Nevertheless, large mammals and, in particular, carnivores and their wide geographic habitat needs, have the 
potential to render any isolated local conservation efforts—and especially large lot zoning in the absence of inter-local 
and inter-governmental partnerships—meaningless or worse.  See Miller et al., supra note 199; Terborgh et al., supra 
note 54, at 54-58; supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.  The overarching objective of potential connectivity at the 
landscape and sub-regional scales—at least with respect to challenging species of this sort—thus, will be realized (or 
not) at a simultaneously broad and small scale.  See Jamison E. Colburn, Predator Conservation and Restoration in 
New England: A Case Study in Localism’s Ecology (2005) (manuscript on file with author). 
244 For example, in the historic case, Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984), where an 
Illinois town had prohibited the possession of operable handguns within its borders, the scrutiny the court applied to the 
measure was described as “rational basis scrutiny.” Id. at 278.  Yet the Illinois Supreme Court nonetheless took the 
opportunity to consider the ordinance as a means to Morton Grove’s avowed “legitimate governmental interest,” id., 
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With the right assistance,245 habitat-based, bottom-up conservation and restoration 
initiatives have strong advantages.  Without the bureaucratic routines that come with 
high-stakes, “science only” agency decision-making at the broad scale, local governments 
are freer to experiment, improvise, and adapt.246 And depending on the geography and 
the range of the species or population(s) at issue, inter-local partnering could actually 
internalize the benefits of habitat protection, i.e., the presence of the “wild” nature in a 
continuous network of patches and corridors.247 
2. Pragmatic Incrementalism: Place- and Population-Based. Local habitat 
protection and restoration bears little resemblance to the rationalistic processes of the 
federal law of habitat.   While both must cope with ignorance and human-disturbed 
ecosystems, only one operates through the slow and costly findings of “detailed 
statements,”248 the adversarial selection of (artificially bounded) “indicators” of 
 
that is, the reduction of the risk of death or injury from guns within the borders of the town.  Id.  When an objection 
was raised that the law made an exception for security guards and that the exemption tended to undermine the law’s 
effectiveness as to such an interest, the court answered the objection carefully but quite persuasively.  Id. (“The village 
trustees could validly have believed that security guards as a group were likely to exercise greater responsibility in 
using their weapons than citizens generally. . . .”).   
245 Judicial doctrines structuring scrutiny of local conservation around the need for inter-local cooperation and the 
prevalence of illegitimate motives in suburban regulatory actions could incentivize cooperation by “flushing out” any 
pretenses and revealing sham conservation for what it is.  See Kathryn A. Foster, Regional Impulses, 19 J. URB. AFF.
375, 398 (1997) (“Mutual benefit, not altruism, governs regional outcomes. . . .  [B]argaining parties, strong and weak 
alike, must be made no worse off by new regional outcomes or such outcomes will not occur.”).  Of course this whole 
model relies in largest measure on the “private” propensity to conserve or preserve land and habitat. I believe the 
empirical data supports this reliance, though.  For example, according to the Land Trust Alliance, between 1998 and 
2003,conservation easements held by some 1,500 land trusts nationwide spiked from 7,392 to 17,847—increasing the 
area protected from 1.385 million acres to 5.067 million acres.  See http://www.lta.org/aboutlt/census.shtml.
246 For species such as amphibians, managed forestry practices even at scales as small as a stand of trees can be 
decisive to a local population’s persistence throughout harvesting and other activity.  Uncompacted soil, coarse and 
deep leafy and woody debris litter left on the forest floor, and patches of canopy shade, for example, were identified by 
deMaynadier and Hunter as critical. DeMaynadier & Hunter, supra note 243, at 251.  Thus, judicial rejections of small 
scale efforts per se—often rooted in skepticism of the local government as sovereign, see, e.g., Avalonbay 
Communities, Inc. v. Wilton Inland Wetlands Comm., 832 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2003)—are misplaced.  Skepticism 
demanding some kind of proof that the measure was adopted with legitimate economic or aesthetic interests in mind 
(and not naked prejudice), though, see, e.g., Caspersen v. Town of Lyme, 661 A.2d 759, 763-64 (N.H. 1995), is 
importantly different. 
247 Marketing such a “natural communities conservation plan” has already begun in California and there is no reason to 
presume that other places cannot improve upon its successes.  See Douglas P. Wheeler, Ecosystem Management: An 
Organizing Principle for Land Use, in LAND USE IN AMERICA supra note 27, at 155. 
248 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). 
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ecological health,249 or with a fixation upon species already facing oblivion.  But if the 
failures of comprehensive rationality are well known in attempts to achieve anything as 
complex as community or ecological health,250 the potential of this bottom-up alternative 
is still unrealized.  The role impact players must fulfill in this passive architecture is to 
foster the communication within real estate markets that will promote capitalization of 
habitat-based conservation and restoration.251 
Even with economic competitiveness motivating the measures we see today on 
environmental amenities like open-space landscapes, slope and ridge integrity, aquifers 
and the like,252 it is still possible to envision a future where these competitors collaborate 
 
249 Andelman & Fagan, supra note 12, at 5957. 
250 Cf. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (describing the failures of urban planners 
to achieve their optimally zoned community); KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note 60, at 19-22. 
251 See Dewitt John, Civic Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: CHALLENGES,
CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES 219, 230-34 (Robert F. Durant et al. eds., 2004).  Effective communication and education 
about landscape-scale connectivity faces the traditional dilemma of environmental politics: the more sophisticated the 
understanding of an ecosystem becomes, the less easily it is communicated widely.  See BRULLE, supra note 108, at 
278.  Nonetheless, planning and conservation professionals have available to them today a wealth of literature on the 
importance of connectivity.  FORMAN, LAND MOSAICS, supra note 46, at 155-57; FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY, supra 
note 66, at 129-30; HONACHEVSKY, supra note 68, at 81-84; NOSS ET AL., supra note 60, at 176-80; MCELFISH, supra 
note 69, at 7-19 BEATLEY, supra note 120, at 196-217.  Indeed, finding workable solutions to habitat problems at the 
local level which are then communicated regionally, may, in reality, be easier than doing so through the announce-and-
defend organizational culture of most administrative agencies.  See Eileen Gay Jones, Risky Assessments: Uncertainties 
in Science and the Human Dimensions of Environmental Decisionmaking, 22 WM & MARY ENV. L & POL’Y REV. 1, 
14-28 (1997) (discussing uses of “public comment” in which agencies announce predetermined conclusions after taking 
comments merely as a way to prepare their defenses); Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning, in 
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, at 144, 153-56 
(Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (critiquing the habitat conservation planning program of the Fish & 
Wildlife Service for its tight control of “public participation” and the agency’s propensity to exclude all but the most 
intensely interested stakeholders).  But it is undoubtedly a role that acutely interested activists must play at the local 
level if a mutually sustaining relationship is to arise between small scale and individual involvement.  See CRONIN &
KENNEDY, supra note 66, at 263-79. 
252 That kind of competition characterizes suburbs in their search for residents: they are what they are, in large measure, 
because of what and who is around them but not in them.  DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 112, 135-48 (describing the 
aesthetic fascination with “wilderness” and one suburb’s effort to outdo its neighbors by affirmatively cultivating a 
sense of the wild within its open spaces);  TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 89, at 181-82.  Of course, the 
protection of steep slopes might be motivated by a concern for erosion and loss of productive soils.  See, e.g., NOLON,
OPEN GROUND, supra note 69, at 358-62.  On the other hand, one of the towns Nolon publicizes for its exemplary slope 
protection ordinance (Penfield, New York), Nolon, Parochialism, supra note 68, at 400, was actually famously the 
subject of challenges to its exclusionary zoning practices in the 1970s.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).  
Because “[i]t is really up to local governments to seek out sources of good information” and to integrate the available 
data into “comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, subdivision ordinances, and a host of specific environmental and 
infrastructure controls and capital improvement plans,” MCELFISH, supra note 68, at 149, there is plenty of slack for 
any such mechanism to serve ends other than concern for local flora or fauna.  The slope regulation or large lot 
requirement might, after all, be motivated by a desire to constrain the supply of developable land.  Duncan and Duncan, 
in an incisive critique of the environmental ethic of the Town of Bedford in Westchester County forty miles north of 
New York City, marshal impressive evidence suggesting that “[a] seemingly innocent appreciation of landscapes and 
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to accomplish common ends.  But successfully harnessing this proprietary power of 
suburban local government may turn on biological diversity being viewed as a form of 
local and regional earnings.253 Pragmatism has no quarrel with the incentivization of 
locality-by-locality cooperation to secure such earnings because that joint enterprise is 
unbounded.254 Quite unlike the bureaucratic agencies superintending our paradoxically 
disjointed state and federal habitat programs, though, local governments set their goals ad
hoc: they strike bargains as quasi-corporate agents whose principals are self-interested 
and proximate.255 So to expect any aspect of local governance to be rational or 
comprehensive from its inception is a category mistake and state and federal courts 
hearing challenges to local initiatives are under well-hewn rules of deference.256 
desire to protect local history and nature can act as subtle but highly effective mechanisms of exclusion and 
reaffirmation of class identity.”  DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 112, at 4. Their Bedford bears a suspicious similarity 
to Mount Laurel and many other suburbs and exurbs. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 112.   
253 The strengths conservation practice draws from such a decomposed version of itself in the “middle landscape” come 
in at least two forms.  First, it sheds the politically naïve hopes that potential connectivity can be achieved by amassing 
enough exceptional enclaves to be set upon highly prescriptive federal designations (like those of the Wilderness Act or 
the ESA).  See supra notes 21-26 accompanying text.  Second, because any particular initiative is of such a diminished 
scale and is ad hoc by nature, participants are less often repeat players and have less incentive and fewer opportunities 
to behave strategically and rely upon legal process or judicially imposed relief to manipulate the other stakeholders.  Cf. 
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 56, at 348-56.   With less incentive to resort to litigation, participants logically stand more to 
gain through real engagement on a continuing basis.  See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward Ecologically 
Sustainable Democracy?, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE, at 208, 213 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003). 
254 No matter how successful a single land management agency or state is in efforts to protect habitat, the legal 
boundaries confining it constitute an artificial limitation of its horizons.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
255 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 146.  As I have argued elsewhere, the capital that can be generated from such trades 
between owners—capital that can fund the sort of active biophysical manipulation of landscapes necessary to 
improving potential connectivity—is becoming pivotal to continued progress.  Bargains among actors with a diversity 
of available means and ends can do just this.  See Jamison E. Colburn, Trading Spaces: Habitat Mitigation “Banking” 
Under Fish & Wildlife Service Guidelines, 20 NAT. RES. & ENV. 33 (Summer 2005). 
256 Thus, in Rancho Lobo, LTD. v. DeVargas, 303 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002), a local forest practices ordinance 
required compliance with measures that had been left “recommended” by a similar state statute.  The court had no 
problem affirming the validity of the ordinance as a “mere complement” to the state statute and not something to be 
preempted thereby.  Id. at 1201-07.  See also Droste v. Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County, 85 P.3d 585 
(Colo.App. 2003) (in deferential review of county permit denial court upholds local determination that building plan 
was incompatible with wildlife habitat values); Florida Wildlife Federation v. Collier County, 819 So.2d 200 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 2002) (deferential review of local ordinance establishing interim measures for the protection of Florida panthers).  
Interestingly, localities in several states already have experience answering development pressures with concern for the 
protection of corridors for future transportation solutions.  See, e.g., Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 N.E.2d 655 
(N.C. 1990) (upholding town’s rejection of subdivision plan on grounds developer failed to reserve land needed for 
future roads planned within the town). 
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In this pragmatic reorientation of the two problems of local conservation, the 
choices of what to target with scarce management resources are, given their character and 
scope, acknowledged for being both deeply aesthetic257 and importantly self-defining.258 
But if real professional and judicial scrutiny provokes localities making these choices to 
act in ways that actually enhance the viability of local flora and fauna populations, it 
ought to be more collaboration than attack.259 For, if the modern problem with the local 
polis is at base one of motive,260 the sunshine that attends a duty to explain and justify an 
intention to others is a powerful disinfectant.  
 
257 Even the ESA, ostensibly the most general and science-based species protection law, has focused on “only the most 
extraordinarily special . . . species with significant public appeal or tenacious human advocates,” thanks largely to the 
“gauntlet of the ESA’s listing process.”  Doremus, Saving the Ordinary, supra note 12, at 330. 
258 Judicial scrutiny of an avowedly aesthetic purpose is neither inappropriate nor wholly unfamiliar in local 
governance.  Costonis marshaled impressive evidence that courts had evolved in their review of aesthetics ordinances, 
eventually requiring confirmation of community-expression and generality in several different legal contexts.  
Costonis, supra note 175, at 381-86.  What Costonis argued aesthetic regulations by local communities amounted to in 
their best form were “socially homeostatic devices,” that is, levers on the “pace and character of environmental change 
in a manner that precludes or mitigates damage to their identity, a constancy no less critical to social stability than 
biological constants are to the human body’s physiological equilibrium.”  Id. at 420.  It is this kind of respect for local 
aesthetics that the judiciary has shown and which the form of scrutiny proposed here assumes. 
259 In Caspersen v. Town of Lyme, 661 A.2d 759 (N.H. 1995), a forestry zoning district was challenged for, among 
other things, erecting an exclusionary barrier to low-income people (a 50 acre minimum lot size was one of the 
restrictions).  Id. at 761. Even the challengers conceded “that the ordinance was passed for legitimate purposes, 
including to encourage forestry and timber harvesting . . . .”  Id. at 763.  Thus, the gist of the challenge was that the 
selected means—lot size—was not rationally related to the articulated ends.  The trial court heard testimony from the 
town’s expert, however, that the selected minimum lot size was rationally related to the economic viability of “forestry 
enterprises,” and found that the evidence supported the town’s finding.  Id. at 764.  The means/ends engineering that 
could be fostered if this kind of judicial scrutiny was practiced more widely, especially where there is reason to believe 
means and ends have become confused, is precisely what pragmatism demands.  See WESTBROOK, DEWEY AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 222, at 310-18 (describing the modern condition of establishing truly public ends as a politics 
of knowledge wherein “effective and organized inquiry” is released to experiment with means and ends and produce 
place-based communities).  Suburbs are famous for their snobbery. See DUNCAN & DUNCAN, supra note 112, at 99 
(“Bedford’s residents are great supporters of wetlands when they are fighting potential development, but when not 
wearing their anti-development hats, they appear somewhat less interested.”).  And it is just this brand of scenery-as-
nature that fails conservation biology.  See Colburn, Indignity, supra note 1, at 448-55.  But courts—including courts 
scrutinizing land use ordinances—have proven themselves capable of recognizing sham justifications, often fashioning 
legal doctrine piecemeal in order to debunk the delusional or dishonest.  See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement 
Co. v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963) (invalidating open space ordinance as an effort to 
fence out development and as a regulatory taking); Bonnie Briar Syndicate Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 
971 (N.Y. 1999) (deferring to town’s creation of “recreational” district restricting subdivision on grounds that it 
situated within an overall, long-term plan to manage growth); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 
P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (requiring that growth-phasing ordinances serve a “regional” conception of the public welfare); 
Rancourt v. Town of Barnstead, 523 A.2d 55 (N.H. 1986) (reversing town’s denial of permission to subdivide on 
grounds that its estimates of projected market growth it used as a benchmark were lacking “solid, scientific, statistical 
basis”).  The problem is defining and properly confining such judicial scrutiny, though, given the potential for strategic 
uses thereof by acutely interested stakeholders. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 56, at 356-62. 
260 See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.  Cf. DEWEY, PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS, supra note 104, at 138 
(“Persons have their own business to attend to, and “business” has its own precise and specialized meaning.  Politics 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR LOCALISM’S ECOLOGY 
As our national fascination with the “special”261 and the “wild”262 show, our 
suburban nation takes a distinct and pronounced interest in the existence of and 
occasional interaction with “wilderness” and “wildlife.”  Unfortunately, though, the 
existing theoretical picture of “local environmental law” obscures more than it reveals by 
portraying local conservation as a devolved version of modern regulation or as 
democracy-in-action.  For if truly “wild” spaces and species are becoming increasingly 
rare,263 the relevance of local concern for nature consists chiefly in its sway with 
homevoters.264 It is their perceptions that matter most in suburbia, both politically and 
biologically: house sparrows, squirrels, skunks, and other commensals of suburban 
 
thus tends to become just another “business”: the especial concern of bosses and managers of the machine.”).  
Affirmatively unjust or illegitimate motives are also an incipient feature of land use regulations.  But they are often 
inchoate and implicit enough to lie beneath otherwise legitimate local sentiments and preferences.  See Ziegler, supra 
note 91, at 55 n.120 (“Today, the increasingly popular notion of “smart growth” is ambiguous enough to embrace some 
of our worst impulses and to avoid any sober assessment of the costs sprawl imposes on others and the natural 
environment.”).  Expressly exclusionary attitudes toward incoming residents are virtually per se illegal and are easily 
invalidated in court. See, e.g., Construction Industry Assn. of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1975). The much more difficult questions come in the form of tacit discrimination.  
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (listing a set 
of factors for courts to use in testing whether a discriminatory motive existed for any particular zoning ordinance with 
an exclusionary or discrimination impact); Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972) 
(upholding a series of restrictions on subdivision and development by finding that they were not outright prohibitions).  
But courts have shown themselves increasingly alert to such possibilities within local environmental law. See 
Caspersen v. Town of Lyme, 661 A.2d 759 (N.H. 1995) (upholding a fifty acre minimum lot size requirement as a 
legitimate means for preserving a “forestry district”); MORE. 
261 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
262 See NASH, supra note 10; Doremus, Saving the Ordinary, supra note 12. 
263 See TERBORGH, supra note 13;  Cronon, The Trouble With Wilderness, supra note 10, at 69; Doremus, Saving the 
Ordinary, supra note 12. 
264 Bateson and Smith connect the fact that “[w]ildlife viewing is now the number one outdoor activity in the United 
States,” with the more than 1200 local and regional land trusts nationwide that had, as of 1998, helped to protect about 
4.7 million acres of land—“an area larger than the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined.”  Emily Bateson 
& Nancy Smith, Making It Happen: Protecting Wilderness on the Ground, in WILDERNESS COMES HOME, supra note 
65, at 182, 193.  This movement is perhaps the clearest evidence that significant private capital is being attracted to 
protect locally significant habitat, see generally MIKE MCQUEEN & ED MCMAHON, LAND CONSERVATION FINANCING 
(2003)  (describing the conservation funding community and its localist political strategies), something that is also 
becoming clear at the polls election after election.  “As development accelerated over the last two decades, federal aid 
to states to acquire parks and open space evaporated.  But the dramatic rise in grassroots support for open space 
stunned even seasoned conservationists.  From 1998 to 2002, voters in states and localities across the U.S. approved 
670 referenda, devoting more than $25 billion to parks and open space.”  Id. at 12. Furthermore, at the same time 
capital has flowed the technology available for grassroots land conservation has flourished.  “[G]eographic information 
systems have enabled ecologists and planners to envision growth scenarios and estimate their effects not just on 
society’s so-called gray infrastructure—the road, utility and water systems that are essential to modern life—but the 
green infrastructure, an interconnected network of greenspace that conserves natural ecosystem values and functions 
while providing associated benefits to people.”  Id. at 17.   
65
society are neither “amenities” worth capitalizing in property values nor the creatures 
being jeopardized today by our sprawl.265 
In this light, then, suburbia as a whole is not the enemy, as so many think.266 
Dispatch is the signature strength of those motivated by self-interest267 and, if anything, 
municipalities that succeed in their competitive environment by keeping residents and 
attracting new ones have shown themselves to be highly skillful bargainers268 and highly 
adaptive, pragmatic stewards of local aesthetics.269 What theorists of local conservation 
should be developing are the notional distinctions differentiating illegitimate perversions 
of local authority from the genuine, aesthetically-driven and adaptively managed 
conservation initiative.  Such distinctions would be instrumental in the now on-going 
process of leveraging suburban land use policies away from simple scenery and toward a 
 
265 Various predators, songbirds, and ungulates like moose, though, seem to be.  The constructivist view of local self-
interest in wildlife habitat, then, is that the more localized the wildlife population is, the more valuable it grows to its 
suburban communities.  Cf. DAVID DOBBS & RICHARD OBER, THE NORTHERN FOREST 36-57 (1996) (describing intense 
efforts by lakeshore homeowners’ association to preserve waterfowl populations around Lake Umbagog, New 
Hampshire and linking the enthusiasm to the meaningfulness as well as economic benefits of the waterfowl). 
266 See DOWIE, supra note 34.  Intra- and inter-corporate networks are vastly superior to bureaucracies in their ability to 
think independently and in parallel, to recognize surprises, to pool information without bottlenecking, and at learning-
by-doing. Compare Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 278 (1999) (“[A] public corporation is a team of people who enter into a complex agreement to work together for 
their mutual gain. . . .  They enter into this mutual agreement in an effort to reduce wasteful shirking and rent-seeking 
by relegating to the internal hierarchy the right to determine the division of duties and resources in this joint enterprise. 
They thus agree not to specific terms or outcomes . . . but to participation in a process of internal goal setting and 
dispute resolution.”) with Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) (arguing that American corporate law is designed to “maximiz[e] the value of corporate 
enterprises to investors” and “minimiz[e] the sum of the transaction and agency costs of contracting”).  This has the 
effect of making them adaptive by nature. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 56, at 323-36.   
267 NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note 23, at 298-307 (describing organizational breakdowns in monitoring programs 
carried out by public agencies not directly interested in the success or failure of the population); Westley, Governing 
Design, supra note 44, at 401-05 (describing the design of a “changeful organization” and the need to give superiors a 
direct interest in the successful gathering of accurate information from the field as operations are implemented); cf.
Salwasser et al., supra note 63 (describing the friction that inheres in creating multi-agency arrangements to manage 
species with large area habitat needs).  
268 The one thing the entrepreneurial municipality has proven perfectly adapted to doing is bargaining, both with other 
municipalities and with businesses and individuals seeking permission to go forward with development activities.  See 
Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 81, at 879-87; Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 751-52.  
269 FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 87. Capable of swift, improvisational action initiated in response to 
stimuli from their environments, suburban local governments are a lot like their fully private counterparts.  Rodriguez, 
supra note 45, at 761. 
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gradually more complex sense of ownership of place.270 If it sounds fanciful, imagine the 
price premium that will attach to homes in such places as plant and wildlife diversity 
continue to shrink.271 
It has been said that America has a big problem in how it sees its built 
environments.272 If the environmental community’s deepest ambition is the creation of a 
more biocentric American society, then the reckoning with how incompletely the 
administrative state can pursue that end is approaching.  Its structural shortcomings are 
framed by comparing the dignity it assigns to its own processes as opposed to that it 
assigns ordinary citizens and ordinary nature.  Another prospective future is in local 
governments as shrewd borrowers of skills and human capital from ordinary people, each 
other, nonprofits, and academia.  A future for local government law that facilitates such 
performance opens up a wealth of ecological possibilities in our localism, combining the 
advantages of voluntarism with the superiority of networks and self-interest over 
centralized expert administration.  As Dewey argued (paraphrasing Emerson), “[w]e lie . . 
 
270 “Associational harmony, not visual beauty, is what community groups primarily seek from aesthetic regulation, and 
standards of aesthetic formalism cannot be authoritatively rendered as objective, ontologically based “laws.”. . .  
[T]hese standards are derived—or should be derived—from a profile of the characteristics of the existing resource that 
have generated the associational bonds between it and its constituencies.”  Costonis, supra note 175, at 424-25 
(citations omitted).  To expect that such an aesthetic could arise through noncentralized interactions between 
suburbanites and the market is no more improbable than the rise of the American lawn as a dominant aesthetic 
tradition. Cf. BORMANN ET AL., supra note 144, at 49 (suggesting that the carefully tended lawn “developed from a 
marriage of many forces: the long history of our love of the lawn coupled with technological advancements that made 
modern agriculture possible, agricultural corporations searching for new outlets for their products, and skilled 
marketers fighting for market shares”).  The truth is, some judicial encounters with “local environmental law” evidence 
a much more sophisticated approach to its context than others.   In Town of Westport v. Connecticut Siting Council,
797 A.2d 655 (Conn. Super. 2001), a state board charged with the siting of cell towers was met by a town’s challenge 
that its chosen site was prejudicial to the town and environmentally harmful.  The reviewing court weighed the 
evidence but ultimately rejected the town’s challenge, chiefly because the town’s proposed alternative site presented 
equal or worse environmental impacts and its only apparent virtue was that it was farther from the town’s view.  Id. at 
666-70.  Not all judicial encounters with such controversies have been as careful to scrutinize claims about 
environmental impacts, true.  See, e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (Mass. 1972) 
(in challenge to the creation of a local “flood plain district” where argument was made that the prime purpose of the 
locality was to prevent development of any kind court rejected challenge flatly concluding that “[t]he validity of this 
by-law does not hinge upon the motives of its supporters”).  But the mixed motives of a local polis demand it.   
271 See PERLMAN & MILDER, supra note 191 at 202-03. 
272 “[T]o the extent that we live an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real 
home is in the wilderness, to just the extent we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we 
actually lead.  We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine to be the most precious 
part—aloof from its entanglements.”  Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, supra note 10, at 81. 
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. in the lap of an immense intelligence.  But that intelligence is dormant and its 
communications are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community 
as its medium.”273 
273 DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS, supra note 104, at 219. 
